Secrecy and the force of truth: countering post-truth regimes

Post-truth regimes are disconcerting to the extent that they confuse the distinction between true and false and thus obfuscate and obstruct political debate. And they dismantle the secret by imitating its habit: they constantly make claims while leaving us to guess what exactly the true content is – or whether there is any content at all. In an imagined world without secrets, there would be no curiosity or confidentiality, no sincerity or trust, and no political possibility of thinking otherwise. Analysis of the logic of secrecy, the article argues, helps us to revisit the established confidence in our culture in the force of truth, and to confront a challenge post-truth regimes pose: that to establish truth involves affective force. Contrary to the common belief that truth – and secrecy – is something to be revealed, a Foucauldian reading suggests that to mobilize truth requires both truthfulness and a moment of creation. Truth relies on the secret but will always only emerge on the surface.     

THE EFFECTS OF FINANCIAL AND RECOGNITION INCENTIVES ACROSS WORK CONTEXTS: THE ROLE OF MEANING

We manipulate workers' perceived meaning of a job in a field experiment and interact meaning of work with both financial and recognition incentives. Results show that workers exert more effort when meaning is high. Money has a positive effect on performance that is independent of meaning. In contrast, meaning and recognition interact negatively. Our results provide new insights into the stability of incentive effects across important work contexts. They also suggest that meaning and worker recognition may operate via the same motivational channel. (JEL C93, J33, M12, M52)     

Is the majority always right? Young children's normative interpretations of majority and dissenting peer behavior

The present study investigates the social-cognitive underpinnings of young children's bias to follow the majority. More specifically, we focus on the question of whether children not only copy the behavior of a majority of peers, but whether they also understand this majority behavior as a social norm that everyone needs to follow. Additionally, we investigated whether seeing a unanimous majority or a majority and dissenting peer makes a difference for children's normative understanding. Participants included 180 preschool-age children (4-to-5 years old) who engaged in a conformity paradigm, where they either saw the behavior of a unanimous majority of peers, or additionally the behavior of a single dissenting peer, or only the behavior of two individual peers behaving differently (Control). Afterward, children mostly copied the unanimous majority and protested against others, when they deviated from this majority, thus indeed interpreting the behavior of a unanimous majority as a norm that others need to follow. However, when they had seen a majority as well as a dissenter, children's protest and copying in favor of the majority dropped. Overall, our findings show that preschool children interpret the behavior of a unanimous majority as normative. However, when children additionally see a dissenter's behavior, this normative interpretation is weakened.