Angelic Belief as American Folk Religion1

Belief in angels and their intervention in the material world is prevalent in the United States. Theoretically, the concept of folk religion offers an instructive lens into the popularity of these beliefs, which exist inside, outside, and across official religious doctrines, and are therefore able to transcend the boundaries of specific religious traditions by appealing to a diverse array of believers. Empirical analyses from a recent national survey support the application of the concept of folk religion, demonstrating that these beliefs are present in substantial proportions across disparate subgroups. Belief in angelic intervention is prevalent among conservative and “mainline” Protestants, Catholics, those with high levels of conventional religious practice, biblical literalists, and even those who strongly believe in “paranormal” phenomena such as Bigfoot and ESP. Belief in angels and claims of angelic protection provide compelling and flexible narratives, ready cognitive attributions, and emotional comfort. Consequently, these views have strong memetic appeal and are transposable into multifarious subcultures.     

A new mixed first-order integer-valued autoregressive process with Poisson innovations

AStA Advances in Statistical Analysis - Integer-valued time series, seen as a collection of observations measured sequentially over time, have been studied with deep notoriety in recent years, with...     

American families: trends and correlates

Discussion focused on the nature of the roles of the family, a review of the major demographic changes (marriage, cohabitation, nonfamily households, remarriage, fertility, teenage pregnancy, and female employment) affecting the American family in the past decades, and the nature of the impact on women, men, and children. There were four major trends identified: 1) increased proportions of children living in single-parent families due to high rates of divorce and increased childbearing outside of marriage; 2) increased proportions of adults in nontraditional living arrangements; 3) increased female labor force participation during all stages of the life cycle; and 4) decreased proportions of children and increased proportions of older people out of total population due to declining mortality and fertility rates. Family formation arises out of childbearing and childrearing roles, the need for companionship and emotional support, and the opportunities for specialization and trade, and the economies of scale. The costs of family living may include the potential for disagreement, conflict, loss of privacy, and time and money. There were a number of reasons identified for not maintaining traditional families consisting of a married couple with children. The trends were for later age at marriage: 24.4 years in 1992 for women, increased cohabitation (almost 50% cohabiting prior to first marriage in 1985-86), decreased number of married couple households, and increased number of adults in non-family households. The divorce rate has risen over the past 100 years with peaks in the 1970s; the reasons were identified as increased baby boomers and new marriages, increased labor participation of women, and changes in gender roles. The stabilization and slight decline in rates may be due to a natural leveling, the likelihood of greater stability within new marriages, and the aging of the baby boomers. An anticipated increase in divorce rates in the future was also justified. Remarriage rates varied by gender, age at separation/divorce, presence of children, race/ethnicity, and education. Fertility remained stable at 1.8 during the late 1970s and early 1980s and increased slightly to 2.0 in 1989. IN 1990, there were 25% out-of-wedlock births compared to 5% in 1960. About 12% of births in 1989 were to teenagers. There has been an increase in female-headed households, the median income of which in 1992 was $13,012, or 33% of married couple income.     

How female education affects reproductive behavior in urban Pakistan

Although Pakistan remains in a pretransitional stage (contraceptive prevalence of only 11.9% among married women in 1992), urban women with post-primary levels of education are spearheading the gradual move toward fertility transition. Data collected in the city of Karachi in 1987 were used to determine whether the inverse association between fertility and female education is attributable to child supply variables, demand factors, or fertility regulation costs. Karachi, with its high concentration of women with secondary educations employed in professional occupations, has a contraceptive prevalence rate of 31%. Among women married for less than 20 years, a 10-year increment in education predicts that a woman will average two-fifths of a child less than other women in the previous 5 years. Regression analysis identified 4 significant intervening variables in the education-fertility relationship: marriage duration, net family income, formal sector employment, and age at first marriage. Education appears to affect fertility because it promotes a later age at marriage and thus reduces life-time exposure to the risk of childbearing, induces women to marry men with higher incomes (a phenomenon that either reduces the cost of fertility regulation or the demand for children), leads women to become employed in the formal sector (leading to a reduction in the demand for children), and has other unspecified effects on women's values or opportunities that are captured by their birth cohort. When these intervening variables are held constant, women's attitude toward family planning loses its impact on fertility, as do women's domestic autonomy and their expectations of self-support in old age. These findings lend support to increased investments in female education in urban Pakistan as a means of limiting the childbearing of married women. Although it is not clear if investment in female education would have the same effect in rural Pakistan, such action is important from a human and economic development perspective.     

Fertility and mortality in Finland since 1750

Summary In this paper the development of fertility and mortality in Finland, and their interrelations with each other and with economic factors is discussed. An analysis by individual years shows that rises and falls in mortality and fertility rates did not always coincide with poor and good harvests. Fertility in Finland decreased slightly at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but fell sharply over the period 1876-1925. This fall corresponded closely to changes in the death rate, especially for infants, and appears to justify the conclusion that the changes were connected. These population shifts have been called the first and second demographic transitions, of which the latter was the more dramatic. Factors tending to reduce mortality among infants and in other age groups during the second demographic transition are obvious; those underlying the first demographic transition are less clear. In this connection, the importance of breast feeding and campaigns designed to favour the practice are stressed. These helped to reduce infant mortality and were one of the main reasons for the first demographic transition. Finnish material also suggests that some kind of family planning existed during the pre-industrial period; it is only by making this assumption that the various figures can be made compatible.     

New household projections for the united states

This paper reviews the methods used to prepare the new household projections for the United States that were recently issued by the Bureau of the Census and examines the effect on the resulting number of households of the assumptions made about future marriages and future proportions of household heads in the population.One population projection series was used, since all series are identical for the adult population. Marriage assumptions were generated by assuming various outcomes of the marriage squeeze (defined as the excess of females relative to the number of males in the main ages at marriage in the next few years). Assumptions about proportions of household heads were generated by assuming, in varying degrees, continuation of recent trends in these proportions.Projected changes in marriage and in the proportions of household heads in the population account for one-fourth to one-third of the projected increase in the number of households; the remaining increase is attributable to projected changes in the size and structure of the adult population. Varying the assumed proportions of household heads produces greater differences in the projected total number of households than does varying the marriage assumptions used here. Nevertheless, the various possible outcomes of the marriage squeeze, as represented by the assumptions used, produce significantly different projections of increases in the number of young husband-wife households.The most striking finding is that by 1985, proportions of household heads among the population not "married, spouse present" may well rise to such a level that over the long term, the smaller the number of persons who marry, the larger will be the number of households.     

Historical demography: achievements and prospects

Historical demography as a separate discipline came into existence when family reconstruction was first developed for the analysis of a pre-transition population. This paper assesses the significant achievements made in this field of population studies since then. Attention is also paid to equally significant findings obtained from aggregative analysis based on back projection, and to a large body of research results for the period of the demographic transition. In the last part of the paper, new research directions are discussed. Data issues as well as methodological ones are raised. Special attention is given to newly emerging Asian historical demography where different source materials require different methods and techniques, which in turn are expected to broaden the scope of the so far disproportionality fertility-oriented field. Finally, discussions are extended to economic, cultural and institutional aspects of the subject, with a plea not to isolate demographic analysis from other branches of historical research.     

Buddhist factors in population growth and control A survey based on Thailand and Ceylon *

Abstract Although Buddist doctrine and institutions do not directly encourage the procreation of children, the Buddhist countries of South Asia (for the purposes of this paper, Ceylon, Burma, Thailand and Cambodia) have high fertility rates. The first half of this paper is devoted to examining possible reasons for this: particularly, whether there are non-Buddhist factors which produce high fertility and outweigh the negative Buddhist attitude, or whether there are less obvious factors within the structure of Buddhist culture which tend to produce high fertility indirectly; this preliminary review of evidence favours the latter explanation. In the second half of the paper South Asian Buddhist attitudes to policies of population control are examined. While in theory there is no Buddhist opposition to family planning, apart from the general Buddhist rejection of abortion, some differences of attitude towards other methods are observable between Ceylon and Thailand, the Buddhist opposition to contraception being stronger in the former than in the latter. It is suggested that the differences in attitude may be due to the larger proportion of non-Buddhists in the population of Ceylon than in Thailand, although the opposition is expressed in primarily doctrinal terms.