Testing transitivity in choice under risk

Recently proposed models of risky choice imply systematic violations of transitivity of preference. This study explored whether people show the predicted intransitivity of the two models proposed to account for the certainty effect in Allais paradoxes. In order to distinguish “true” violations from those produced by “error,” a model was fit in which each choice can have a different error rate and each person can have a different pattern of preferences that need not be transitive. Error rate for a choice is estimated from preference reversals between repeated presentations of the same choice. Results showed that few people repeated intransitive patterns. We can retain the hypothesis that all participants were transitive.     

Confidence biases and learning among intuitive Bayesians

We design a double-or-quits game to compare the speed of learning one’s specific ability with the speed of rising confidence as the task gets increasingly difficult. We find that people on average learn to be overconfident faster than they learn their true ability and we present an intuitive-Bayesian model of confidence which integrates confidence biases and learning. Uncertainty about one’s true ability to perform a task in isolation can be responsible for large and stable confidence biases, namely limited discrimination, the hard–easy effect, the Dunning–Kruger effect, conservative learning from experience and the overprecision phenomenon (without underprecision) if subjects act as Bayesian learners who rely only on sequentially perceived performance cues and contrarian illusory signals induced by doubt. Moreover, these biases are likely to persist since the Bayesian aggregation of past information consolidates the accumulation of errors and the perception of contrarian illusory signals generates conservatism and under-reaction to events. Taken together, these two features may explain why intuitive Bayesians make systematically wrong predictions of their own performance.     

Why do young women marry old men?

This paper presents an overlapping generations household model with positive assortative matching (richer individuals marry richer partners), incomplete information about partner’s type (it takes time to reveal income-earning capabilities of individuals) and a gender pay gap on the labor market (men are more likely to end up with a high-paying job). In equilibrium, a gender pay gap creates an excess supply of desirable husbands and women marry early to increase their chance of being matched with an ideal partner, which results in a gender age gap on the marriage market. A modified model with asymmetric information yields a similar result. An extended model where individuals have an option to remain single (the marriage market does not necessarily clear in equilibrium) yields a similar result as well.     

Strong and weak consistency of LS estimators in the EV regression model with negatively superadditive-dependent errors

In this paper, the strong laws of large numbers for partial sums and weighted sums of negatively superadditive-dependent (NSD, in short) random variables are presented, especially the Marcinkiewicz–Zygmund type strong law of large numbers. Using these strong laws of large numbers, we further investigate the strong consistency and weak consistency of the LS estimators in the EV regression model with NSD errors, which generalize and improve the corresponding ones for negatively associated random variables. Finally, a simulation is carried out to study the numerical performance of the strong consistency result that we established.     

More nonparametric Bayesian inference in applications

Discussion of “Nonparametric Bayesian Inference in Applications” by Peter Mueller, Fernando A. Quintana, Garritt Page: More Nonparametric Bayesian Inference in Applications.     

Present bias and health

This study uses a dynamic discrete choice model to examine the degree of present bias and naivete about present bias in individuals’ health care decisions. Clinical guidelines exist for several common chronic diseases. Although the empirical evidence for some guidelines is strong, many individuals with these diseases do not follow the guidelines. Using persons with diabetes as a case study, we find evidence of substantial present bias and naivete. Counterfactual simulations indicate the importance of present bias and naivete in explaining low adherence rates to health care guidelines.     

The “Citizen Scientist”: Reflections on the Public Role of Scientists in Response to Emerging Biotechnologies in New Zealand

Much of the traditional discussion on science and society engagement has concentrated on the role (and even duties) of citizens in response to science, and on attempts to scientise civilian consciousness to appreciate the benefits of scientific progress. Irwin’s (1995) concept of “Citizen Science” was an important milestone in our understanding of “science and society” relations, which focused attention on the needs and concerns of citizens and looked to a new form of science “enacted by citizens themselves” (Irwin 1995: ix). In this paper, I consider the other side of the science and society relationship by focusing on the scientist as citizen. Over time, a significant minority of scientists have been active in raising public concerns around the social impacts of science and technology, particularly around biotechnology and nanotechnology. This paper presents results from a New Zealand study that engaged scientists with community groups in dialogue about biotechnology. I discuss how this may represent an emerging form of scientific reflexivity and consider the implications for future engagement practice.