Insights from the Evaluation of Past Local Area Population Forecasts

Local area population forecasts have a wide variety of uses in the public and private sectors. But not enough is known about the errors of such forecasts, particularly over the longer term (20 years or more). Understanding past errors is valuable for both forecast producers and users. This paper (i) evaluates the forecast accuracy of past local area population forecasts published by Australian State and Territory Governments over the last 30 years and (ii) illustrates the ways in which past error distributions can be employed to quantify the uncertainty of current forecasts. Population forecasts from the past 30 years were sourced from State and Territory Governments. Estimated resident populations to which the projections were compared were created for the geographical regions of the past projections. The key features of past forecast error patterns are described. Forecast errors mostly confirm earlier findings with regard to the relationship between error and length of projection horizon and population size. The paper then introduces the concept of a forecast ‘shelf life’, which indicates how far into the future a forecast is likely to remain reliable. It also illustrates how past error distributions can be used to create empirical prediction intervals for current forecasts. These two complementary measures provide a simple way of communicating the likely magnitude of error that can be expected with current local area population forecasts.     

Stochastic Forecasting of Labor Supply and Population: An Integrated Model

This paper presents a stochastic model to forecast the German population and labor supply until 2060. Within a cohort-component approach, our population forecast applies principal components analysis to birth, mortality, emigration, and immigration rates, which allows for the reduction of dimensionality and accounts for correlation of the rates. Labor force participation rates are estimated by means of an econometric time series approach. All time series are forecast by stochastic simulation using the bootstrap method. As our model also distinguishes between German and foreign nationals, different developments in fertility, migration, and labor participation could be predicted. The results show that even rising birth rates and high levels of immigration cannot break the basic demographic trend in the long run. An important finding from an endogenous modeling of emigration rates is that high net migration in the long run will be difficult to achieve. Our stochastic perspective suggests therefore a high probability of substantially decreasing the labor supply in Germany.     

Long-Term Earnings Differentials Between African American and White Men by Educational Level

This paper investigates long-term earnings differentials between African American and white men using data that match respondents in the Survey of Income and Program Participation to 30 years of their longitudinal earnings as recorded by the Social Security Administration. Given changing labor market conditions over three decades, we focus on how racial differentials vary by educational level because the latter has important and persistent effects on labor market outcomes over the course of an entire work career. The results show that the long-term earnings of African American men are more disadvantaged at lower levels of educational attainment. Controlling for demographic characteristics, work disability, and various indicators of educational achievement does not explain the lower long-term earnings of less-educated black men in comparison to less-educated white men. The interaction arises because black men without a high school degree have a larger number of years of zero earnings during their work careers. Other results show that this racial interaction by educational level is not apparent in cross-sectional data which do not provide information on the accumulation of zero earnings over the course of 30 years. We interpret these findings as indicating that compared to either less-educated white men or highly educated black men, the long-term earnings of less-educated African American men are likely to be more negatively affected by the consequences of residential and economic segregation, unemployment, being out of the labor force, activities in the informal economy, incarceration, and poorer health.     

Conducive Characteristics or Anti-Racist Context? Decomposing the Reasons for Veterans’ High Likelihood of Interracial Marriage

Over the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, veterans have been more likely to enter into race/ethnic intermarriages than non-veterans. Theories of race/ethnic intermarriage variously point to how minority race/ethnicity, race/ethnically diverse social settings, progressive racial attitudes, and high socioeconomic status increase individuals’ likelihood of intermarrying. Veterans’ unique racial and socioeconomic characteristics may contribute to their greater likelihood of intermarrying relative to non-veterans: larger percentages of veterans than non-veterans are members of racial and ethnic minority groups, while military service increases individual service members’ long-term economic and educational prospects. At the same time, veterans share in common their exposure to the unique military environment, which may increase their likelihood of intermarriage by diversifying their social circles, and subjecting their attitudes and behavior to group norms that are more explicitly egalitarian than those of society at large. The present study considers these two possible explanations for veterans’ greater likelihood of intermarriage. We use data on seven cohorts of men over six decades in the Current Population Survey, representing a total of 1,456,742 observations, to decompose the difference in likelihood of racial intermarriage between veterans and non-veterans among married men aged 18–65. We find that across cohorts and decades, veterans’ greater likelihood of intermarrying is not fully explained by their race/ethnic and socioeconomic composition. We argue that veterans’ greater likelihood of intermarrying may therefore be driven by their exposure to the military environment.     

Estimating Recent Local Impacts of Sea-Level Rise on Current Real-Estate Losses: A Housing Market Case Study in Miami-Dade,Florida

Sea-Level Rise (SLR) Projections from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers (USACE) indicate increasing, and imminent, risk to coastal communities from tidal flooding and hurricane storm surge. Building on recent research related to the potential demographic impacts of such changes (Hauer et al. 2016, in Nat Clim Chang 3:802–806, 2017; Neumann et al. 2015; Curtis and Schneider in Popul Environ 33:28–54, 2011), localized flooding projections in the Miami Beach area (Wdowinski et al. in Ocean Coast Manag 126:1–8, 2016) and projected economic losses associated with this rise in projected SLR (Fu et al. Ocean Coast Manag 133:11–17, 2016); this research investigates the accrued current cost, in terms of real-estate dollars lost, due to recurrent tidal flooding and projected increases of flooding in Miami-Dade County. Most directly related to this line of research, Keenan et al. (2018) have recently produced results indicating that Climate Gentrification is taking place in Miami, FL with higher elevations in flood prone areas appreciating at a higher rate. In that vein of thinking, we seek to answer a question posed by such research: What is the actual accrued loss to sea-level rise over the recent past? To answer this question, we replicate well-documented estimation methods by combining publicly available sea-level rise projections, tide gauge trends, and property lot elevation data to identify areas regularly at risk of flooding. Combining recent patterns of flooding inundation with future forecasts, we find that properties projected to be inundated with tidal flooding in 2032 have lost $3.08 each year on each square foot of living area, and properties near roads that will be inundated with tidal flooding in 2032 have lost $3.71 each year on each square foot of living area. These effects total over $465 million in lost real-estate market value between 2005 and 2016 in the Miami-Dade area.     

Country-Level Investment in Cultural Opportunity Structures. A Potential Source of Health Differences Between 21 European Countries

Individual’s participation in cultural activities may positively affect health through a pathway mediated by social capital. We examine whether country-level investment in cultural opportunity structures was associated with between-country differences in self-rated health and, if so, whether these associations were mediated by citizens’ confidence in societal institutions, i.e., by institutional trust, regarded as a dimension of social capital. For 24,887 respondents in the European Social Survey, 2006, data on self-rated health, institutional trust (individual-level and country-level), and sociodemographic variables were linked with statistics-based country-level data on 10 indicators of cultural opportunity structures and mediator variables (gross domestic product (GDP), Gini index, and welfare state regime). Over and above the sociodemographics, six cultural indicators contributed to between-country health differences in logistic multilevel regression analysis: the percentage of arts students, the RC index, the percentage of writers and creative artists of total employment, exports of cultural goods, imports of cultural goods, and the number of feature films produced per capita. Controlling, furthermore, for trust, and country-level mediators, only imports of cultural goods contributed to between-country differences in health. No associations with other cultural indicators remained after controlling for GDP or welfare state regime. Institutional trust may partially mediate the significance of cultural investments for self-rated health. However, both cultural investment and trust may be concomitants of general prosperity and welfare policies. Future studies should investigate whether the countries’ welfare policies influence the transformation of cultural investment into institutional trust and which types of indicators best depict associations between investments and health.     

The Relationship Between Social Capital and Individualism–Collectivism in Europe

The aim of the present study was to examine the relationship between social capital and individualism–collectivism in a sample of 50,417 individuals from 29 European countries using data from the European Social Survey Round 6 (2012). Social capital was measured in terms of generalized social trust and informal social networks; individualism–collectivism was operationalized via Schwartz’s Openness to Change–Conservation value dimension. Results from a hierarchical linear modeling analysis showed that less than 10% of variance in social capital indicators was found between countries, meaning that the level of social capital varies more substantively between individuals than between the countries. Openness to Change had a weak but statistically significant and positive relationship both with the indices of Generalized Social Trust and Informal Social Networks, which remained significant even when individual age, gender, education level, and domicile were controlled for. In sum, our findings show that the positive relationship between social capital and individualism that has been found at the cultural level also holds at the individual level: people who emphasize independent thought, action, and readiness to change are also more willing to believe that most people can be trusted and are more engaged in informal social networks. The relationship is, nevertheless, very weak and the strength of the association varies significantly across different European countries. This variation, however, cannot be explained by country differences in level of democracy or human development and the country’s wealth moderates only the individual level relationship between Openness to Change and Informal Social Networks. Our findings suggest that sources of social capital at the individual level can be found in people’s immediate social surroundings, as well as their everyday social interactions.     

Quality of Life in Intentional Communities

The present study was initiated to investigate levels and predictors of wellbeing among inhabitants of intentional communities (ICs). An anonymous, Internet-based questionnaire was distributed to US and Canadian ICs. Responses were obtained from 913 members. Wellbeing was measured by the widely used satisfaction with life scale (SWLS). Hierarchical linear regression analyses were run to test the predictive validity of Social support, Identity fusion, Meaning in life, Community satisfaction and Life change, and Religious activity above and beyond demographic variables and personality traits. Mean scores on the SWLS were estimated to 5.27 and 5.47 (1–7 scale) for men and women, respectively. The full model explained 41.4% of the variance for men and 38.2% for women. Personality explained 13.4 (men) and 14.4% (women) of the variation, while demographic variables only had a minor impact. Overall, presence of Meaning in life and Social support were the most important predictors. The IC inhabitants reported wellbeing on par with the highest scores previously published. The findings support the contention that sustainability, in the form of a communal lifestyle of low ecological footprint, may be promoted without forfeiting wellbeing.     

Job Insecurity: Differential Effects of Subjective and Objective Measures on Life Satisfaction Trajectories of Workers Aged 27–30 in Germany

Job insecurity has become increasingly evident in European countries in recent years. In Germany, legislation has increased insecurity through erosion of the standard employment relationship. Fixed-term contracts are central to definitions of insecurity based on atypical or precarious work but there is still limited understanding of what creates insecurity and how it affects workers. Drawing on Bourdieu’s thesis that “insecurity is everywhere”, the relationships between subjective and objective measures of insecurity are examined for their impact on the 5-year trajectories of life satisfaction of men and women in the age group 27–30. Latent growth curve analysis of data from the German Socio-Economic Panel for 2010–2014 highlights the adverse and lasting effects of subjective concerns about job insecurity on life satisfaction trajectories. This association cuts across educational groups, with far reaching implications as subjective concerns about job security permeate young worker’s lives well beyond the objective condition of being employed on a fixed-term contract.     

An Empirical Assessment of Households Livelihood Vulnerability: The Case of Rural Ghana

The recent years witnessed a sharp drop in China’s demographic dividend; therefore, some reform measures about China’s fertility policy have been adopted to optimize population structures and to maintain demographic dividend. However, our simulation results reveal that the new two-child fertility policy cannot effectively deal with population ageing, and that China’s fertility policy needs further adjustment. Specifically, we find that the new two-child fertility policy will deteriorate demographic dividend before 2050, through combination of simulation results and formula derivation. Aiming to stabilize demographic dividend at ideal range all the time, we build nonlinear integer programming model to propose an appropriate reforming path for China’s fertility policy. Then, we simulate and compare demographic developments under the proposed reforming path with those under three possible fertility policies: one-child, two-child and no fertility restriction, verifying that the proposed reforming path has better performance on stabilizing demographic dividend than these three fertility policies have. Finally, sensitivity analysis of upper bound of research interval is conducted to evaluate the effect of the upper bound on proposed reforming path. Based on these results, we suggest that China should continue to execute current strict fertility policy before 2032, then begin to relax it gradually especially during 2036–2041, and completely cancel fertility policy after 2065.