THE EFFECT OF TECHNICAL CHANGE ON MARKET STRUCTURE

The paper examines the effects of technical change on market structure. It is found that: 1) the role of independent inventors and small firms is much more important in the early stages of the evolution of a product; 2) the net effect of innovations on entry reverses itself over the product cycle; 3) there is a shift in the importance of various sources of innovation over the product cycle. The two forces which contribute to this result are: 1) a decline in the importance of innovations as technology matures and 2) the proliferation of products adapted to specialized uses.     

Mutual Intention

This paper takes as its starting point the problem of characterizing, in a precise way, situations in which two people collaborate to achieve a common goal. It is suggested that collaboration is normally based on an apparently paradoxical state of mind which I call "mutual intention". Mutual intention is a concept belonging to the same family as Lewis's and Schiffer's "mutual knowledge". These concepts have the paradoxical feature that they require, for their definition, an infinite series of propositions of the form X knows (or intends, or assumes) p, where X is a single agent and p is a proposition. The source of these infinite series is traced, and it is shown that they can be represented in a plausible and enlightening way by means of a recursive notation. Finally, three applications of the concept of "mutual intention" are given: (i) in the semantic analysis of certain sentences with plural subjects; (ii) in the analysis of agreement and related speech acts; and (iii) in the clarification of the phenomenon of "implicit agreement".     

MARKET STRUCTURE AND POLITICAL INFLUENCE: NEW DATA ON POLITICAL EXPENDITURES, ACTIVITY, AND SUCCESS

This paper utilizes new data to evaluate the determinants of the political influence of thirty-five manufacturing industries on the U.S. Congress during 1976–80. Several measures of influence serve to distinguish between political activity and success. Seller concentration and geopolitical dispersion increase both activity and success, but neither industry size nor leading-firm size proves significant. We test whether political expenditures facilitate obtaining the favors conferred on an industry by its market structure or by influence independent of that strurture; statistical inference strongly confirms both roles.     

THE CONTROL OF EXTERNALITIES IN A GROWING URBAN ECONOMY

The received theory of externality control, which implicitly assumes that both the social marginal damage and marginal treatment cost schedules will remain fixed during the time any policy is operative, concludes that an effluent tax and an auction of rights to emit pollutants in the amount of a given emissions standard will be equally efficient in meeting that standard. We show that urban growth causes shifts in both schedules. These shifts in turn substantially increase the welfare loss from a fixed effluent tax relative to that from an auction market with a fixed number of licenses.     

Price Versus Quantity: Market-Clearing Mechanisms When Consumers are Uncertain about Quality

High-quality producers in a market where quality varies can reap superior profits by charging higher prices, selling greater quantities, or both. Empirical analyses of the mutual fund and automobile industries show that high-quality producers sell more units than their low-quality competitors, but at no higher price (or retail markup) per unit. Our theoretical models find that if qualities are known by consumers and production costs are constant, then having a higher quality secures the producer both higher price and higher quantity. The market may clear in a different fashion if there is "quality uncertainty"; that is, if some consumers can discern quality but others cannot. Then, high- and low-quality producers may end up setting a common price, which allows the high-quality producer to sell substantially more. In this context, quality begets quantity.     

The ties that bind: the role of migrants in the uneven geography of international telephone traffic

Recent work suggests that migrants have been a major driving force in the dramatic growth of international telephony over recent decades, accounting for large rises in telephone calls between countries with strong immigrant/emigrant connections. Yet, the existing literature has done a poor job of evaluating the substantive importance of migrants in explaining large disparities in levels of bilateral voice traffic observed between different countries. It has also failed to go very far in examining how domestic and relational factors moderate (namely amplify or attenuate) the influence of migrant stocks on international calling. Our contribution addresses these gaps in the literature. For a sample, which includes a far larger number of countries than previous studies, we show that, together with shorter‐term visitors, bilateral migrant stocks emerge as the relational variable with one of the substantively largest influences over cross‐national patterns of telephone calls. We also find that the effect of bilateral migrant stocks on inter‐country telephone traffic is greater where the country pairs are richer and more spatially distant from one another.