Doctor/politician. Physicians often shocked by political reality

What motivates doctors to get into politics? Some say it's a broader sense of accomplishment--helping not only patients, but society as a whole. Learn how some doctor/politicians got into the game, and what they're learning as they play it.     

The South Oaks Gambling Screen: a review with reference to Australian use

The South Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS) is a psychometric instrument widely used internationally to assess the presence of pathological gambling. Developed by Lesieur and Blume (1987) in the United States of America (USA) as a self-rated screening instrument, it is based on DSM-III and DSM-III-R criteria. This paper describes the origins and psychometric development of the SOGS and comments critically in relation to its construct validity and cutoff scores. Reference is made to the use of the SOGS in the Australian setting, where historically gambling has been a widely accepted part of the culture, corresponding to one of the highest rates of legalised gambling and gambling expenditure in the world. An alternative approach to the development of an instrument to detect people who have problems in relation to gambling is proposed.     

The Gambling Self-Efficacy Questionnaire: An Initial Psychometric Evaluation

Instruments to assess individuals' self-efficacy for the control of addictive behaviors have been useful for monitoring behavior change, predicting maintenance of treatment gains, and identifying potential relapse situations. The Gambling Self-Efficacy Questionnaire (GSEQ) was developed to assess perceived self-efficacy to control gambling behavior. A demographically diverse sample of 309 adult gamblers completed an initial set of 42 items, of which 16 were selected to form the final version of the GSEQ. The GSEQ showed high internal consistency ( = .96) and good test-retest reliability (r = .86). A factor analysis provided some support for a unitary factor structure. As expected, GSEQ scores were negatively correlated with reports of problematic gambling behavior. Participants experiencing problems related to their gambling behavior scored significantly lower on the GSEQ than those who were not experiencing gambling problems. This psychometric examination of the GSEQ supported its potential utility for treatment planning and outcome evaluation with problem gamblers.     

Urban Dispersal in Australia

In a recent issue of the Journal, Professor R. E. Lonsdale argued that the relatively successful American experience of decentralization suggests serious difficulties in attempting a comparable programme in Australia. His comparisons, while illuminating many of the problems which must be faced by a realistic regional development policy, are unduly pessimistic in their assessment of the Australian situation. The barriers to urban dispersal in Australia lie less in economic and social conditions than in political attitudes and governmental structures.     

Familism Values,Perspective Taking,and Prosocial Moral Reasoning: Predicting Prosocial Tendencies Among Mexican American Adolescents

Mexican American youth often engage in relatively high levels of prosocial behaviors. We theorize that this may be due to a cultural value system that encourages familism values, which, in turn, may foster the development of sociocognitive processes that promote prosocial behaviors. Two hundred and five Mexican American early adolescent youth (M_age = 10.9 years, SD = 0.84; 51% girls) reported their familism values, perspective taking, prosocial moral reasoning, and six types of prosocial behaviors. The results indicated that perspective taking partially mediated the relation between familism values and the specific prosocial tendencies theoretically linked to the Mexican American culture. The study demonstrated the utility of integrating cultural and traditional developmental mechanisms in attempting to explain prosocial behaviors.     

“THE WAR FOR THE FARE”: HOW DRIVER COMPENSATION AFFECTS BUS SYSTEM PERFORMANCE

Prior to 2007, two systems of bus driver compensation coexisted in Santiago, Chile: one paid drivers per passenger transported, while the other paid a fixed wage. Per‐passenger drivers engaged in “The War for the Fare,” altering their driving patterns to compete for passengers. Examining these systems on similar routes in Santiago, we observed two key findings. Compared with the fixed‐wage system, the per‐passenger system leads to (1) 13% shorter passenger wait times, via reduced bunching of buses and (2) 67% more accidents per kilometer driven, via more aggressive driving. We discuss implications for the design of incentives in public transit. (JEL L92, M52, R41)