On the likelihood of dummy players in weighted majority games

When the number of players is small in a weighted majority voting game, it can occur that one of the players has no influence on the result of the vote, in spite of a strictly positive weight. Such a player is called a “dummy” player in game theory. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the conditions that give rise to such a phenomenon and to compute its likelihood. It is shown that the probability of having a dummy player is surprisingly high and some paradoxical results are observed.     

Nurturing the virtuous circle: Looked After Children's participation in reviews,a cyclical and relational process

Children's participation in decision making of all kinds is of increasing interest across the world as more and more countries seek to comply with Article 12 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. The participation rights of children who are in the care of the state are of particular concern. Recent research in England suggests that Independent Reviewing Officers (IROs) can play a crucial role in ensuring that looked after and accommodated children are able to participate in care planning and review processes. This paper outlines the findings of the first Scottish study to investigate the role of Reviewing Officers in encouraging children's participation in reviews. Surveys were collected from social workers, Reviewing Officers and young people after 69 review meetings as part of an action research study. Follow‐up qualitative interviews were then completed with 10 young people and a focus group held with the five participating Reviewing Officers. The findings suggest that participation in looked after reviews can best be understood as a cyclical and relational process and that taking part in action research may enhance participation practices. While the role of the Reviewing Officer was found to be important, the findings suggest that everyone involved in the care and support of the young person needs to encourage participation processes that are individualized.     

Second degree Pareto dominance

We present and discuss a binary relation aimed at the study of the re-distribution of income. We characterize, in a number of ways, the set of income allocations that can be reached from an initial allocation through a sequence of pair-wise equalizing transfers, where the sequence contains no flow of income from any donor to anyone else who ends up strictly richer than this donor himself ends up at the outcome of the entire sequence. Thanks are due to Peter Lambert and James Mirrlees for their comments. Thon was with the Department of Economics, University of Macau, when some of the work on this paper was done.     

Inequality comparisons when the populations differ in size

This paper considers the problem of comparing two income distributions with different numbers of income recipients. The approach eschews the “replication of populations” of Dalton’s Population Principle which has been a fixture of the literature on income inequality since its inception. We start from a preorder which is a generalization of majorization, construct the “better-than” set and characterize the order-preserving welfare functions in a unified framework. The fixed population case falls off as a particular case.     

Interpersonal Amplification of Risk? Citizen Discussions and Their Impact on Perceptions of Risks and Benefits of a Biological Research Facility

Much risk communication research has demonstrated how mass media can influence individual risk perceptions, but lacks a comprehensive conceptual understanding of another key channel of communication: interpersonal discussion. Using the social amplification of risk as a theoretical framework, we consider the potential for discussions to function as amplification stations. We explore this possibility using data from a public opinion survey of residents living in potential locations for a new biological research facility in the United States. Controlling for a variety of key information variables, our results show that two dimensions of discussion—frequency and valence—have impacts on residents’ perceptions of the facility's benefits and its risks. We also explore the possibility that an individual's overall attitude moderates the effect of discussion on their perceptions of risks and benefits. Our results demonstrate the potential for discussions to operate as amplifiers or attenuators of perceptions of both risks and benefits.     

Consistency of a class of information criteria for model selection in non-linear regression

In this paper we prove the consistency in probability of a class of generalized BIC criteria for model selection in non-linear regression, by using asymptotic results of Gallant. This extends a result obtained by Nishii for model selection in linear regression.     

On the voting power of an alliance and the subsequent power of its members

Even, and in fact chiefly, if two or more players in a voting game have on a binary issue independent opinions, they may have interest to form a single voting alliance giving an average gain of influence for all of them. Here, assuming the usual independence of votes, we first study the alliance voting power and obtain new results in the so-called asymptotic limit for which the number of players is large enough and the alliance weight remains a small fraction of the total of the weights. Then, we propose to replace the voting game inside the alliance by a random game which allows new possibilities. The validity of the asymptotic limit and the possibility of new alliances are examined by considering the decision process in the Council of Ministers of the European Union.     

Le marché a dit. Intermédiaires financiers et managers dans le secteur électrique

The role played in the electricity industry by finance analysts, consultants and rating agencies has received too little attention in research on the liberalization of technical networks. Three arguments are brought forward. First of all, despite any rational argumentation, these intermediaries must be seen as ordinary actors with their interests, drawbacks and cognitive limits. Secondly, they have played an important part in transforming what used to be a tightly regulated industry. Their power mainly derives from their ability to influence the definition of the “right” policies and the production of information prior to decision-making. It takes the concrete form of an oligopoly power over two basic links in the information flow: big operations in the capital market and the ability to make comparisons between firms, sectors and countries and thus recommend the “right” allocation of resources. Thirdly, this quite real power does not have mechanical effects since it reflects a state of equilibrium within the firm, as the case of Suez proves. The relation between markets and firms is more interactive that it seems at first glance.