La qualité de l'emploi en Amérique latine: théorie et faits

Traditionnellement, la littérature sur le développement consacrée aux marchés du travail d'Amérique latine s'est concentrée sur le nombre d'emplois et la productivité. Mais, étant donné la persistance d'une forte proportion d'emplois informels ou précaires, pour que l'analyse ait du sens, il faut aussi considérer des implications du statut professionnel sur la qualité de l'emploi. Partant d'observations faites ces dernières décennies, les auteurs concluent que la plupart des aspects de cette qualité – protection sociale comprise – dépendent de la signature d'un contrat écrit. Ce constat les conduit à formuler quelques suggestions pour stabiliser l'emploi formel et assurer un financement suffisant de la protection sociale.     

Quality of employment in Latin America: Theory and evidence

Historically, the development literature concerned with Latin American labour markets has focused on job numbers and productivity. But given the persistence of large shares of informal and now otherwise precarious employment, the authors argue that meaningful analysis also requires consideration of the implications of occupational status for the quality of employment. Based on empirical evidence from recent decades, they conclude that most dimensions of this concept – including social protection – depend on the conclusion of a written contract of employment. This finding leads them to outline policy options for stabilizing formal employment and securing adequate funding for social protection.     

Computation of Sharp Bounds on the Expected Value of a Supermodular Function of Risks with Given Marginals

We show that the rearrangement algorithm (RA) introduced in Puccetti and Rüschendorf (2012 Puccetti, G., Rüschendorf, L. (2012). Computation of sharp bounds on the distribution of a function of dependent risks. Journal of Computational and Applied Mathematics 236(7):1833–1840.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) to compute distributional bounds can be used also to compute sharp lower and upper bounds on the expected value of a supermodular function of d random variables having fixed marginal distributions. Compared to the analytical methods existing in the literature the algorithm is widely applicable, more easily obtained and gives insight into the dependence structures attaining the bounds.     

Correction of 'On the Inconsistency of Equilibrium Refinement'

Theory and Decision -     

E-Capacities and the Ellsberg Paradox

Ellsberg's (1961) famous paradox shows that decision-makers give events with known probabilities a higher weight in their outcome evaluation. In the same article, Ellsberg suggests a preference representation which has intuitive appeal but lacks an axiomatic foundation. Schmeidler (1989) and Gilboa (1987) provide an axiomatisation for expected utility with non-additive probabilities. This paper introduces E-capacities as a representation of beliefs which incorporates objective information about the probability of events. It can be shown that the Choquet integral of an E-capacity is the Ellsberg representation. The paper further explores properties of this representation of beliefs and provides an axiomatisation for them.     

A macroeconomic potential describing structural change of the economy

For the purpose of describing change in an economy's structure, and addressing issues of transformation, the notion of a time-dependent macroeconomic potential function is introduced. It penalizes deviations from equilibrium (entrepreneurial error) and induces moves toward equilibrium. Thus, from the concept of a potential function is derived the concept of short-term and long-term change forces. We focus here on the long-term structural changes of an economy as distinct from short-term cyclical variations, and we represent economic transformations as phase-transitions between monostable and ambiguous bistable states of the economy. One important feature of the potential function approach is that the parameter of the potential can be determined from empirical data. In particular, the parameters can be regressed for input variables. Hence, a relationship has been established between the structural change force and a set of input variables, some of which are controlled in part by either public or private sector agents. The method has been applied to West German and United States industry data for 1950–1980.     

Bargaining with Incomplete information an axiomatic approach

Within this paper we consider a model of Nash bargaining with incomplete information. In particular, we focus on fee games, which are a natural generalization of side payment games in the context of incomplete information. For a specific class of fee games we provide two axiomatic approaches in order to establish the Expected Contract Value, which is a version of the Nash bargaining solution.