Colonialization and community: Implications for first nations development

First Nations' communities have been a major focus for the longhistory of colonial action in Canada. The results have beendisastrous for Native cultural, identity and pride. Four majorcommunity institutions – political, economic, religiousand educational and the family – have been devastated.This has robbed Aboriginal Nations of their identity and theirsense that they have the ability effectively to manage theirenvironments and has contributed significantly to their disadvantagedposition within Canada. If community development is to be utilized in First Nationscommunities, four objectives must be addressed: (1) strengtheningcommunity traditions and culture; (2) development of culturallyappropriate community-based organizations; (3) reflection onthe importance of land for local communities; (4) the forgingof links between local and national issues.     

Immigrants' Language Skills and Visa Category1

This article is concerned with the determinants of English language proficiency among immigrants in a longitudinal survey for Australia. It focuses on both visa category and variables derived from an economic model of the determinants of destination‐language proficiency among immigrants. Skills‐tested and economic immigrants have the greatest proficiency shortly after immigration, followed by family‐based visa recipients, with refugees having the lowest proficiency. Other variables the same, these differences disappear by 3.5 years after immigration for speaking skills; and although they diminish, they persist longer for reading and writing skills. The variables generated from the model of destination‐language proficiency (such as schooling and age at migration) are, in part, predictions of visa category, but they are more important statistically for explaining proficiency.     

Joint impact of multiple observations on a subset of variables in multiple linear regression

In multiple linear regression analysis, each observation affects the fitted regression equation differently and has varying influences on the regression coefficients of the different variables. Chatterjee & Hadi (1988) have proposed some measures such as DSSE_ij (Impact on Residual Sum of Squares of simultaneously omitting the ith observation and the jth variable), F_j (Partial F-test for the jth variable) and F_j(i) (Partial F-test for the jth variable omitting the ith observation) to show the joint impact and the interrelationship that exists among a variable and an observation. In this paper we have proposed more extended form of those measures DSSE_IJ, F_J and F_J(I) to deal with the interrelationships that exist among the multiple observations and a subset of variables by monitoring the effects of the simultaneous omission of multiple variables and multiple observations.     

How can David orchestrate resources to enhance firm performance? A dynamic approach to coping with resource constraints

Given that the possession of abundant resources does not always guarantee superior firm performance, this study proposes a dynamic approach to enhancing firm value. Building on the resource orchestration thesis, we investigate how firms facing resource constraints enhance their capabilities over time by orchestrating resources and how this resource orchestration can play a role in improving firm performance. Using the dynamic perspective, this study identifies four resource orchestration modes, which are specified based on how a given firm dynamically allocates its resources to technology (enacted by R&D activities) and marketing (enacted by advertising activities). Accordingly, we claim that firms with resource constraints can enhance their performance by escalating or altering their resources over time. To test our hypotheses, we used a sample of 4078 small and medium-sized enterprises in manufacturing industries between 1984 and 2018. We found that focus escalation for technology positively affects firm performance, captured by Tobin's q, and that focus alternation toward either technology or market is positively related to firm performance. Finally, we discuss the theoretical and practical implications of our findings.     

Assaultive behavior. Does provocation begin in the front office?

1. Provocation is an important risk predictor because these issues can be recognized, assessed, and appropriate interventions can be implemented to reduce the associated risks. It is only by the reduction of such "non-fixed" risk factors that any reduction of assaults can be accomplished. 2. Involuntary admission, patients with dementia or organic brain disorder, physical or verbal limits, staff attitude, denial of the possibility of assaults, and the educational level and clinical experience of the staff may help provoke an assaultive episode. 3. An important step is assessing the assault to identify provocation due to certain medical causes, and to document the extent of degeneration in patients with dementia or organic brain disorder. Medical intervention would be indicated and would appropriately address the causes of some violent episodes.     

Who Pays? Can We Pay Them Back?

This chapter is about a very old question that is thrown up again in discussion related to ANT. Do orders have necessary limits to what can belong to them? It is possible to read ANT as containing or demanding a moral commitment to the inclusion of the disenfranchised. It can often seem to be in the business of giving credit where credit is due, spreading recognition to even the most unexpected quarters. To sustain itself such a morality would depend on the possibility of infinite inclusion. By identifying this picture of 'belonging-by-assemblage' and its traditional counterpart 'belonging-by-banishment' and by finding both at play within ANT, the papers argues that ANT is an ethical rather than a moral enterprise, bringing the unanswered question of the nature of belonging to bear across domains, rather than approaching each domain with a 'cookie-cutter' moral formula. The disturbing 'unsecuring' of belonging that ANT involves continues within the philosophical tradition ANT trades on and contributes to in the form of an abiding controversy over the place of the natural world.     

Sex preference versus number preference: the case of Korea

The author argues that the effect of sex preference must be disentangled from the effect of number preference in Korea. This study tests--with hazard models--the effect of the number of previous children on the next birth according to the sex composition of previous children. Data were obtained from the 1974 Korean Fertility Survey. This paper also analyzes the timing of childbearing in recent periods in order to determine whether replacement-level fertility is temporary or permanent. The ideal number of children declined from 3.9 children in 1965 to 2.1 in 1991. The age-specific fertility rates for ages 20-24 years declined rapidly during the late 1980s. The fertility rates among women aged 25-29 years and 30-34 years increased during 1985-90. The proportion of fertility among women aged 20-29 years increased from 67.9% in 1975 to 86.6% in 1984. Women born in the late baby boom period of the late 1950s to mid-1960s reached prime reproductive age during the late 1980s and 1990s, but the crude birth rate remained about the same during 1985-92. A higher percentage of women (22.4%) born during 1955-59 remained single in 1990. During 1960-90, the percentage of women aged 20-24 years who were married declined. These trends indicate later age at childbearing and an explanation for the temporary nature of below-replacement fertility in the late 1980s. Korean women did not want to have more than 2 children, and the interval between first and second births increased since 1985. Among pregnancies of parity 2 conceived since 1985, over 90% of women with at least one son ended subsequent pregnancies by abortion compared to only 59% without sons. Hazard models of 1974 data reveal that son preference had an important effect on fertility. Fertility was higher among women with only daughters. Findings suggest that the value of sons must be measured at the societal and not at the individual level.     

The role of public health in population health

The role of public health is central in population health. What distinguishes public health from clinical medicine is that it's focus is on the entire population--not the individual patient. To achieve the goal of population health, healthy communities, or Healthy People 2000 requires physician leadership in medicine and public health at all levels--local, state, and national. The challenge is formidable, but the goals are attainable through strategies that focus on the goal of the common good and through collaboration of public health, medicine, and the community.     

Poland's crisis and East European socialism

Conclusion We began this article by asking whether the Polish crisis is a socialist or a Polish disease. By citing the structural factors, we brought out the common difficulties affecting all East European societies in their political and economic development. These difficulties arose out of the transition from extensive to intensive economic growth and the consequent need to replace political mobilization of the population with their political integration. The structural contradictions occurred together with conjunctural developments in the world economy, the collapse of detente, the post-war demographic explosion, and natural calamities. Poland was least able to cope with these structural and conjunctural dynamics. The result was a society united on a national basis in its conflicts with the Party State apparatus. This conflict was never resolved by Solidarity nor by the subsequent military coup.While Poland and Romania had quite similar structural and conjunctural dynamics, it was only in Poland that the constellation of nation-specific factors yielded a societal reaction of system-threatening character. Looking at the rest of Eastern Europe, we do not see a similar constellation of factors. Rather, the combination of structural, conjunctural, and specific conditions has prevented the deeper contradictions from evolving into Solidarity-type mass movements of the Polish variety. Thus, we believe that the Polish developments will not be replicated in any of the other East European countries in the foreseeable future.Does this mean that the Polish experience is so unique that it is without relevance for the other East European states? On the contrary, the recognition of common structural problems points to fundamental conflicts in all the countries of actually existing socialism. The essence of these conflicts may be the same. It is the ability to identify and deal with them that distinguishes one East European regime from another. This ability varies with the specific and conjunctural factors as applied to each country. While there is little likelihood that the Polish disease will spread, this is partly because the other East European states are beginning to take preventive measures. In other words, they are learning from the Polish experience.There are several indicators that these regimes have learned from the Polish crisis. We can summarize them in the following predictions:First, we believe that state power and the repressive apparatus of the various East European countries will be reinforced and made more effective. This applies not so much to overt shows of force but to more sophisticated methods of social control and repression: e.g., limiting information channels, dispersing dissident groups, giving in to workers protests before they spread, taking practical measures to prevent consumer shortages from getting out of hand, and the like.Second, we can expect that oppositional forces, especially intellectuals, will be increasingly restricted in their ability to formulate and articulate system-threatening demands. The East European states will take any measures - jail, slander, internal deportation, cooptation, forced emigration - to make sure that intellectuals' contact with workers is weakened or at least strictly supervised.Third, we can expect the Eastern European states to take further measures to integrate potential system-threatening movements into the official system. We will see further attempts to improve the access possibilities for those social interests that have up to now been neglected, e.g. in physical and social infrastructures, neglected regions. Moreover, there will be renewed efforts to make the system of political socialization (education, propaganda, culture) more effective. Finally, we can expect anti-corruption campaigns within the State, Party, and industrial bureaucracies as the elites attempt to make these organs more legitimate in the eyes of the population.In recent months there seems to be considerable evidence that the East European regimes have taken all these measures. There have been attempts to re-invigorate the official trade unions. Yuri Andropov's succession was marked by a highly publicized anti-corruption campaign designed to win favor among rank-and-file workers. In Romania there have been exhortations towards more self-sufficiency and self-management, so that individual producers will be less dependent on State retail outlets, and the country less dependent on costly foreign imports. The reduction in East-West trade and decline of detente have also given more leeway for the East European repressive apparatus to crack down on dissidents and oppositional movements.With reduced trade, the economic benefits of detente no longer exist as a restraining factor on the authorities. The West now has reduced influence on domestic politics in East Europe. The combination of integration and repressive measures has so far prevented the structural contradictions from growing into true political crises of the Polish variety. Eastern Europe (and Poland) is remarkably quiet.With the broad enthusiasm fostered in the West by the rise of Solidarity, it is understandable that its brutal demise had generated parallel feelings of disillusionment. It would be erroneous to consider the Polish events as an archetype for Eastern Europe. The problems of East European regimes reflect a general system crisis (economic and political), each country's response depends on specific local conditions and fortuitous conjunctures. If the Polish events are to be understood, they must be explained as a variant in a larger East European context.Having concentrated on the crisis aspects in Poland and Romania should not blind us from the fact that these systems have an amazing ability to reproduce themselves - to muddle through. Actually existing socialism is more than simply brute force. Each of the East European societies exhibits a complex dialectic between the forces of functional stability and the forces of immanent contradictions. As such, in addition to their structural aspects, we must analyze each of these societies in their differing vulnerability to conjunctural events and in their specific political, social, and cultural characters.For those who seek to replace actually existing socialism with a more emancipatory socialism, the Polish crisis constitutes a key point of departure. It should be discussed both in terms of what it means for Poland, and for Eastern Europe. The Polish events provide further evidence that the tasks of social theory reside as much in explaining why societies muddle through as why they fall apart.