Ageing and the labor market

Generation size and structure may have substantial effects on the labor market. This perspective is crucial for the German economy which is one of the most rapidly ageing societies. The paper studies the effects of relative cohort size and relative cohort age on unemployment. The time-series analysis employs cointegration techniques to discriminate between short-run and long-run developments. The econometric investigations suggest that in the long-run, there is no sufficient evidence that young cohorts experience higher unemployment rates if their cohort size is relatively high. In the short-run, there is in general a positive impact of relative cohort size and relative cohort age on unemployment.Revised version of Discussion Paper No. 90-25, University of Munich. A first draft of this paper was written, when I was visiting CentER, Tilburg University. I wish to thank Sijbren Cnossen, John De New, Horst Krämer, Walter Krämer, Winfried Schmahl, Christoph M. Schmidt, Bernard M. S. van Praag, Michael R. Veall, Jürgen Wolters, the participants of the ISPE-conference and three referees of this journal for helpful comments, John De New, Lucie Merkle and Martin Milhleisen for able research assistance, and the German Science Foundation (DFG) for financial support. The paper has also benefited from a research visit to Université Catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve.     

On Stalnaker's Notion of Strong Rationalizability and Nash Equilibrium in Perfect Information Games

Counterexamples to two results by Stalnaker (Theory and Decision, 1994) are given and a corrected version of one of the two results is proved. Stalnaker's proposed results are: (1) if at the true state of an epistemic model of a perfect information game there is common belief in the rationality of every player and common belief that no player has false beliefs (he calls this joint condition strong rationalizability), then the true (or actual) strategy profile is path equivalent to a Nash equilibrium; (2) in a normal-form game a strategy profile is strongly rationalizable if and only if it belongs to C , the set of profiles that survive the iterative deletion of inferior profiles.     

Strategy-proof division with single-peaked preferences and individual endowments

We consider the problem of (re)allocating the total endowment of an infinitely divisible commodity among agents with single-peaked preferences and individual endowments. We propose an extension of the so-called uniform rule and show that it is the unique rule satisfying Pareto optimality, strategy-proofness, reversibility, and an equal-treatment condition. The resulting rule turns out to be peaks-only and individually rational: the allocation assigned by the rule depends only on the peaks of the preferences, and no agent is worse off than at his individual endowment. Received: 8 September 1995/Accepted: 30 October 1996     

The optimum growth rate for population reconsidered

This article gives exact general conditions for the existence of an interior optimum growth rate for population in the neoclassical two-generations-overlapping model. In an economy where high (low) growth rates of population lead to a growth path that is efficient (inefficient), there always exists an interior optimum growth rate for population. In all other cases, there exists no interior optimum. The Serendipity Theorem, however, does, in general, not hold in an economy with government debt. Moreover, the growth rate for population that leads an economy with debt to a golden rule allocation can never be optimal.      

Das deutsche Produktionsmodell unter dem Druck des Shareholder Value

The industrial restructuring of the 1990s has a twofold character. The wide reception of different modes of direct participation during the first half of the 1990s was followed by a much more restrictive development in the second half of the decade. More shareholder value-oriented forms of corporate governance encourage cyclical changes of management orientation resulting from the structural contradictions of a flexible and market-oriented form of corporate organisation. Contrary to the beginning of reorganization when shareholder value-orientation had the effect of a catalyst for the introduction of direct participation, both orientations led to a dramatic reduction of long time compromises (between employers and employees) in the second half of the 1990s. The introduction of a more shareholder value-oriented governance has led to the completion of a market-centred mode of control, which has become the decisive binding element within a new configuration of management principles and industrial relations. This development is empirically examined in a study undertaken between 1993 and 2000 in 36 companies of the automobile, electronic, supplier and machine tool industry as well as in the data processing branch.     

Target Rules for Public Choice Economies on Tree Networks and in Euclidean Spaces

We consider the problem of choosing the location of a public facility either (a) on a tree network or (b) in a Euclidean space. (a) (1996) characterize the class of target rules on a tree network by Pareto efficiency and population-monotonicity. Using Vohra's (1999) characterization of rules that satisfy Pareto efficiency and replacement-domination, we give a short proof of the previous characterization and show that it also holds on the domain of symmetric preferences. (b) The result obtained for model (a) proves to be crucial for the analysis of the problem of choosing the location of a public facility in a Euclidean space. Our main result is the characterization of the class of coordinatewise target rules by unanimity, strategy-proofness, and either replacement-domination or population-monotonicity.     

Participation in Decision-making at the Plant Level: Reflections on the German Experience

Plant level participation because of its location offers larger opportunities to influence decisions than participation on the job but falls short of providing access to company decision arenas. Legal institutional regulations become important because of the specific characteristics of this kind of involvement in decision-making of dependent labor. Therefore the German Framework is described and discussed with democratic conceptual, social science and new institutional economics perspectives in mind. The findings show the restrictions of plant level participation but—at least for the German case—indicate that differences in interest tend to be expressed and modify decisions. An evaluation of effects on business activities nevertheless does not indicate systematic disadvantageous economic consequences, there might even be positive results in terms of efficiency and effectiveness.     

Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples

We consider two-sided matching markets with couples. First, we extend a result by Klaus and Klijn (J Econ Theory 21: 75–106, 2005, Theorem 3.3) and show that for any weakly responsive couples market, there always exists a “double stable” matching, i.e., a matching that is stable for the couples market and for any associated singles market. Second, we show that for weakly responsive couples markets, the associated stable correspondence is (Maskin) monotonic and Nash implementable. In contrast, the correspondence that assigns all double stable matchings is neither monotonic nor Nash implementable.