Philosophie des coaching

The philosophy of coaching. Anthropological, hermeneutical and ethical implicationsCounselling and coaching can be understood as modern means to foster human autonomy, following the normative idea of the enlightenment. This anthropology must be completed with the Heideggerian concept of care, which clears misunderstandings of an asymmetry between coach and client. The hermeneutical dimension of coaching is analysed as creative and perspectival understanding on the basis of a fundamental questionability. With this innovative philosophical interpretation of coaching, its ethical values are adequately grounded.     

Coaching als Instrument der Personalentwicklung in Kirche und Caritas Mehr Chancen als Grenzen

Coaching for leaders and representatives in churchesThis article shows possibilities of coaching for leaders and representatives in churches, especially during this time with many transformations in ecclesiastical structures. It seems to be very important for acceptance of coaching, that the coach has a high standard of knowledge about this branch.     

Supervision und Coaching als interne Beratungsangebote in der Bundesagentur für Arbeit

Supervision and coaching as internal consulting in a great public administrationThe author describes the process of the implementing of supervision, coaching and practise discussion in a great public administration. The difficulties of such an intention are shown, which appear, if an organization has no experiences with these formats and the decision makers have no background knowledge. Furthermore it is explained by which measures an institutional anchorage was possible. Because the process is not finished yet, a view of further developments is given.     

International labor migration and social security: Analysis of the transition path

This paper numerically simulates a two-country overlapping-generations model to study international labor migration when the two countries are characterized by different social-security systems. The present analysis extends previous work beyond steady-state considerations. The most striking result is that in all cases considered, dynamically efficient and inefficient economies in autarkic steady-state, migration leads to temporary welfare losses in both countries. In all cases, the transition path is characterized by temporary dynamic inefficiency in one country.All correspondence to Doris Geide-Stevenson. We would like to thank an anonymous referee for very helpful comments. We are responsible for any remaining errors. Responsible editor: Christoph M. Schmidt.     

Peer effects on substance use among American teenagers

The widespread use of illicit substances by American teenagers has attracted the interest of both the general public and academic researchers. Among the various factors that people believe influence youth substance use, peer effects are identified as a critical determinant. Identifying peer effects, however, is known to be a difficult task. In an attempt to overcome known difficulties, I estimate peer effects on substance usage among American teenagers using perceived peer behavior in the National Longitudinal Survey Youth 97. The data indicate robust peer effects. Moreover, the results do not change substantially in school and household fixed effects estimations.This is a chapter of my Ph.D. dissertation submitted to Michigan State University. I am especially grateful to David Neumark for his constructive comments and continuous encouragement. I thank Jeff Biddle, Ali Berker, Frederic Durousseau, Gigi Foster, Daniel Hamermesh, John Strauss, Jeffrey Wooldridge, the participants in the labor economics workshop at Michigan State University and 2001 Joint Statistical Meeting, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. Scott Adams and David Wetzell gave me detailed comments, as well as advice on English. Donna Maurer provided careful editorial assistance. All remaining errors are, of course, my own. Due to a confidentiality agreement with the BLS on the usage of the NLSY 97 GeoCode file, the part of the dataset that is constructed from the GeoCode file cannot be released. Responsible editor: Daniel S. Hamermesh     

Demography and gender regimes: The case of Italians and ethnic traditions

In proposing measures that might improve adverse projected population futures, many demographers have endorsed feminist demands for family-friendly social policies and gender equity in the home. This paper provides a constructive critique of some versions of this argument. Without presenting new empirical data, it makes a case for the use of alternative conceptual tools in study design. It does so by focusing on three underpinnings of claims that fertility is lowest in countries with the greatest disparity between public and private patriarchy. Using Italy and Italians as an example, the paper discusses empirical measurements of the domestic division of labour, depictions of Italian family traditions and theorizations of family dynamics more generally, and wider understandings of modernity and tradition, both on the canvas of grand theory and within ethnographies of Italian families. The paper concludes with examples of studies that use the suggested conceptual framework.     

The core of social choice problems with monotone preferences and a feasibility constraint

We consider collective choice with agents possessing strictly monotone, strictly convex and continuous preferences over a compact and convex constraint set contained in ₊^k . If it is non-empty the core will lie on the efficient boundary of the constraint set and any policy not in the core is beaten by some policy on the efficient boundary. It is possible to translate the collective choice problem on this efficient boundary to another social choice problem on a compact and convex subset of ₊^c (c<k) with strictly convex and continuous preferences. In this setting the dimensionality results in Banks (1995) and Saari (1997) apply to the dimensionality of the boundary of the constraint set (which is lower than the dimensionality of the choice space by at least one). If the constraint set is not convex then the translated lower dimensional problem does not necessarily involve strict convexity of preferences but the dimensionality of the problem is still lower. Broadly, the results show that the homogeneity afforded by strict monotonicity of preferences and a compact constraint set makes generic core emptyness slightly less common. One example of the results is that if preferences are strictly monotone and convex on ² then choice on a compact and convex constraint exhibits a version of the median voter theorem.I thank Donald Saari for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.     

Why one person one vote?

We provide a simple justification as to why the core principal in liberal democracies the one-person-one-vote is desirable. We compare two possible constitutions. In a fixed democracy, each individual has one vote and the same opportunity to propose public projects. In a flexible democracy, those that set the agenda can additionally propose to limit future participation in voting and agenda-setting. We show that a fixed democracy restricts majorities from taxing minorities to a greater extent than a flexible democracy. A flexible democracy may be more suited to enable a polity to undertake public projects. This possible advantage may be too small to outweigh taxation distortions and citizens unanimously favor the one-person-one-vote rule ex ante.I am grateful to Ami Glazer, Ulrich Erlenmaier, Tobias Kleinschmidt, seminar participants in Heidelberg and Konstanz, and in particular to an anonymous referee for valuable suggestions and comments.     

A maximal domain of preferences for strategy-proof,efficient, and simple rules in the division problem

The division problem consists of allocating an amount M of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents. Sprumont (1991) showed that if agents have single-peaked preferences over their shares, the uniform rule is the unique strategy-proof, efficient, and anonymous rule. Ching and Serizawa (1998) extended this result by showing that the set of single-plateaued preferences is the largest domain, for all possible values of M, admitting a rule (the extended uniform rule) satisfying strategy-proofness, efficiency and symmetry. We identify, for each M and n, a maximal domain of preferences under which the extended uniform rule also satisfies the properties of strategy-proofness, efficiency, tops-onlyness, and continuity. These domains (called partially single-plateaued) are strictly larger than the set of single-plateaued preferences. However, their intersection, when M varies from zero to infinity, coincides with the set of single-plateaued preferences.An earlier version of this paper circulated under the title A maximal domain of preferences for tops-only rules in the division problem. We are grateful to an associate editor of this journal for comments that helped to improve the presentation of the paper and to Matt Jackson for suggesting us the interest of identifying a maximal domain of preferences for tops-only rules. We are also grateful to Dolors Berga, Flip Klijn, Howard Petith, and a referee for helpful comments. The work of Alejandro Neme is partially supported by Research Grant 319502 from the Universidad Nacional de San Luis. The work of Jordi Massó is partially supported by Research Grants BEC2002-02130 from the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología and 2001SGR-00162 from the Generalitat de Catalunya, and by the Barcelona Economics Program of CREA from the Generalitat de Catalunya. The paper was partially written while Alejandro Neme was visiting the UAB unde r a sabbatical fellowship from the Generalitat de Catalunya.     

Measuring and implementing equality of opportunity for income

Departing from the welfarist tradition, recent theories of justice focus on individual opportunities as the appropriate standard for distributive judgments. To explore how this philosophical conception can be translated into concrete public policy, we select the income as relevant outcome and the income tax as the relevant redistributive policy, and we address the following questions: (i) what is the degree of opportunity inequality in an income distribution? (ii) how to design an opportunity egalitarian income tax policy? Several criteria for ranking income distributions on the basis of equality of opportunities are derived. Moreover, we characterize an opportunity egalitarian income tax and we formulate criteria for choosing among alternative tax schedules. I would like to thank Peter Lambert for his encouragement and guidance, and Walter Bossert, Maurice Salles, and partecipants at the 1998 Social Choice and Welfare Conference, Vancouver, and at the Conference on Non–Welfaristic Issues in Normative Economics in Caen for their helpful comments and suggestions. Financial support of the Ministero dellIstruzione, Università e Ricerca (Italy) is gratefully acknowledged. Responsibility for any remaining deficiency is mine.