Professional vitality and career success: Mediation,age and outcomes

We propose a model that explains the complex phenomenon of successful career at work, and focuses on the antecedents of professional vitality at the workplace. The model sheds light on the role of professional vitality as an essential ingredient for successful careers. Using a survey design, we tested our model with a sample of 545 managers and professionals. The findings suggest effects of career attitudes on career outcomes, mediated by professional vitality. The relationship between professional vitality and age at work environment forms an inverse U shape curve, peaking at age of fifties, an optimistic note for the global aging workforce.     

The Risks of Using Nuclear Energy Sources in Space: Some Lay Activists'Perceptions

A combination of directive and nondirective techniques was used to study the mental models of 30 lay activists regarding the risks of nuclear energy sources in space. Respondents'perceptions were compared with an "expert model" of the processes generating and controlling these risks, in terms of both the substance of their beliefs and several statistical measures of their performance. These analyses revealed a complex pattern of strengths and weaknesses. Their details are used to derive recommendations for formulating messages about these risks.     

Strategic Liquidity Provision in Limit Order Markets

We characterize and prove the existence of Nash equilibrium in a limit order market with a finite number of risk‐neutral liquidity providers. We show that if there is sufficient adverse selection, then pointwise optimization (maximizing in p for each q) in a certain nonlinear pricing game produces a Nash equilibrium in the limit order market. The need for a sufficient degree of adverse selection does not vanish as the number of liquidity providers increases. Our formulation of the nonlinear pricing game encompasses various specifications of informed and liquidity trading, including the case in which nature chooses whether the market‐order trader is informed or a liquidity trader. We solve for an equilibrium analytically in various examples and also present examples in which the first‐order condition for pointwise optimization does not define an equilibrium, because the amount of adverse selection is insufficient.     

Organizational Identity and Legitimacy under Major Environmental Changes: Tales of Two UK Building Societies

We studied how organizational identity (OI) and organizational legitimacy (OL) interplayed within two British building societies during drastic environmental changes over two decades. Four salient phases of environmental changes were identified in the British building society sector over the last two decades (introduction of new regulatory framework, recession, demutualization threats and post‐demutualization era). Comparative analysis of the two firms' responses to the environmental changes found that, employing distinct specific strategies, both firms accorded tremendous attention and efforts to OI narration and re‐narration in order to regain OL. Four properties were identified regarding the interplay between OI narrative and OL: level, locus, mechanism and approach. Our study contributes to the literature by (a) empirically demonstrating the role of the OI/OL interplay in understanding the relationship between organizations and external changes; (b) empirically demonstrating the valence of a narrative approach to OI as a useful perspective to study organizational change and OL; and (c) identifying the role of narrative in leading and directing such changes.     

Information in Securities Markets: Kyle Meets Glosten and Milgrom

This paper analyzes models of securities markets with a single strategic informed trader and competitive market makers. In one version, uninformed trades arrive as a Brownian motion and market makers see only the order imbalance, as in Kyle (1985). In the other version, uninformed trades arrive as a Poisson process and market makers see individual trades. This is similar to the Glosten–Milgrom (1985) model, except that we allow the informed trader to optimize his times of trading. We show there is an equilibrium in the Glosten–Milgrom‐type model in which the informed trader plays a mixed strategy (a point process with stochastic intensity). In this equilibrium, informed and uninformed trades arrive probabilistically, as Glosten and Milgrom assume. We study a sequence of such markets in which uninformed trades become smaller and arrive more frequently, approximating a Brownian motion. We show that the equilibria of the Glosten–Milgrom model converge to the equilibrium of the Kyle model.     

Risk Knowledge and Risk Attitudes Regarding Nuclear Energy Sources in Space

A series of four studies examined the relationship between how much people know about the risks of using nuclear energy sources in space and how they feel about the technology. We found that the more people know, the more favorable they are—except for two groups of people selected from organizations with strong pro-industry or pro-environment positions. These results suggest that a technology will get a more favorable hearing if it can get its message out—providing that it has a legitimate story to tell and that the situation has not become too polarized already. The limits to these conclusions are discussed.