Stages of change in batterers and their response to treatment

One important dimension of individual differences among batterers is their readiness to change. According to the transtheoretical model (Prochaska & DiClemente, 1984), all individuals go through precontemplation, contemplation, preparation, action, and maintenance before a change in behavior is accomplished. The applicability of this model to intimate partner violence was assessed by administering the University of Rhode Island Change Assessment (URICA) scales (with reference to their domestic violent behavior) to 210 court-ordered male batterers. Their responses were clustered, and two clusters were derived and then compared on other measures. As hypothesized, cluster 2 individuals (characterized by a profile of URICA scale scores suggesting an earlier stage of change) self-reported less initial distress (depression, anxiety, and alcohol abuse), less violence, and fewer problems with anger than cluster 1 individuals (characterized by URICA scale sores suggesting a later stage of change), although partners reported no difference in violence perpetrated by the two clusters. Cluster 1 individuals evidenced greater improvement in self-reported depression, anxiety, and anger control. Strategies to engage the more resistant cluster 2 individuals as well as suggestions for future research are considered.     

Reciprocity, Altruism, Solidarity: A Dynamic Model

Reciprocity is a decisive behavioural rule resulting in successful co-operation or deterrence. In this paper, a dynamic model is proposed, where reciprocity is described by changes in altruistic (or malevolent) ties. Multiple steady states may exist in one of which there may be general cooperation (solidarity) and the other being one of universal malice (war of each individual against all other individuals). We apply our theory to a number of examples, illustrating that the agents’ initial preferences determine whether a steady state of solidarity, selfishness or malice will emerge.     

Determinants of voluntary assurance on sustainability reports: an empirical analysis

Driven by the ongoing discussion of corporate responsibility, growing numbers of companies have been publishing what have become known as sustainability reports. These reports have in part been subject to voluntary external assurance. Although the percentage of assured reports is significant, the market for this kind of assurance is still in an early stage of development. In this context the present article will ascertain the theoretical determining factors in the demand for voluntary external assurance and subject these in relation to the markets in Germany, the Netherlands and Great Britain to empirical analysis. In the context of the development of hypotheses shaped by agency theory, the constructs of agency costs and signalling can be distinguished. Variables measuring these constructs will be examined. It can be shown that the type and scope of the reporting (i.e., the choice of the Global Reporting Initiative ‘application level’), the existence of a sustainability department, and the size of the company are associated with the demand for voluntary assurance. Additional control variables are examined. Here it appears that the demand for external assurance is highest in Great Britain. Finally, research opportunities in this field will be indicated and recent normative developments briefly sketched.     

OPTIMAL EXCHANGE RATES: A MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE APPROACH

Motivated by the observation that exchange‐rate management resembles market‐making, we use microstructure theory to conduct a welfare analysis of exchange‐rate management, including the “corner solutions” of a free float and a fixed peg. We show that a policy that smoothes out exchange‐rate fluctuations needs to trade off the welfare gain due to lower risk exposure of local producers against the trading losses that the policy would generate due to speculation. We identify the conditions under which exchange‐rate management can increase welfare and argue that these conditions are more likely to be satisfied in illiquid markets, mainly small economies and emerging markets. We also explore the role of a Tobin tax (assuming enforceability) in facilitating exchange‐rate management. (JEL: E58, F31, G14, O24)     

NORMS MAKE PREFERENCES SOCIAL

We explore the idea that prosocial behavior in experimental games is driven by social norms imported into the laboratory. Under this view, differences in behavior across subjects is driven by heterogeneity in sensitivity to social norms. We introduce an incentivized method of eliciting individual norm‐sensitivity, and we show how it relates to play in public goods, trust, dictator, and ultimatum games. We show how our observations can be rationalized in a stylized model of norm‐dependent preferences under reasonable assumptions about the nature of social norms. Then we directly elicit norms in these games to test the robustness of our interpretation.