Characteristics and impact of faked interviews in surveys – An analysis of genuine fakes in the raw data of SOEP

Summary: Panel data offers a unique opportunity to identify data that interviewers clearly faked by comparing data waves. In the German Socio–Economic Panel (SOEP), only 0.5 percent of all records of raw data have been detected as faked. These fakes are used here to analyze the potential impact of fakes on survey results. Due to our central finding the faked records have no impact on the mean or the proportions. However, we show that there may be a serious bias in the estimation of correlations and regression coefficients. In all but one year (1998), the detected faked data have never been disseminated within the widely–used SOEP study. The fakes are removed prior to data release.* We are grateful to participants in the workshop on Item Nonresponse and Data Quality on Large Social Surveys for useful critique and comments, especially Rainer Schnell and our outstanding discussant Regina Riphahn. The usual disclaimer applies.     

Rank- and sign-dependent linear utility models for finite first-order gambles

Finite first-order gambles are axiomatized. The representation combines features of prospect and rank-dependent theories. What is novel are distinctions between gains and losses and the inclusion of a binary operation of joint receipt. In addition to many of the usual structural and rationality axioms, joint receipt forms an ordered concatenation structure with special features for gains and losses. Pfanzagl's (1959) consistency principle is assumed for gains and losses separately. The nonrational assumption is that a gamble of gains and losses is indifferent to the joint receipt of its gains pitted against the status quo and of its losses against the status quo.Reprints may be obtained from either author. Luce's work was supported, in part, by the National Science Foundation grant IRI-8996149 to the University of California, Irvine.     

Organization for technological change

This is the third and last in the series of articles on Planning for Technological Innovation. It deals with change, which is seldom predictable in useful detail. A company can therefore best pursue its vital purpose through a preconditioned opportunism, applied with forcefulness and pertinacity. Since forecasting is difficult, business should be organized for change and a corresponding structure is proposed, institutionalizing a readiness for adaptation. Dynamic or adaptive planning is then tested against an historic case of innovative vigour.     

Wage and nonwage outcomes in collective bargaining: Determinants and tradeoffs

Using unskilled labor wage rates and union contract scores derived from a sample of 500 U.S. manufacturing contracts, this study finds that in 1975 there was considerable variation in unions’ abilities to deliver higher wages and desirable nonwage contractual provisions to their members (though it is clear that the stronger unions have bargained high levels of both wages and nonwage items). There are a variety of union power, employee quality, union preference, and employer cost variables which impact upon the bargaining choices made between wages and nonwage provisions, and it appears that union strength tilts the compensation package toward wages. The authors, associate professors at the University of Illinois, are very grateful to Christopher Pawlowicz, Ronald Seeber, and Roger Wolters for their help in gathering data. They also are grateful to the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Policy, Evaluation and Research of the U.S. Department of Labor and to the Research Board of the University of Illinois for financially supporting this research. Such support in no way implies, however, that the Department or the University endorses the methods or conclusions in this study.     

The marxian theories of value and exploitation axiomatised

The empirical claim made by the marxian theory of value may be made explicit by means of a set-theoretical axiomatisation. The axiomatised theory is seen to be testable, though to have a low degree of testability. The extent to which the theory of exploitation succeeds in revealing an exploitation which would otherwise be concealed is doubtful. The theory of value may be severely tested only by comparing its predictions, if any, with the facts.