Manipulation via Endowments in Exchange Markets with Indivisible Goods

We consider exchange markets with heterogeneous indivisible goods. We are interested in exchange rules that are efficient and immune to manipulations via endowments (either with respect to hiding or destroying part of the endowment or transferring part of the endowment to another trader). We consider three manipulability axioms: hiding-proofness, destruction-proofness, and transfer-proofness. We prove that no rule satisfying efficiency and hiding-proofness (which together imply individual rationality) exists. For two agents with separable and responsive preferences, we show that efficient, individually rational, and destruction-proof rules exist. However, for some profiles of separable preferences, no rule is efficient, individually rational, and destruction-proof. In the case of transfer-proofness the compatibility with efficiency and individual rationality for the two-agent case extends to the unrestricted domain. If there are more than two agents, for some profiles of separable preferences, no rule is efficient, individually rational, and transfer-proof.     

Wie ist Globalisierung m?glich? Zur Entstehung globaler Vergleichshorizonte am Beispiel von Wissenschaft und Sport

The article conceives of globalization as a highly improbable phenomenon. In contrast to the mainstream of the globalization literature, we ask under which conditions the globalization of societal fields can potentially become an empirical reality. We proceed in three steps: The second part presents an explanatory model that identifies the conditions under which global horizons of comparison may emerge. Our model is predicated on the assumption that the globalization of societal fields is enabled not only by relational linkages (??ties??) but by public comparative discourses (??cultural linkages??) too. In the third part, we apply this model on the development of modern science and competitive sports, proving the explanatory power of our model and showing that in both cases global horizons of comparison first consolidated in the late 19^th century. The final part concludes with reflections on commonalities and differences between the two cases, on the applicability of the model to other social fields (e.g, economy) and on its implications for the analysis of globalization processes.     

Achtsamkeit in der Schule durch ein professionsbezogenes Achtsamkeitstraining für LehrerInnen

This article argues for a culture of mindfulness in schools. It postulates that mindfulness is a necessary part of health promotion in schools since it constitutes an important personal resource in solving urgent problems such as increasing adipositas, addictive behavior and procrastination. Mindfulness of teachers is stated as an essential catalyst for mindfulness-based activities in schools. First results of a research project are presented and discussed which developed a profession-related mindfulness training adapted especially for teachers.     

Private Bag: Speech by Secretary of the Interior,Richard Lamm—9/21/2030

Population and Environment -     

MONITORING IN TEAMS: USING LABORATORY EXPERIMENTS TO STUDY A THEORY OF THE FIRM

Alchian and Demsetz’s influential explanation of the classical business firm (The American Economic Review, 1972, 62, 777–795) argues that there is need for a concentrated residual claim in the hands of a central agent, to motivate the monitoring of workers. We model monitoring as a way to transform team production from a collective action dilemma with strong free riding incentives to a productivity‐enhancing opportunity with strong private marginal incentives to contribute effort. In an experiment, we have subjects experience team production without monitoring, team production with a central monitor, and team production with peer monitoring. Then subjects vote on whether to employ the central monitor, who gets to keep a fixed share of the team output, or to rely on peer monitoring, which entails a coordination or free riding problem. Our subjects usually prefer peer monitoring but they switch to the specialist when unable to successfully self‐monitor. We provide evidence for situations in which team members resist the appointing of a central monitor and succeed in overcoming coordination and free riding problems as well as for a situation in which an Alchian–Demsetz‐like firm grows in the laboratory.