Flipping and ex post aggregation

We show that Bayesian ex post aggregation is unstable with respect to refinements. Suppose a group of Bayesians use ex post aggregation. Since it is a joint problem, each agent's problem is captured by the same model, but probabilities and utilities may vary. If they analyze the same situation in more detail, their refined analysis should preserve their preferences among acts. However, ex post aggregation could bring about a preference reversal on the group level. Ex post aggregation thus depends on how much information is used and may keep oscillating (“flipping”) as one keeps adding more information. Received: 16 April 2002/Accepted: 27 May 2002     

On strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores: A converse result

In a general model of indivisible good allocation, S?nmez (1999) established that, whenever the core is nonempty for each preference profile, if an allocation rule is strategy-proof, individually rational and Pareto optimal, then the rule is a selection from the core correspondence, and the core correspondence must be essentially single-valued. This paper studies the converse claim of this result. I demonstrate that whenever the preference domain satisfies a certain condition of `richness', if the core correspondence is essentially single-valued, then any selection from the core correspondence is strategy-proof (even weakly coalition strategy-proof, in fact). In particular, on the domain of preferences in which each individual has strict preferences over his own assignments and there is no consumption externality, such an allocation rule is coalition strategy-proof. And on this domain, coalition strategy-proofness is equivalent to Maskin monotonicity, an important property in implementation theory. Received: 22 February 2000/Accepted: 22 January 2002 I am grateful to Ryo-ichi Nagahisa, Shinji Ohseto, Hiroshi Ono, Tomoichi Shinotsuka and Shigehiro Serizawa for valuable comments. And I am indebted to two anonymous referees for useful suggestions. Especially, I owe the present proof of Lemma 2 to one referee. I also thank Yukihiko Funaki, Atsushi Kajii, Mamoru Kaneko, Eiichi Miyagawa, Tatsuyoshi Saijo, Manimay Sengupta, Yves Sprumont, Yoshikatsu Tatamitani, Manabu Toda, Takashi Ui, Takehiko Yamato, Naoki Yoshihara and the participants of the seminars in Hokkaido University, Kansai University, ISER (Osaka University), Otaru University of Commerce and Tsukuba University. All errors are my own responsiblity.     

Integrating Career and Personal Counseling

Career and personal counseling are inextricably intertwined. Career problems have a strong emotional component. Career indecision and procrastination may be better interpreted as zeteophobia, the fear of career exploration. Trait and factor theory pictures career counseling as unrealistically simplistic and leads neophytes to view it as boring. Training all counselors to integrate career and personal counseling would lead to better service for clients.     

Testing for state and local government job queues

Bivariate probit estimates with partial observability identify the factors influencing the worker’s decision to seek a state or local government job and the factors influencing the government’s decision to hire particular workers. The estimates routinely confirm the presence of a local job queue but confirm the presence of a state job queue only when the role of unionization is explicitly recognized. Our results suggest that the net benefits from local and state government employment are greater than those from private sector employment. The estimates also indicate that local governments disproportionately hire racial minorities relative to the local governments’ pool of applicants but indicate no such relationship for state governments. The authors thank Dale Belman, Jugal Ghorai, and Matt Higgins for help on this and related work. We also thank the referee and the editor for useful suggestions.     

Farmers,the Practice of Farming and the Future of Agroforestry: An Application of Bourdieu's Concepts of Field and Habitus

Abstract Agroforestry, the practice of raising crops and trees together in ways that are mutually beneficial, provides farmers with an alternative to more conventional farming practices. In this paper, we apply Bourdieu's concepts of “field” and “habitus” in an attempt to better understand the practice of farming and the role that agroforestry may have in farming systems. Analysis is based on qualitative and quantitative interviews of farmers and other key informants in two regions, Fox‐Wyaconda Watershed in northeast Missouri and Scott County in southeast Missouri. Within the field of farming, farmers emphasized the importance of economic, family and rental relations. Important habitus considerations include different interpretations of what constitutes farming and what constitutes forestry. Based on Bourdieu's theoretical framework, we offer three alternative paths of social change that may lead to more widespread utilization of agroforestry.     

Psychological taxing in Flemish municipalities

We analyse whether the psychological pricing in the private sector has a public sector counterpart in tax policy. Analysing the main theoretical arguments for the existence of price points, and applying them to the public sector, suggests that psychological taxing reveals itself by the use of non-0 ending tax rates. The tax rate endings of the local income taxes, which are set by 308 Flemish municipalities in the fiscal year 1998, suggests the presence of psychological taxing. Non-0 endings occur more frequently in municipalities where demand for public policy is more elastic (and where, therefore, the benefits to the politicians from setting a tax just below a tax point is higher). The pre-tax income inequality and the level of the tax rate positively affect psychological taxing. The latter effect is reinforced in those municipalities where the existing tax rate is above the average tax rate in neighbouring municipalities and below their neighbours’ minimum, although this effect has a limited effect and is offset the further below the minimum the tax is set.     

The dilemma of recognition: Administrative categories and cultural diversity

Governments around the world combat inequality by means of group-specific redistribution. Some pursue redistribution that benefits groups, but also wish to avoid accentuating or even recognizing group distinctions. This poses a dilemma that they try to resolve by adjusting the category system used to target redistribution. There are three types of adjustment: accommodation (the multicultural approach), denial (the ideal-typical liberal solution), and replacement (a compromise). In replacement the targets of redistributive policies are constructed to avoid accentuation or recognition of inconvenient group distinctions, but still allow redistribution that benefits these groups. Replacement is increasingly in demand around the world because the disadvantages of multiculturalism are becoming apparent while denial is hard to sustain in the face of group inequality. The actual effect of replacement is little researched and less understood, however. Does it resolve the dilemma of recognition? Two examples–India and Nigeria–where replacement has been tried ever since the 1950s cast doubt on its viability.