利用CAPM计算中国房地产行业资本成本

行业资本成本特别是中国房地产行业资本成本的计算具有重要的意义,这不但是房地产行业的投资者进行投资的主要参考依据,也是房地产企业投融资活动的重要参考依据。本文首先对资本成本理论进行了综述,并且利用经典资本资产定价模型即CAPM理论对中国房地产行业资本成本进行了计算,得出中国房地产行业的资本成本为12.44%。在此基础之上可以初步认为:如果中国房地产投资的实际回报率低于12.44%,而仍然有大量资金涌入的话,那么该行业确实存在着一些“泡沫”。     

运力受扰的多车场车辆调度干扰管理问题研究

为解决物流配送系统中因运输车辆毁坏而产生的干扰问题,基于干扰管理思想提出了解决问题的扰动恢复策略与实施方案。在扰动度量的基础上,设计了多车场车辆调度扰动恢复策略,建立相应的干扰管理模型。针对多车场车辆调度干扰管理问题的特有属性,设计了一系列求解简化策略,有效简化了问题的求解空间。结合干扰管理模型的特点,使用改进的遗传算法进行求解。最后给出了一个算例,其结果证明了干扰管理模型与算法的有效性。     

股权激励计划公告前的盈余管理——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

本文以"上市公司股权激励管理办法"颁布以来沪深两市首次披露股权激励计划的上市公司为研究对象,运用单样本T检验和配对样本T检验的方法,研究了股权激励计划公告日前经理人的盈余管理行为.研究发现:股权激励计划公告日前的三个季度,经理人通过操纵"操纵性应计利润"进行了向下的盈余管理,公告日后盈余存在反转现象;但是,并没有显著的证据表明经理人在股权激励计划公告日前通过操纵"非经常性损益"进行盈余管理.     

基于ERP与APS集成模型的协同供应链计划研究

对于供应链中的企业而言,如何实现ERP和APS的集成是解决供应链协同计划的关键.为此,利用供应链计划矩阵思想,通过对ERP和APS各个层次上功能模块以及业务流程上的集成,提出了ERP与APS的集成框架模型;在此基础上,研究并提出了协同供应链计划模型.     

基于动态线性混合模型的居民消费行为研究

针对居民消费行为中存在的地区差异和时间因子影响的研究,本文采用更一般形式的动态线性混合模型来进行建模,对其参数估计及其有关性质进行了讨论,采用Monte carlo模拟说明了几种估计量的优良性和不同估计量之间的差异,最后我们采用此模型对我国居民消费行为进行了实证研究,并对所建议模型如解释能力和预测能力等进行了对比分析,最后提出改善居民消费结构的建议.     

考虑零售商质量控制和风险规避的供应链网络均衡研究

研究零售商质量控制和供应链成员风险规避背景下供应链网络均衡问题。应用条件风险值度量风险规避程度,利用变分不等式理论描绘供应链参与者的最优经济行为,设计供应链网络均衡模型,考虑风险规避和质量控制策略对均衡的影响,证明均衡解存在且唯一,并运用Levenberg-Marquardt算法求解均衡模型。最后对重要参数进行数值分析,揭示质量控制和风险规避对供应链均衡解以及参与者条件风险值的影响。研究表明：供应链参与者越规避风险越有利于产品质量水平的提高,风险规避程度的加深会降低制造商或零售商自身的CVaR,同时增大对方的CVaR,对因产品合格率提高带来的利益而言,制造商所得优于零售商。     

基于共同持有资产的银行间接关联网络研究

金融市场是一个复杂系统,银行之间不仅有直接的拆借关系,还能够通过投资市场建立间接关联。本文分析了资产内生相关性、资产降价出售以及银行投资行为等因素对银行间接关联程度的影响,基于这些因素通过持有共同资产构建银行系统的间接关联,并以此为基础通过平面极大过滤图方法生成银行间接关联网络,论证了该网络中的系统重要性银行,并通过对该网络结构特征的分析,发现间接关联网络具有小世界和无标度等特征,这些特征与银行通过直接拆借形成的网络相似。本文对于银行间接关联网络的研究不仅能够更加清晰地了解银行之间的关系,也为银行系统性风险的监管提供了新的视角。     

Incentives in a Stage‐Gate Process

Many large organizations use a stage‐gate process to manage new product development projects. In a typical stage‐gate process project managers learn about potential ideas from research and exert effort in development while senior executives make intervening go/no‐go decisions. This decentralized decision making results in an agency problem because the idea quality in early stages is unknown to the executive and the project manager must exert unobservable development effort in later stages. In light of these challenges, how should the firm structure incentives to ensure that project managers reveal relevant information and invest the appropriate effort to create value? In this study, we develop a model of adverse selection in research and moral hazard in development with a go/no‐go decision at the intervening gate. Our results show that the principal's uncertainty regarding early‐stage idea quality—a term we refer to as idea risk—alters the effect of late‐stage development risk. The presence of idea risk can alter the incentives offered to the agent and may lead the principal to reject projects that otherwise seem favorable in terms of positive net present value. A simulation of early‐stage ideas, found through search on a complex landscape, shows that the firm can mitigate the negative effects of idea risk by encouraging breadth of search and high tolerance for failure.     

Balancing Revenues and Repair Costs under Partial Information about Product Reliability

We consider the problem faced by a company selling a product with warranty and under partial information about the product reliability. The product can fail from multiple failure types, each of which is associated with an inherently different repair cost. If the product fails within the warranty duration, then the company is required to pay the repair cost. The company does not know the probabilities associated with different failure types, but it learns the failure probabilities as sales occur and failure information is accumulated. If the failure probabilities turn out to be too high and it becomes costly to fulfill the warranty coverage, then the company may decide to stop selling the product, possibly replacing it with a more reliable alternative. The objective is to decide if and when to stop. By formulating the problem as a dynamic program with Bayesian learning, we establish structural properties of the optimal policy. Since computing the optimal policy is intractable due to the high dimensional state space, we propose two approximation methods. The first method is based on decomposing the problem by failure types and it provides upper bounds on the value functions. The second method provides lower bounds on the value functions and it is based on a deterministic approximation. Computational experiments indicate that the policy from the first method provides noticeable benefits, especially when it is difficult to form good estimates of the failure probabilities quickly.     

融资代建制─公共工程项目建设管理新模式

本文明确了融资代建制的概念,将公共工程项目–项目融资–代建制联系起来,构建了公共工程项目融资代建制模式框架为:二个层次、三种管理和三项保证。进一步指出融资代建制是有中国特色的PFI,是公共工程项目建设管理的创新模式。