Bureaucratization in the U. S. Department of State*

Very little social scientific research has considered the question of bureaucratization in the individual governmental agency. Departing from an experiment in de-bureaucratization, this article traces the origins of two core components of bureaucracy-hierarchy and rules-in the U. S. Department of State. The discussion emphasizes the interaction between the internal structure of a public organization and two sets of environmental factors: the power setting and the operating environment. It is argued that this interaction produces a high degree of message generation, top-down demands for accountability and control, and bottom-up pressures for clearance and guidance. These conditions lead to a heavy message volume and a high degree of centralization which, in turn, bring on communications overload. Bureaucracy increases as overload is handled through hierarchical differentiation and the proliferation of rules.     

U.S. NARROW MONEY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

This study focuses on sweep programs in establishing conceptually appropriate and reliable measures of narrow money. We propose the aggregates M1RS = M1 + holdings of funds swept in retail sweep programs, and M1S = M1RS + holdings of funds swept in commercial demand deposit sweep programs. Based on quarterly observations from 1959:1–2002:4, cointegration tests indicate the existence of long-run relationships between the velocity of M1S and the corresponding opportunity cost of holding money, using either short-term or long-term interest rates. Tests find weaker evidence for M1RS and little support for MZM. (JEL E41 , G21 )     

Beyond Transparency: Information Overload and a Model for Intelligibility

The role and evaluation of the modern corporation is being challenged by multiple stakeholders, changing markets and public expectations. Unfortunately, corporate governance, regulation and accounting have played a prominent role in business failure for the past decade resulting in a growing lack of public confidence in our markets. We present a new model that contributes to improving the quality of corporate information by providing not more, but better information through increased intelligibility of overall information, benefiting both the firm and its broad array of stakeholders. It has become apparent that boards, management and regulators have been unable to cope with the rise of business failures by adding increasing layers of regulation that have often served only to exacerbate the complexity and further cloud the transparency of needed information. We have identified a growing number of forward‐thinking firms that have found alternative means to provide betterinformation and strengthen their companies. We offer a stakeholder‐centric model for improving information intelligibility based upon the extensive scope and variety of external input derived from the growing social movement organizations. With the added focus on intelligibility, these groups can help foster greater corporate responsibility, meaningful transparency, increased stakeholder benefits, and improved overall performance of the firm.