State versus Market: Contending Interests in the Struggle to Control French Accounting Standardisation

The paper concerns the struggle between different interest groups to control or significantly influence the objectives, institutional arrangements and processes of French accounting standardisation. Its particular focus of interest is the state agency established to deal with standardisation, namely the National Accounting Council, the Conseil National de la Comptabilité (CNC), and its predecessors. The period addressed spans from 1941 to the present, marked by the first attempt to implement a national accounting code, adoption of the initial post-war code in 1947 and subsequent revisions.The paper identifies and examines the role played by the French state in establishing an institutional structure for accounting standardisation and in seeking to influence operation of that structure as a means to achieve a concertation of diverse social and economic interest groups with an interest in accounting standards. The objective for the process from the viewpoint of the state has been seen as the intended dominance of certain interests of state over other interests, whether public sector or otherwise. In the course of time, the dominant interests of the state have changed in the face of changing expectations about the role of financial accounting and reporting in the financial life of France. The role of the state is seen to have come under increasing pressure from private sector interests in France and externally. Particular attention is given to the 1996–8 major reforms to the CNC and associated new regulatory structure.The possibility is assessed of whether and under what terms the French approach to accounting standardisation can be sustained, grounded as it is in a profound attachment by the state to the values of the Etat colbertiste.     

Biased Bootstrap Methods for Reducing the Effects of Contamination

Contamination of a sampled distribution, for example by a heavy-tailed distribution, can degrade the performance of a statistical estimator. We suggest a general approach to alleviating this problem, using a version of the weighted bootstrap. The idea is to 'tilt' away from the contaminated distribution by a given (but arbitrary) amount, in a direction that minimizes a measure of the new distribution's dispersion. This theoretical proposal has a simple empirical version, which results in each data value being assigned a weight according to an assessment of its influence on dispersion. Importantly, distance can be measured directly in terms of the likely level of contamination, without reference to an empirical measure of scale. This makes the procedure particularly attractive for use in multivariate problems. It has several forms, depending on the definitions taken for dispersion and for distance between distributions. Examples of dispersion measures include variance and generalizations based on high order moments. Practicable measures of the distance between distributions may be based on power divergence, which includes Hellinger and Kullback–Leibler distances. The resulting location estimator has a smooth, redescending influence curve and appears to avoid computational difficulties that are typically associated with redescending estimators. Its breakdown point can be located at any desired value ε∈ (0, ½) simply by 'trimming' to a known distance (depending only on ε and the choice of distance measure) from the empirical distribution. The estimator has an affine equivariant multivariate form. Further, the general method is applicable to a range of statistical problems, including regression.     

Signaling to Partially Informed Investors in the Newsvendor Model

We analyze a signaling game between the manager of a firm and an investor in the firm. The manager has private information about the firm's demand and cares about the short‐term stock price assigned by the investor. Previous research has shown that under continuous decision choices and the Intuitive Criterion refinement, the least‐cost separating equilibrium will result, in which a low‐quality firm chooses its optimal capacity and a high‐quality firm over‐invests in order to signal its quality to investors. We build on this research by showing the existence of pooling outcomes in which low‐quality firms over‐invest and high‐quality firms under‐invest so as to provide identical signals to investors. The pooling equilibrium is practically appealing because it yields a Pareto improvement compared to the least‐cost separating equilibrium. Distinguishing features of our analysis are that: (i) we allow the capacity decision to have either discrete or continuous support, and (ii) we allow beliefs to be refined based on either the Undefeated refinement or the Intuitive Criterion refinement. We find that the newsvendor model parameters impact the likelihood of a pooling outcome, and this impact changes in both sign and magnitude depending on which refinement is used.     

Investigating impacts of complex sampling on latent growth curve modelling

We investigate the impacts of complex sampling on point and standard error estimates in latent growth curve modelling of survey data. Methodological issues are illustrated with empirical evidence from the analysis of longitudinal data on life satisfaction trajectories using data from the British Household Panel Survey, a national representative survey in Great Britain. A multi-process second-order latent growth curve model with conditional linear growth is used to study variation in the two perceived life satisfaction latent factors considered. The benefits of accounting for the complex survey design are considered, including obtaining unbiased both point and standard error estimates, and therefore correctly specified confidence intervals and statistical tests. We conclude that, even for the rather elaborated longitudinal data models that were considered, estimation procedures are affected by variance-inflating impacts of complex sampling.     

Do hostile sexual beliefs affect men's perceptions of sexual-interest messages?

This study tested the distorted cognitions component of Hall and Hirschman's (1991) quadripartite model of sexual aggression. Men (N = 107) with and without hostile sexual beliefs viewed erotic slides with a female partner who provided one of four patterns of feedback: clear disinterest, token disinterest, compliant interest, and clear interest. Hostile men reported fewer differences between women, were unresponsive to their partner's perceived embarrassment, and reported a consistent positive mood regardless of her feedback. Conversely, nonhostile men were more responsive to feedback, mirrored the partner's embarrassment, and experienced a less positive mood when she communicated clear disinterest in the erotica. These findings support the distorted cognitions component of the quadripartite model of sexual aggression. The authors also discuss the strengths and limitations of this study's methodology.     

Public Management at the Ballot Box: Performance Information and Electoral Support for Incumbent English Local Governments

Publishing performance information about local public services,an increasing trend in many Organisation for Economic Co-operationand Development countries, matters politically because it hasan effect on incumbent local governments' electoral support.Voters are able to use performance information to punish orreward incumbents in the elections that follow their publication,which may fill a gap in the chain of accountability betweenvoters and governments. We model the introduction of publishedComprehensive Performance Assessments of local authorities inEngland, which make summary information about performance availableto voters, as a "shock" to the relationship between voters andincumbents. Controlling for an unpublicized measure of performancechange over time, change in the local tax level, change in localeconomic conditions, and whether the local incumbent is theparty of the incumbent government at the national level, wefind negativity bias. Incumbents in local authorities in the"poor" performance category experience a substantial reductionin aggregate vote share at the election following publication,but there is no similarly sized reward for those in the highestperformance category.