Firm‐level Consequences of Large Minimum‐wage Increases in the Czech and Slovak Republics

Abstract. After an initial decline in the level of real minimum‐wage rates, there were series of unusually large increases in their levels — 70 and 50 per cent — during the years 1999–2002 in the Czech and Slovak Republics, respectively. Using information from matched employee–employer data sets, we look at the impact of minimum‐wage hikes on both wages and employment. Our results suggest that there are some, but not substantial, job losses in reaction to minimum‐wage hikes and that the impact on firm wages is rather large, implying that further increases of similar magnitude might very well have negative consequences for employment.     

基于专利引用的国际性技术外溢实证研究

采用专利跨国引用作为国际性技术外溢的代理变量,基于美国国家经济研究局专利引用数据库分析中国发明专利技术的现状和特征;依据该数据库中6大类36个专利的细分类别,计算1985年～1999年中国与11个创新型国家(地区)的技术相似度;运用技术知识存量替代技术知识流量,测算中国1985年～2004年的对外技术依存度,综合分析技术相似性、对外技术依存度、地理距离和语言等因素对中国通过专利引用获取国际性外溢技术的影响,利用负二项回归方法对影响中国专利引用的相关因素进行计量研究。研究结果表明,技术相似度与跨国专利引用之间不存在显著性正相关关系,对外技术依存度、语言差异均与跨国专利引用显著负相关,地理距离与跨国专利引用显著正相关。     

以美国为参照的国际性技术外溢的经济效果研究

首先,以影响母国技术溢出和东道国吸收同化的8项指标为主要依据,使用因子分析法对26个选定国家进行综合排序,并选取了基于美国技术外溢的11个主要接受国.其次,在对技术知识存量和技术同化能力的度量方法进行描述后,将美国单独作为技术溢出方,测算了11个主要接受国通过进口贸易、FDI和人员交流3种无形(直接)外溢渠道,从美国吸收的外溢技术知识存量.最后,将11个主要接受国从美国吸收的知识存量总和的面板数据纳入广义Cobb-Douglas生产函数中进行研究.结果显示,美国的国际性技术外溢在各国经济发展中发挥了积极的作用.     

Wertschöpfungspotenziale und strategische Implikationen einer Öffnung von Informationsressourcen – Phänomenologie und ein Bezugsrahmen

For some years, companies have successfully harnessed the value-creation potential of external resources by opening up their information resources, thus increasing considerably the value of their own resources. Corresponding phenomena, however, cannot be explained by common resource-based approaches. By providing a structure, our article contributes to a deeper understanding of this issue. We develop a framework, grounded in the Resource-Based View, that differentiates phenomena of opening up information resources between two dimensions: (1) access and (2) control. Our analysis motivates an extended view of information resources management that also accounts for enterprise-external resources. We conceptualize this view as the “management of information spheres,” highlighting the need for further research in the field of value creation related to external resources.     

双边市场中平台企业搭售行为分析

搭售是现实中双边平台企业常用的促销策略之一。通过构建一个两阶段完全信息动态博弈模型,将买方分为搭售喜好型和搭售无差异型,从垄断和竞争两种情形研究了双边平台企业采取搭售策略时,具有不同搭售偏好的买方对最优均衡解的影响以及相应的社会福利变化。研究发现:不论是垄断情形还是竞争情形,搭售对买卖双方均衡进入价格的影响都不确定,而搭售产品的定价则按照传统单边市场的定价方式制定;垄断情形下,搭售能增加买方数量、卖方数量及双边平台企业的利润,而竞争情形下,搭售产品成本较小的双边平台企业将获得较大买方数量、卖方数量及利润。在两种情形下的买方总效用、卖方总效用以及社会总福利均随搭售喜好型买方数量的增加而增加。     

工程质量政府监督多层次利益分配与激励协同机制探究

The implementation of the government supervision of the quality of the project is an international practice. The basic form of government supervision of engineering quality is government supervision on the quality behavior of the engineering main bodies and its results by the competent government department entrusted. Its essence is a dual principal-agent process. The frequent accidents of the engineering quality reflect the loss and failure of the government law enforcement supervision of the engineering quality to some extent. Its root lies in the lack of endogenous power in the law enforcement supervision of the project quality government supervisors in the law enforcement supervision. Therefore, the incentive coordination mechanism of the government supervision based on the multi-level interest distribution is worth explored. In views of the multi-level management system which is formed by the government departments, government quality supervision organizations, quality supervision team (or group) for the government supervision of engineering quality. The benefit distribution function between every party is constructed, and the game model of the multi-level incentive and coordination for the government supervision in engineering quality is built. To solve and deduce from the first stage of the cooperative game and the second stage of the non-cooperative game, the cooperative game can obtain the reward coefficient: . The coordination degree of the best effort can be obtained by the non cooperative game. The result shows that:the coordination degree of government engineering quality supervisor is related to the coordination costs, and had nothing to do with fixed costs. The benefit distribution coefficient not only depends on the efforts of the quality government monitors, but also on the efficiency of other parties' efforts. The quality supervisors of the project will also focus on the coordination with other parties when enhancing their management capabilities to improve the overall performance of project quality government supervision. The strategy of the incentive coordination mechanism for the supervision and cooperation of the project quality government is:the government quality supervision team should set up the supervisory team properly, improve the coordination efficiency and reduce the cost of supervision-coordination to maximize the value of self-motivation. Quality supervision team (or group) should establish the partnership to improve the coordination efficiency for achieving the maximization of their own incentive value.The model and conclusion of incentive synergy mechanism based on multi-level benefit allocation mechanism are researched. It can provide theoretical support and practice reference for the market governance and supervision of general public goods.     

非线性货币政策规则、通胀预期与不确定性

逆序构建了 LSTＲ-NLＲE 模型, 并利用 2000． I ～ 2016． III 的季度数据对我国 LSTＲ 货币 政策规则的非线性与非对称性、最优阈值、阈值和转移速度对不确定性的影响进行了实证研 究． 逆序建模表明,对于 LSTＲ-NLＲE 系统, 若使最优非线性货币政策规则具有 LSTＲ 的形式, 则非线性菲利普斯曲线具有指数形式． 实证研究表明: 我国货币政策呈现非线性与非对称特 征, 且我国通胀预期的阈值与通胀波动幅度相关, 当通胀波动较大时, 通胀预期的阈值较高, 2000． I ～ 2011． III 的阈值为 3% , 当通胀呈趋势变化且波动较小时, 通胀预期的阈值较低, 2011． IV ～ 2016． III 的阈值为 2． 33% ． 同时,合理的通胀目标( 区间) 对非线性货币政策调整至 关重要． 进一步,我国货币政策不确定性效应受阈值影响较大,受转移速度影响较小． 在高机制 状态下,LSTＲ 规则更易稳定产出,但却易导致通胀不确定性; 在低机制状态下,LSTＲ 规则不仅 有较长滞后期,而且易导致产出不确定性,但却更易稳定通胀． 中央银行应依据稳定产出和通 胀的意愿程度,来管理通胀预期: 如果中央银行更倾向于稳定产出, 则应使通胀预期位于阈值 水平之上,以使货币政策处于高机制状态; 如果中央银行更倾向于稳定通胀, 则应使通胀预期 位于阈值水平之下,以使货币政策处于低机制状态．     

探析江苏经济发展变化的源泉:基于SDA的分析

本文采用结构分解分析SDA模型对1990-2005年江苏省经济发展变化的源泉进行了实证研究。主要结论:第一,江苏经济增长长期主要靠消费拉动,中期则更多地依赖投资驱动;第二,技术变化长期对降低三次产业中间消耗需求发挥了显著作用,但中期对第一、第二产业的影响不大;第三,技术进步改善了对绝大多数行业的中间消耗,尤其是对采掘业和资本密集型制造业;第四,消费对现代服务业的促进作用较大,而资本形成对采掘业及部分资本密集型、技术知识密集型行业影响较大;第五,煤炭采选业、电力等行业总产出的变化受制于省际间净调出变化,而服装皮革及其他纤维制品制造业受净出口增加的影响,充分反映出江苏资源、市场两头在外的经济结构特征。     

消费者偏好背景下的买方抗衡势力形成与影响

与以往研究关注产业链内部因素不同,对于厂商利用消费者偏好因素的买方抗衡势力形成机理和影响的研究考虑了市场环境因素作用的买方抗衡势力理论研究新视角。将消费者偏好的市场差异建模为同一产品在不同市场中消费者效用差异,基于外部选择博弈和Hotelling博弈的基本原理,构建综合反映上、下游厂商纵向关系和市场内厂商间横向关系的博弈模型。对下游厂商跨市场并购前后均衡结果的变化进行考察,得到下游厂商利用消费者偏好特征形成自身买方抗衡势力的机理以及该行为对厂商本身和竞争对手谈判势力、收益水平和规模带来的影响。研究结果表明,存在消费者偏好差异的市场间厂商并购行为不仅可以提升合并厂商自身买方抗衡势力和收益,也不会对竞争对手造成负面影响,甚至可以提高部分竞争对手的买方抗衡势力、收益和规模,产生与水岸效应相反的结果。同时,对均衡结果进行福利分析,表明下游厂商的并购行为将提高总产业利润,但会降低消费者剩余和社会福利。     

管理者行为对矿工不安全行为的影响关系研究

矿工不安全行为主要受管理者行为的影响,将管理者行为分为设计行为和管理行为,在文献研究和对管理者进行调查分析的基础上,构建以矿工的安全知识和安全动机为中介变量、从管理者行为到矿工服从性行为和参与性行为的理论模型,运用偏最小二乘法的结构方程模型对来自5个煤矿691份矿工的调查问卷进行分析,研究管理者的设计行为和管理行为对矿工不安全行为的影响作用.研究结果表明,管理者的管理行为对矿工的安全知识和安全动机都有显著影响,设计行为需要通过管理行为才能显著影响矿工的安全知识和安全动机;矿工的安全动机和安全知识分别显著影响其服从性行为和参与性行为.研究结论对管理者的矿工不安全行为管理工作具有理论参考价值.