Privatization of refuse removal and labor costs

We examine the labor-cost savings associated with privatization by comparing earnings and employment trends of public and private sector refuse workers. Findings suggest that high union earnings for workers in the public sector are a source of labor-cost savings in the refuse industry. Evidence on job changers does not indicate that earnings for this group of workers are a compensating differential. Metropolitan area employment findings suggest that municipalities are less likely to use union refuse workers in the public sector when a relatively small percentage of area residents belong to a union. The authors thank Jacqueline Agesa, Keith Bender, Maria Crawford, and Richard Perlman for valuable suggestions. Research assistance from Eric Blackburn is greatly appreciated.     

Deposit Insurance,Institutions, and Bank Interest Rates

Many recent institutional reforms of the financial system have relied on the introduction of an explicit scheme of deposit insurance. This instrument aims at two main targets, contributing to systemic stability and protecting depositors. However, it may also affect the interest rate spread in the banking system, which can be viewed as an indicator of either inefficiency or market power in this financial segment. This paper provides an empirical investigation of the effect of deposit insurance and other institutional and economic variables on bank interest rates across countries. We find that deposit insurance increases the lending–deposit spread in banking. The main effect seems to arise not from the deposit side though, but from an increase in the lending rate. We interpret this result as evidence of the presence of moral hazard problems related to this instrument. We also find that higher quality of institutions is associated with lower spreads, thus contributing to eroding sources of market power in the banking sector.     

An introduction to econometric applications of empirical process theory for dependent random variables

This paper discusses some uses in econometrics of empirical process theory for dependent rendom variables. Examples considered include non-standard parametric hypotheses tests and semiparametric estimation. The application of bracketing functional limit results is discussed in some detail     

Screening for patients with alcohol problems: severity of patients identified by the CAGE.

Primary care physicians are well situated to identify patients with substance abuse problems and motivate them to seek appropriate assistance, but active programs are the exception. A study in a community setting was undertaken to assess the CAGE (the first letters of key words in a series of four questions about drinking: cut down; annoyed; guilty; and eye-opener), instrument in the routine screening for alcohol problems in both new and established patients. The screening process identified subjects for a pilot evaluation of a motivational interview designed to encourage problem-solving behavior. This article focuses on the screening results and the use of the CAGE instrument. During June and July of 1990, 687 patients of two primary care physicians belonging to a large group practice were asked to complete a health questionnaire that included the CAGE. Those who responded affirmatively to at least two of the four CAGE questions were requested to participate in follow-up assessment of problems associated with alcohol and health. The type and severity of alcohol problems experienced by patients who scored positive on the CAGE are described. Prevalence of a positive score on the CAGE was 8.6 percent with males, smokers, and blue collar and unemployed persons being more likely to score positive. The positive predictive value was .68. Primarily, persons with moderate alcohol problems were identified. Results show that the CAGE instrument is a useful screening device for identifying those with mild to moderate substance abuse problems, increasing the opportunity for intervention prior to serious medical complications. The instrument is easily administered, and has demonstrated relatively high levels of sensitivity and specificity. When combined with assessment and motivational interviews, the CAGE shows promise in the secondary prevention of substance abuse and related health problems.     

EFFECTS OF A PREPAID NONMONETARY INCENTIVE ON RESPONSE RATES AND RESPONSE QUALITY IN A FACE-TO-FACE SURVEY

We conducted a randomized experiment on a face-to-face interviewsurvey in order to test the effects on response rates of a prepaidnonmonetary incentive. Results showed a statistically significantincrease in response rates, mostly through reduction in refusalrates, in the half sample that received the incentive (a gift-typeballpoint pen) as compared with a no incentive control group.The effect appears to be due to greater cooperation from incentiverecipients at the initial visit by an interviewer. Unexpectedly,the incentive group also showed a significantly higher rateof sample ineligibility, possibly due to easier identificationof vacant residences or nonexistent addresses. In addition,evidence suggests greater response completeness among respondingincentive recipients early in the interview, with no evidenceof increased measurement error due to the incentive.     

TESTING SPHERICITY UNDER A MIXTURE MODEL

The robustness of Mauchly's sphericity test criterion when sampling from a mixture of two multivariate normal distributions is studied. The distribution of the sphericity test criterion when the sample covariance matrix has a non-central Wishart density of rank one is derived in terms of Meijer's G-functions; its distribution under the mixture model is then deduced. The robustness is studied by computing actual significance levels of the test under the mixture model using the critical values under the usual normal model.     

Agency costs,property rights,and the evolution of labor unions

Collective bargaining requires that an agent represent workers. This paper examines the implications for the trade union movement of the resulting agency costs. Without transferable rights in the union, union members lack the means and incentive to bring forth the innovative agent controls common to the modern corporation. Considerations of the bargaining strengths of employers and employees, each represented by an agent, provide an explanation of the simultaneous decline of private sector union membership (corporate share holders have been more successful at lowering agency costs) and growth of public sector union representation (where the union official, a “double agent,” serves the interest of both employee and bureaucratic employer). The authors acknowledge the helpful remarks Donald L. Martin whose earlier research on property rights in unions inspired this effort. Don Bellante’s work was supported by a grant from the Research Committee of the College of Business Administration, University of South Florida.     

A note on inverse estimation in non-linear models

The problem of estimating the value of an x variable for a given proportion of an observed value of the y variable is consdered for a non-linear model. Asymptotic confidence limits are obtained and an application of the method is illustrated witreal data.