Testing Infants' Discrimination With the Orientation Latency Procedure

A new discrimination procedure based on the measurement of visual orientation latency to speech stimuli is introduced. Each participant listens to a series of short familiarization test trials. In each trial, 5 to 7 centrally‐presented familiarization stimuli are followed by laterally‐presented test stimuli. Infants were found to orient faster to different‐category than to same‐category test stimuli. This result was found despite a high degree of prosodic variability in the familiarization and test stimuli introduced by changes in talker and speaking rate. The combination of a multitrial design with use of acoustic and prosodic variability seems suitable for studying the representation of phonological categories.     

Employment Patterns of Less-Skilled Workers: Links to Children’s Behavior and Academic Progress

Using data from five waves of the Women’s Employment Survey (WES; 1997–2003), we examine the links between low-income mothers’ employment patterns and the emotional behavior and academic progress of their children. We find robust and substantively important linkages between several different dimensions of mothers’ employment experiences and child outcomes. The pattern of results is similar across empirical approaches—including ordinary least squares and child fixed-effect models, with and without an extensive set of controls. Children exhibit fewer behavior problems when mothers work and experience job stability (relative to children whose mothers do not work). In contrast, maternal work accompanied by job instability is associated with significantly higher child behavior problems (relative to employment in a stable job). Children whose mothers work full-time and/or have fluctuating work schedules also exhibit significantly higher levels of behavior problems. However, full-time work has negative consequences for children only when it is in jobs that do not require cognitive skills. Such negative consequences are completely offset when this work experience is in jobs that require the cognitive skills that lead to higher wage growth prospects. Finally, fluctuating work schedules and full-time work in non-cognitively demanding jobs are each strongly associated with the probability that the child will repeat a grade or be placed in special education.     

A FORMAL EXPLICATION OF THE CONCEPT OF FAMILY HOMEOSTASIS

The concept of family homeostasis and related concepts such as family rules and family feedback mechanisms came under heavy fire in a recent article by Dell (1982). It is not easy to evaluate the arguments brought forth by Dell, since the concepts in question seem to have never been formally explicated. Most of this article is devoted to an attempt to develop such a formal explication. Dell's arguments are then examined one by one in the light of this explication, and most of them are shown to be mistaken. His main conclusion, that the concept of homeostasis should be replaced by a concept of coherence, is rejected.     

Is there a moral economy of state formation? Religious minorities and repertoires of regime integration in the Middle East and Western Europe, 600–1614

This article asks how state formation processes informed the normative frameworks of late-Medieval and early-Modern Latin European and Muslim Middle Eastern regimes. The question at hand is not why pre-Modern regimes discriminated against religious minorities (as well as other groups) during the pre-Modern period, but why Western European states consistently engaged in mass expulsions of their non-Christian subjects from the late thirteenth century onward and the neighboring states of the Middle East did not. Rather than addressing these peculiar policies as a function of religion, culture, or law the article adopts a comparative, contextual method. With the aid of Charles Tilly’s theoretical perspectives it isolates critical variables in pre-Modern Middle Eastern state formation. These variables are then used to shed light on the circumstances and relationships that led to Latin Europe’s mass expulsions of Jews and Muslims between 1290 and 1614.     

On Optimal Rules of Persuasion

A speaker wishes to persuade a listener to accept a certain request. The conditions under which the request is justified, from the listener's point of view, depend on the values of two aspects. The values of the aspects are known only to the speaker and the listener can check the value of at most one. A mechanism specifies a set of messages that the speaker can send and a rule that determines the listener's response, namely, which aspect he checks and whether he accepts or rejects the speaker's request. We study mechanisms that maximize the probability that the listener accepts the request when it is justified and rejects the request when it is unjustified, given that the speaker maximizes the probability that his request is accepted. We show that a simple optimal mechanism exists and can be found by solving a linear programming problem in which the set of constraints is derived from what we call the L‐principle.     

Dilemmas of an Economic Theorist

What on earth are economic theorists like me trying to accomplish? This paper discusses four dilemmas encountered by an economic theorist: The dilemma of absurd conclusions: Should we abandon a model if it produces absurd conclusions or should we regard a model as a very limited set of assumptions that will inevitably fail in some contexts? The dilemma of responding to evidence: Should our models be judged according to experimental results? The dilemma of modelless regularities: Should models provide the hypothesis for testing or are they simply exercises in logic that have no use in identifying regularities? The dilemma of relevance: Do we have the right to offer advice or to make statements that are intended to influence the real world?