政治关联、财务绩效与企业社会责任——来自中国化工行业上市公司的证据

以2007-2011年中国化工行业上市公司为样本,实证考察了政治关联、财务绩效和企业社会责任之间的关系。将政治关联划分为代表委员类和政府官员类两种类型。研究发现,不同类别的政治关联方式对企业社会责任的影响路径存在显著差异。具体表现为,高管的代表委员类政治关联正向作用于企业财务绩效,而财务绩效的提升会促使其更好地履行社会责任。而且,在控制了财务绩效的影响后,代表委员类政治关联对企业社会责任仍具有显著的正向影响,其政治关联的级别越高,企业的社会责任表现越好。这说明财务绩效在两者之间起着部分中介作用;然而,政府官员类政治关联会降低企业的财务绩效。在控制了财务绩效的影响后,其对企业社会责任的影响并不显著,表明了财务绩效在政府官员类政治关联和企业社会责任之间起着完全的中介作用。     

Linking perceived organizational support with employee work outcomes in a Chinese context: Organizational identification as a mediator

Perceived organizational support (POS) is viewed as an important explanatory framework for understanding the relationship between employees and the workplace, and is regarded by some researchers as central in understanding job-related attitudes and behaviors of employees. However, less research has taken into account the role of organizational identification, which reflects how individuals define the self with respect to their organization, as a potential influence on such relationships. Drawing on a cross-organizational sample of 238 subordinate-supervisor dyads from the People’s Republic of China, we examined whether organizational identification mediates the effect of perceived organizational support (POS) on work outcomes including turnover intentions, work performance, and organizational citizenship behavior (OCB). Results from the current study showed that organizational identification fully mediates the relation of POS to OCB-directed to individuals, and partially mediates relations between POS and other work outcomes (turnover intention, work performance, OCB-directed to organization). Implications for management theory and practice are discussed.     

连带责任治理在供应商集群中的有效性研究

在核心企业与供应商集群的渠道关系情境下探讨连带责任治理对机会主义行为的作用,将网络中心性和使用渠道权力纳入连带责任治理研究框架,考察二者对机会主义行为的影响以及对连带责任与机会主义行为之间关系的调节效应。以一家出口企业的供应商集群为研究对象,获得82个连带责任小组样本共246个被调查者的调查数据,应用SPSS 19．0软件和层级回归法对研究假设进行检验。研究结果表明,供应商之间的连带责任对其机会主义行为有显著的抑制作用;供应商领导者的网络中心性负向影响其他供应商成员的机会主义行为,并强化连带责任对机会主义行为的抑制作用;核心企业通过使用渠道权力负向影响供应商集群的机会主义行为,但会弱化连带责任对机会主义行为的抑制作用。     

前摄性行为视角下的员工创新——前摄型人格、反馈寻求与员工创新绩效

随着外部环境日渐复杂,新一代员工自我意识觉醒,信息化工作模式扩展,企业传统管理机制对员工绩效的影响越发有限。利用员工自我管理机制以及前摄性行为提升其自身创新绩效的管理路径有望成为持续增强企业创新实力的新方法。研究以国有科技型组织中的知识员工为样本,以主动反馈寻求行为为中介,探索前摄型人格对员工创新绩效的影响机制。研究结果表明,员工前摄型人格对其创新绩效具有正向影响;反馈寻求行为(询问与监测)完全中介前摄型人格对创新绩效的影响;主管对创新的支持正向调节直接反馈寻求行为——询问与创新绩效的关系,具有创新性同事的存在正向调节间接反馈寻求行为——监测与创新绩效的关系。     

知识员工目标取向与知识团队反思对知识活动行为的交互影响研究

知识经济时代,科技型企业对知识型团队与知识型员工的依赖程度越来越高,知识型员工的知识获取与知识分享等知识活动行为越来越受到组织研究者的关注。本文综合运用目标取向理论与团队反思理论,将知识团队反思纳入到知识员工目标取向对知识活动行为影响的研究中,并推导出一个跨层次交互作用模型。通过对116个知识团队(含601个知识员工)样本的调查分析,得出实证研究结果 :知识员工学习取向对知识获取行为与知识分享行为具有显著的正向效应,且团队反思可以显著调节(增强)学习取向对知识分享行为的影响作用;证明取向对知识获取行为的影响效应不显著,但对知识分享行为具有显著的正向效应,而团队反思可以显著调节(增强)证明取向对知识获取行为与知识分享行为的影响作用;回避取向对知识获取行为与知识分享行为均具有显著的负向效应,且团队反思可以显著调节(削弱)回避取向对知识获取行为与知识分享行为的影响作用。最后讨论了研究的管理启示、研究局限及研究展望。     

Competitive analysis for make-to-order scheduling with reliable lead time quotation

This paper makes extended studies on the discrete problem of online scheduling and reliable lead time quotation (discrete Q-SLTQ) introduced by Keskinocak et al. (Manag. Sci. 47(2):264–279, 2001). We first relax the assumption on revenue function from a linear decreasing function to any decreasing function. We present an online deterministic strategy which is optimal in competitiveness for concave revenue functions. The above results are further extended to the continuous Q-SLTQ model where orders are released at arbitrary time points. For the discrete Q-SLTQ problem, if orders are with nonuniform lengths, we prove the nonexistence of online strategies with bounded competitive ratios; otherwise if orders are with unit length but various weights, we present an optimal online strategy.     

Multiple L(j,1)-labeling of the triangular lattice

Let n,j,k be nonnegative integers. An n-fold L(j,k)-labeling of a graph G is an assignment f of sets of nonnegative integers of order n to the vertices of G such that, for any two vertices u,v and any two integers a∈f(u), b∈f(v), |a?b|≥j if uv∈E(G), and |a?b|≥k if u and v are distance two apart. The span of f is the absolute difference between the maximum and minimum integers used by f. The n-fold L(j,k)-labeling number of G is the minimum span over all n-fold L(j,k)-labelings of G. Let n,j,k and m be nonnegative integers. An n-fold circular m-L(j,k)-labeling of a graph G is an assignment f of subsets of {0,1,…,m?1} of order n to the vertices of G such that, for any two vertices u,v and any two integers a∈f(u), b∈f(v), min{|a?b|,m?|a?b|}≥j if uv∈E(G), and min{|a?b|,m?|a?b|}≥k if u and v are distance two apart. The minimum m such that G has an n-fold circular m-L(j,k)-labeling is called the n-fold circular L(j,k)-labeling number of G. This paper provides upper and lower bounds for the n-fold L(j,1)-labeling number and the n-fold circular L(j,1)-labeling number of the triangular lattice and determines the n-fold L(2,1)-labeling number and n-fold circular L(2,1)-labeling number of the triangular lattice for n≥3.     

An improved algorithm for tree edit distance with applications for RNA secondary structure comparison

An ordered labeled tree is a tree in which the nodes are labeled and the left-to-right order among siblings is relevant. The edit distance between two ordered labeled trees is the minimum cost of transforming one tree into the other through a sequence of edit operations. We present techniques for speeding up the tree edit distance computation which are applicable to a family of algorithms based on closely related recursion strategies. These techniques aim to reduce repetitious steps in the original algorithms by exploring certain structural features in the tree. When these features exist in a large portion of the tree, the speedup due to our techniques would be significant. Viable examples for application include RNA secondary structure comparison and structured text comparison.     

Strategic Information Sharing in Competing Channels

We investigate strategic information sharing in two competing channels. The retailer in a channel can ex post decide whether to share private demand information with his upstream manufacturer after the content of information becomes known. We find that a retailer discloses low demand and withholds high demand to induce lower wholesale prices from his manufacturer. We show that a retailer should share less information when the retail market becomes more competitive, but should disclose more information when his capability to acquire information improves. When a decentralized supply chain competes with an integrated channel, we show that firms in the supply chain benefit from the rival channel's effort to improve information capability, that the incentive for the retailer in the supply chain to improve his information capability increases with the intensity of competition and with the rival channel's information capability, and that the retailer may not want to pursue perfect information acquisition even when doing so is costless. Extensive numerical studies demonstrate that similar results also hold for two decentralized supply chains competing with each other.