国际社会中的权力、合法性与秩序

权力是一种社会现象,它不仅受到行为体之间物质资源分配的制约,而且也受到行为体所处的社会和物质生活环境的重大制约,更重要的是它受到合法性政治的制约。合法性政治对现代国际秩序的性质和发展的影响有两种方式。第一种方式是合法性政治塑造了现代国际秩序的轮廓,这种秩序最明显的特征是主权的全球化。第二种方式涉及特殊责任的界定和分配在处理全球挑战中的作用。从历史上看,国际秩序是通过特定国家尤其是大国之间的特殊责任分配来获得的,但由于这些特殊责任分配制度或多或少地会在主权国家之间构成一定的等级秩序,因此,它们将面临那些没有享受特殊责任的国家的挑战,或者是那些认为享有特殊责任的行为体没有履行好自己义务的行为体的挑战。     

Strategic sustainability and financial performance: exploring abnormal returns

The ongoing empirical debate about whether SRI is associated, if anything, with subpar or surpassing financial performance is characterized by a somewhat indistinct focus and the infeasibility of tapping the full potential of existing models. By indistinct focus, we mean an analysis based on an aggregation of a myriad of SRI factors that potentially affect a firm’s financial performance. The inability of taking full advantage of existing models is reflected by the fact that studies with European data have not been able to comprehensively account for systematic risk tilts. This paper presents a portfolio analysis that overcomes these issues by analyzing a distinct selection of small and innovative firms. We argue that both their strategic implementation of Corporate Social Responsibility and the general growth in socially responsible investments (SRI) lend themselves to an explanation for positive abnormal returns of this portfolio. We account for the idiosyncratic investment style of SRI by introducing a comprehensive pan-European risk-adjusted portfolio analysis based on the Carhart four-factor model. A novel propensity score matching method in conjunction with the estimation of structural models completes the conventional robustness checks in the literature.     

Ownership concentration beyond good and evil: is there an effect on corporate performance?

In this paper, we analyze the relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance, while accounting for the endogeneity of the ownership structure, a potential curvilinearity of the performance effect, differences in corporate governance systems, and alternative performance measures. Using a sample of 1,079 firms from 8 countries we find evidence for a curvilinear effect of ownership concentration on firm performance, which becomes insignificant after controlling for endogeneity. Hence, our results support the findings by Demsetz and Villalonga (J Corp Fin 7(3):209?C233, 2001). More research is needed to disentangle the contradictory findings in prior works.     

Sins of the parents: Self-control as a buffer between supervisors' previous experience of family undermining and subordinates' perceptions of abusive supervision

Drawing upon social learning theory, the intergenerational transmission of violence hypothesis, and research on self-control, we develop a model of the relationships among previous experiences of family undermining, self-control, and abusive supervision. We tested the model with data obtained from supervisor–employee matched pairs in Study 1 and matched triads in Study 2. Results revealed that: 1) supervisors who experienced higher levels of family undermining (whether reported by the immediate supervisor or a sibling) during childhood are more likely to engage in abusive supervisory behaviors as adults; and 2) this relationship is moderated such that it is stronger for supervisors with low self-control. Overall, our results highlight the role of self-control in mitigating the impact of supervisors' previous experiences of family undermining on subordinate perceptions of abusive supervision, even after controlling for previously established antecedents.     

Trust and adaptive learning in implicit contracts

Trust is a phenomenon that still is quite rarely investigated in agency theory. According to a common intuitive reasoning, trust should develop over time and it should evolve even in finite implicit-contract relationships. However, if the contracting parties are fully rational, theory cannot explain this. We therefore extend the standard model and develop a model of a finite relationship where the principal promises to pay a voluntary period-by-period bonus if the agent has worked according to the implicit agreement. The agent is boundedly rational and unable to foresee the principal’s future bonus decisions. The principal is, with some probability, honest and pays a promised bonus even in situations where ex-post cheating would be optimal. Based on the agent’s adaptive learning process, we show how trust evolves depending on the principal’s bonus-payment strategy. Depending on different levels of the agent’s bounded rationality, we derive the principal’s optimal pure strategy as part of a unique equilibrium. In an extension we show that the results are robust if the agent has bounded recall. The optimal strategy pattern mirrors a subset of trigger strategies which is exogenous in the standard model. Our findings imply that subjective incentives are more effective with increasing tenure of employees, or, that the optimal level of trust depends on how fast work environments change.     

Set Identified Linear Models

We analyze the identification and estimation of parameters β satisfying the incomplete linear moment restrictions E(z^⊤(xβ−y)) = E(z^⊤u(z)), where z is a set of instruments and u(z) an unknown bounded scalar function. We first provide empirically relevant examples of such a setup. Second, we show that these conditions set identify β where the identified set B is bounded and convex. We provide a sharp characterization of the identified set not only when the number of moment conditions is equal to the number of parameters of interest, but also in the case in which the number of conditions is strictly larger than the number of parameters. We derive a necessary and sufficient condition of the validity of supernumerary restrictions which generalizes the familiar Sargan condition. Third, we provide new results on the asymptotics of analog estimates constructed from the identification results. When B is a strictly convex set, we also construct a test of the null hypothesis, β₀∈B, whose size is asymptotically correct and which relies on the minimization of the support function of the set B− {β₀}. Results of some Monte Carlo experiments are presented.     

Internationaler Joint Venture Erfolg: Eine Meta-Analyse

To analyze the success factors of international joint ventures (IJVs), this study meta-analytically integrates 106 studies of 32.318 firms. The results show that the success factors from the partner level (e.g., operational and strategic fit, partner experience) and IJV level (e.g., commitment, trust, control, interdependence, conflicts, conflict management, and organizational learning) determine IJV performance. Further, results reveal that IJV type, industry, and geographical distance moderate the relationships between success factors and IJV performance. Thus, this study contributes to extant knowledge by synthesizing and contextualizing quantitative empirical IJV research.     

Practical implications of the resource-based view

Managers use many decision making tools when developing a firm’s strategic direction. Ideally, such tools yield a good solution for an acceptable amount of application effort. This paper presents the results of an experimental research project that compares the effectiveness of a theory-based strategic decision making tool, theVRIO-framework, with two alternative decision making heuristics for predicting the stock-market performance of different companies. First, we assess how the predictions of theVRIO-framework contrast with decisions based on “gut feeling” using the forecasts derived from a recognition-based decision making tool, theRecognition Heuristic. Secondly, theVRIO-framework’spredictive power is compared to predictions derived fromAnalyst Ratings. Our results suggest that the predictions of theVRIO-framework are superior to those of theRecognition Heuristic and theAnalyst Ratings, supporting the practical usefulness of resource-based theory. We conclude that resource analysis is important to strategic decision making and discuss the implications of our findings for future research and management practice.     

Why Health Care Reform Now? Strategic Framing and the Passage of Obamacare

Economic reform and health care reform were both focal points outlined in President Obama's policy agenda, with increasing pressure to address economic and social insecurity given that President Obama entered office during the Great Recession (2007–09). The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (commonly known as ‘Obamacare’) successfully passed in March 2010 in the context of the economic crisis. We argue that the strategic framing of the economic crisis, through reasoning and arguments linking health care reform with economic downfall, is important in understanding the successful passage of Obamacare, and that this is reflected through strategic frames in speeches delivered by the President on health care reform. Health care reform has been successful not in spite of but rather because of the economic crisis of 2008, that allowed President Obama to use a strategic frame focusing on costs and economic problems. The two main frames identified are the ‘market’ and ‘rights’ frames. President Obama's strategic frames specifically surrounding the economic and cost‐containment priority of health care reform are categorized as a ‘market’ frame in this article. He used this frame until the passage of the law in 2010, when the frame shifted to ‘rights’ frames, largely portrayed through anecdotes and focused on the concept of ‘access’ to care rather than the ‘cost’ of care. This is observable through tracking speeches and statements made in support of health care reform between 2009 and 2013.