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Coordination games often have multiple equilibria. The selection of equilibrium raises the question of belief formation: how do players generate beliefs about the behavior of other players? This article takes the view that the answer lies in history, that is, in the outcomes of similar coordination games played in the past, possibly by other players. We analyze a simple model in which a large population plays a game that exhibits strategic complementarities. We assume a dynamic process that faces different populations with such games for randomly selected values of a parameter. We introduce a belief formation process that takes into account the history of similar games played in the past, not necessarily by the same population. We show that when history serves as a coordination device, the limit behavior depends on the way history unfolds, and cannot be determined from a-priori considerations. 相似文献
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Itzhak Gilboa Larry Samuelson David Schmeidler 《Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society》2014,82(4):1405-1442
We argue that the notion of Pareto dominance is not as compelling in the presence of uncertainty as it is under certainty. In particular, voluntary trade based on differences in tastes is commonly accepted as desirable, because tastes cannot be wrong. By contrast, voluntary trade based on incompatible beliefs may indicate that at least one agent entertains mistaken beliefs. We propose and characterize a weaker, No‐Betting, notion of Pareto domination which requires, on top of unanimity of preference, the existence of shared beliefs that can rationalize such preference for each agent. 相似文献
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This paper offers a model of individual well-being that takes into account cognitive factors. It postulates that individuals
compare payoffs to aspiration levels. The latter are determined by past experiences (adaptation), by other people's performance
(interpersonal comparison), as well as by reasoning (justifications and excuses). We axiomatize a measure of well-being defined
on real-valued vectors of various lengths. It is a linear combination of differences between payoffs and aspiration levels,
where the aspiration level at each instance is a linear function of past payoffs.
Received: 3 April 1998/Accepted: 23 March 1999 相似文献
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Itzhak Gilboa Fabio Maccheroni Massimo Marinacci David Schmeidler 《Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society》2010,78(2):755-770
A decision maker (DM) is characterized by two binary relations. The first reflects choices that are rational in an “objective” sense: the DM can convince others that she is right in making them. The second relation models choices that are rational in a “subjective” sense: the DM cannot be convinced that she is wrong in making them. In the context of decision under uncertainty, we propose axioms that the two notions of rationality might satisfy. These axioms allow a joint representation by a single set of prior probabilities and a single utility index. It is “objectively rational” to choose f in the presence of g if and only if the expected utility of f is at least as high as that of g given each and every prior in the set. It is “subjectively rational” to choose f rather than g if and only if the minimal expected utility of f (with respect to all priors in the set) is at least as high as that of g. In other words, the objective and subjective rationality relations admit, respectively, a representation à la Bewley (2002) and à la Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). Our results thus provide a bridge between these two classic models, as well as a novel foundation for the latter. 相似文献