Estimation of Error and Bias in Bayesian Monte Carlo Decision Analysis Using the Bootstrap

Bayesian Monte Carlo (BMC) decision analysis adopts a sampling procedure to estimate likelihoods and distributions of outcomes, and then uses that information to calculate the expected performance of alternative strategies, the value of information, and the value of including uncertainty. These decision analysis outputs are therefore subject to sample error. The standard error of each estimate and its bias, if any, can be estimated by the bootstrap procedure. The bootstrap operates by resampling (with replacement) from the original BMC sample, and redoing the decision analysis. Repeating this procedure yields a distribution of decision analysis outputs. The bootstrap approach to estimating the effect of sample error upon BMC analysis is illustrated with a simple value-of-information calculation along with an analysis of a proposed control structure for Lake Erie. The examples show that the outputs of BMC decision analysis can have high levels of sample error and bias.     

Efficiency in religious organizations

Churches must realize that the management of their human resources is critical. The U.S. Catholic Church in recent years has been this problem take on even more significance with the apparent shortage of priests. This article considers this problem in light of a relatively new methodology, data envelopment analysis, which compares organizations to comparable best-practice units. The authors conclude that the Church would benefit from a better distribution of priests, both within and across dioceses. They also conclude that the use of deacons and priestless parishes can be effective in some circumstances.     

Assessing the influence of regional Environmental Protection Agency offices on state hazardous waste enforcement decisions

In assessing the influence of regional Environmental Protection Agency EPA offices on the state management of hazardous waste programs, we focused on the extent to which federal administrative decisions affect levels of enforcement activity by state environmental agencies and whether these effects vary over time. Our results indicated that state enforcement actions were affected by state program capacity variables such as primacy and the strength of existing hazardous waste policies as well as one federal-level factor—the distribution of grant monies. The impact of federal oversight decisions was minimal.     

Additive and Multiplicative Models and Multistage Carcinogenesis Theory

In light of the Armitage-Doll multistage carcinogenesis theory, this paper examines the assumption that an additive relative risk relationship is indicative of two carcinogens that affect the same stage in the cancer process. We present formulas to compute excess cancer risks for a variety of patterns for limited exposure durations to two carcinogens that affect the first and penultimate stages; and using an index of synergy proposed by Thomas (1982), we find a number of these patterns to produce additive, or nearly additive, relative risk relationships. The consistent feature of these patterns is that the two exposure periods are of short duration and occur close together.     

Outsourcing and union power

The outsourcing of union work and jobs either diffuses or diminishes union membership, depending on perspective and situation. The correlation of trends in union membership to trends in union power, while less than perfect, has until recently been relatively strong over the past sixteen years. The fact that as diverse a sample of unions as AFSCME, SEIU, and UAW have chosen to make outsourcing a prominent labor/public relations issue suggests that the correlation continues to be perceived by the union movement to be significant, notwithstanding the efforts of the “new” leadership of the AFL-CIO to break that link with respect to union political power by “taxing” member unions and their members to contribute both money and militancy to the 1996 election cycle. Although outsourcing may lead only to the diffusion of union membership either within or between unions, as opposed to the diminution of union membership, this fact has not received a great deal of attention. The net effect on total union membership of outsourcing from one union employer to another union employer is unclear, although the effect on the membership of the union at the outsourcing employer is not. The redistribution of membership within a union as a result of outsourcing is likely to have little immediate impact on union power. However, as even the best case scenario presented above suggests, it may have significant long-run deleterious effects on union bargaining power by taking labor out of a sheltered market and putting it into potentially competitive market. This is particularly likely to be the case when outsourcing (1) places the outsourced work into a different industry or wage contour and (2) creates the possibility of moving from sole-source to multiplesource supplier arrangements. The redistribution of membership between unions as a result of outsourcing is unlikely to have a major impact on union power broadly defined. It can have, however, serious deleterious effects in terms of the power of an individual union, as suggested in my “competitive case” scenario. The fact that one union’s losses due to outsourcing may be another union’s gain is of little consolation to the losing union. That act, in and of itself, may make the threat of outsourcing a potential union “Achilles heel” at the bargaining table by placing it into competition with some other, perhaps unknown, union as well as possibly nonunion competition. The most obvious threat to union power comes from outsourcing that diminishes union membership overall by transferring jobs from union to nonunion employers. The willingness and ability of employers to move work/jobs entirely out of the orbit of union control constitutes, in terms of power and particularly union bargaining power, a revisitation of the phenomenon of the “runaway shop.” It may also be viewed as a proactive form of hiring permanent replacements for (potentially) striking workers. The union options in dealing with such a challenge are to endeavor to preclude outsourcing through legislation or collective bargaining or to chase the work by organizing the unorganized, hopefully with the help of the unionized outsourcing employer. Neither option may be easy, but as the 1996 auto industry negotiations suggest, the former may be less difficult than the latter. The possibility that outsourcing from union to nonunion employer may provide unions with the power to organize from the top (outsourcer) down (outsourcee) cannot be entirely ignored as the issue of supplier “neutrality” reportedly was raised in the 1996 auto negotiations. The adverse effects of outsourcing on union political and financial power, by virtue of its impact on the level or distribution of union membership, can and may well be offset by an increase in union activism—as measured by dues levels, merger activity, organizing commitment, and political action. The adverse effects of outsourcing on union bargaining power are more problematical from the union standpoint. The effect of outsourcing, whatever its rationale or scenario, appears to be to put union labor back into competition. Thus, outsourcing constitutes yet another challenge to the labor movement in its ongoing and seemingly increasingly unsuccessful battle to take and keep U.S. union labor out of competition by proving itself able and willing to organize to the extent of the market and standardizing wages in that market.     

PRODUCT CHARACTERISTICS, HUMAN CAPITAL, AND LABOR MARKET SEGMENTS:

This article contends that one key to understanding different forms of work organization lies in the nature of the products being created. Product characteristics are proposed to be critical determinants of the type of human capital, either general or firm specific. Following from prior theory, labor market barriers develop based on type of human capital. These barriers then have a direct bearing on employee rewards. The nature of the product distinction is captured with a comparison of two product-types (goods and services) conceived as theoretically distinct. General skills are hypothesized to be more important in the service-producing sector, while firm-specific skills are hypothesized to be more important in the goods-producing sector. Empirical analyses using the 1991 General Social Survey compare workers in the service-producing and goods-producing sectors to illustrate differences in the salience of firm-specific and general skills. Two hypotheses are supported. Firm-specific skills have a stronger effect on earnings in manufacturing industries than in service industries. Also, skills acquired from on-the-job training, when compared with other skills, are more weakly related to service employee rewards. These distinctions between sectors suggest insights into structures unique to the service employment workplace.