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951.
The proliferation of innovative and exciting information technology applications that target individual “professionals” has made the examination or re‐examination of existing technology acceptance theories and models in a “professional” setting increasingly important. The current research represents a conceptual replication of several previous model comparison studies. The particular models under investigation are the Technology Acceptance Model (TAM), the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB), and a decomposed TPB model, potentially adequate in the targeted healthcare professional setting. These models are empirically examined and compared, using the responses to a survey on telemedicine technology acceptance collected from more than 400 physicians practicing in public tertiary hospitals in Hong Kong. Results of the study highlight several plausible limitations of TAM and TPB in explaining or predicting technology acceptance by individual professionals. In addition, findings from the study also suggest that instruments that have been developed and repeatedly tested in previous studies involving end users and business managers in ordinary business settings may not be equally valid in a professional setting. Several implications for technology acceptance/adoption research and technology management practices are discussed.  相似文献   
952.
We discuss the identification and estimation of discrete games of complete information. Following Bresnahan and Reiss (1990, 1991), a discrete game is a generalization of a standard discrete choice model where utility depends on the actions of other players. Using recent algorithms to compute all of the Nash equilibria to a game, we propose simulation‐based estimators for static, discrete games. We demonstrate that the model is identified under weak functional form assumptions using exclusion restrictions and an identification at infinity approach. Monte Carlo evidence demonstrates that the estimator can perform well in moderately sized samples. As an application, we study entry decisions by construction contractors to bid on highway projects in California. We find that an equilibrium is more likely to be observed if it maximizes joint profits, has a higher Nash product, uses mixed strategies, and is not Pareto dominated by another equilibrium.  相似文献   
953.
In this paper, we introduce the notion of transferable control, defined as a situation where one party (the principal, say) can transfer control to another party (the agent) but cannot commit herself to do so. One theoretical foundation for this notion builds on the distinction between formal and real authority introduced by Aghion and Tirole, in which the actual exercise of authority may require noncontractible information, absent which formal control rights are vacuous. We use this notion to study the extent to which control transfers may allow an agent to reveal information regarding his ability or willingness to cooperate with the principal in the future. We show that the distinction between contractible and transferable control can drastically influence how learning takes place: with contractible control, information about the agent can often be acquired through revelation mechanisms that involve communication and message‐contingent control allocations; in contrast, when control is transferable but not contractible, it can be optimal to transfer control unconditionally and learn instead from the way in which the agent exercises control. (JEL: C70, C72, D23, L2)  相似文献   
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