The Role of Effort in Shifting Preference for Feedback Stimuli

ABSTRACT

Researchers have examined preference for the format of delivery of feedback, however little research has examined strategies to increase feedback and praise desirability. The current study aimed to evaluate whether preference shifted for stimuli that signaled work and for manager-praise stimuli that were delivered after work. Moreover, we sought to understand if these preference shifts were greater when the work was higher-effort compared to lower-effort work tasks (a phenomenon described in the basic literature as within-trial contrast). The study took place in a simulated work environment. Sixteen university students clicked on a shape that produced the work task, completed a mock medical data-entry task, and received manager-praise on an FR1 and FR20 schedule. At the start of the study and following each contingency exposure trials, they completed a preference assessment for both the shapes and the manager-feedback stimuli. The primary dependent variable was the percentage of preference change for two categories of stimuli – shapes presented at the beginning of trials that signaled which condition participants were in and manager-praise stimuli presented at the end of trials. Preference for the shape stimuli for both high- and low-effort stimuli decreased indicating that stimuli that signal work may become less preferred. Preference for the manager-praise stimuli for both high- and low-effort stimuli increased suggesting that stimuli that follow work may become more preferred. Overall, these data suggest that the conditions under which managers deliver feedback and praise may influence preference for those stimuli.     

Neighborhood context and racial differences in early adolescent sexual activity

Evidence suggests that African American youths initiate sexual activity at earlier ages than do European American or Latino youths. Using data from a multilevel study in Chicago, we developed and tested a neighborhood-based model of the timing of first adolescent intercourse that emphasizes the impact of neighborhood structural disadvantage and collective efficacy on early sexual activity (at ages 11 to 16). In turn, we explored the extent to which neighborhood factors account for racial differences in the timing of first intercourse. The findings indicate that demographic background, family processes, peer influences, and developmental risk factors account for about 30% of the baseline increased likelihood of early sexual onset for African American youths compared with European American youths. However, a significant residual racial difference remained even after we considered a host of micro-level factors. Neighborhood-level concentrated poverty largely explained this residual racial difference. Collective efficacy also independently contributed to the delay of sexual onset. No significant baseline difference in age of sexual initiation was found between Latino and European American youths.     

Effects of information on college students' perceptions of antidepressant medication

The authors examined the impact of pharmaceutical companies' advertisements on college students' perceptions of depression and concomitant treatment with antidepressants among 13 male and 31 female undergraduates from a midwestern university. The students were randomly assigned to groups that read either pharmaceutical company advertisements or scientific information about depression and its treatment. The analysis revealed that 40% of the women in the advertisement condition as opposed to 1 woman (6%) in the scientific condition rated themselves as having mild, moderate, or severe depression on the Beck Depression Inventory, second edition. Women in the advertisement condition were significantly more likely to believe that depression required treatment with antidepressant medication and were more willing than women in the scientific condition to suggest antidepressant treatment to others.     

The Home Office and random allocation experiments

By examining the history of the random experiment in the Home Office in the United Kingdom, this article demonstrates that research is not an altogether rational process and that fashion, personality, and politics are at least as important as science and evidence when setting research and policy programs and determining methodologies. The article also shows that even in 1970, the research world was a village and that issues and fashions on one side of it could determine the outcome of decisions on the other side, even though they had no direct relevance. On a more optimistic note, the article shows how the fashions go in cycles so that if you could not get the research funded in the last cycle, just wait 20 years for the cycle to come around and try again.     

Neighborhood Structure,Social Organization,and Number of Short‐Term Sexual Partnerships

We examine the relationship between neighborhood structural characteristics, social organization, and the sexual partnering practices of adults. Analyses of 1990 census and 1995–1997 survey‐based data on Chicago neighborhoods and adult sexual activity reveal for men a number of neighborhood influences on sexual partnering practices. First, residential stability is negatively associated with having a short‐term sexual partner in the last year. Second, neighborhood social ties are positively associated with short‐term sexual partnering in neighborhoods with low levels of collective efficacy—the combination of cohesion and shared expectations for beneficial action among neighbors—but this effect is substantially reduced as collective efficacy increases. Moreover, neighborhood collective efficacy and social ties mediate the effect of residential stability on sexual partnering practices. Neighborhood characteristics were not associated with short‐term sexual partnering for women.     

CORRUPTION: TOP DOWN OR BOTTOM UP?

This article studies the impact of corruption on an economy with a hierarchical government. In particular, we study whether centralizing corruption within the higher level of government increases or decreases the total amount of corruption. We show that when the after-tax relative profitability of the formal sector as compared to that of the informal sector is high enough, adding a layer of government increases the total amount of corruption. By contrast, for high-enough public wages and/or an efficient monitoring technology of the bureaucratic system, centralization of corruption at the top of the government hierarchy redistributes bribe income from the lower level to the upper level. In the process, total corruption is reduced and the formal sector of the economy expands.     

The Prevalence of Uncorrected Refractive Errors in Adolescents Incarcerated in a Youth Detention Center

The purpose of this study was to determine the number of residents requiring corrective lenses in a youth detention center for juveniles from 12 to 18 years old over a 2-year period. A greater number of adolescents incarcerated for criminal activity in a detention center had uncorrected refractive errors (34.87 %) as compared to a comparable population in the public school system (22 %). The prevalence of significant refractive errors among incarcerated adolescents in this study is significantly higher than has been reported previously. The current study found a refractive error rate of almost 35 %. This difference can be explained by a number of factors in their social environments and identifies an area for potential intervention to reduce antisocial behavior in this population.     

REPEATED LOBBYING BY COMMERCIAL LOBBYISTS AND SPECIAL INTERESTS

Developing a lobbying model of repeated agency, we explain previously unexplained features of the real‐world lobbying industry. Lobbying is divided between direct representation by special interests to policymakers, and indirect representation where special interests employ professional intermediaries called commercial lobbyists to lobby policymakers on their behalf. Our analytical structure allows us to explain several trends in lobbying. For example, using the observation that in the United States over the last 20 years, policymakers have spent an increasing amount of their time fundraising as opposed to legislating, we are able to explain why the share of commercial lobbyist activity in total lobbying has risen dramatically and now constitutes over 60% of the total. The key scarce resource in our analysis is policymakers' time. Policymakers allocate this resource via implicit repeated agency contracts that are used to incent special interests and commercial lobbyists to provide a mix of financial contributions and information on policy proposals. These implicit agency contracts solve both an information problem in the presence of unverifiable policy information and a contracting problem in the absence of legal enforcement. These repeated relationships, that are often described using the pejorative term “cronyism” in the popular press, may in certain circumstances be welfare improving. (JEL D72, D82, H1, P16)