‘Our young people are worse’: family backgrounds,educational progression and placement options in public care systems

Introducing continental European approaches to UK child welfare practice raises a problem of comparison: to what extent are the problems and issues similar to or different from one country compared to another. Social pedagogues trained in continental Europe and working in English residential care services often encountered the phrase ‘our young people are worse’ from their English colleagues, with the implication that the social pedagogic approach was not suitable for the client group. This paper examines two propositions: (1) that in the context of introducing the continental European approach of social pedagogy into children's residential care services in England, young people are ‘different’ in England compared to other European countries and (2) that the placement options and practices for young people living away from their birth parents in continental European countries differ from those in England. Using data from a five nation study of young people from public care backgrounds, the paper argues that while family backgrounds are remarkably similar there are marked differences in the child welfare systems that might account for the perception that young people in care are ‘worse’ in England.     

The Effects of Beliefs Versus Risk Attitude on Bargaining Outcomes

In bargaining environments with uncertain disagreement or “impasse” outcomes (e.g., litigation or labor strike outcomes), there is an identification problem that confounds data interpretation. Specifically, the minimally acceptable settlement value from a risk-averse (risk-loving) but unbiased-belief bargainer is empirically indistinguishable from what one could get with risk-neutrality and pessimistically (optimistically) biased beliefs. This article reports results from a controlled bargaining experiment where data on both risk attitude and beliefs under uncertainty are generated in order to assess their relative importance in bargaining experiment outcomes. The average lab subject is risk-averse, yet optimistic with respect to uncertainty, which is consistent with existing studies that examine each in isolation. I also find that the effects of optimism dominate those of risk-aversion. Optimistic bargainers are significantly more likely to dispute and have aggressive final bargaining positions. Dispute rates are not statistically affected by risk attitude, but there is some evidence that risk aversion leads to a weakened bargaining position. Though additional research is needed to understand the limits of extending these results, a key implication follows. In uncertainty environments where optimism dominates, increased settlement rates are more likely achieved by minimizing impasse uncertainty (to limit the potential for optimism) rather than maximizing uncertainty (to weaken the reservation point of risk-averse bargainers), as has been argued in the dispute resolution literature.      

Playing the Recording Once or Twice: Effects on Listening Test Performances

Much debate surrounds the issue of whether allowing candidates to listen to recordings twice is more desirable in language tests than offering just one opportunity. Using regression models, this study investigates, analyses and interconnects both item difficulty and stimulus length in relation to the frequency of stimulus presentation and its effect on test results. The study involved 1,266 eighth-grade learners with perceived A2/B1 level in English as a first foreign language. The final discussion seeks to offer explanations for the results that clearly indicate the advantages of listening once; likewise, potential implications for listening tests and classroom practice are raised.     

EXCLUSION AND REINTEGRATION IN A SOCIAL DILEMMA

Using a social dilemma game, we study the cooperative behavior of individuals who reintegrate their group after being excluded by their peers. We manipulate the length of exclusion and whether this length is imposed exogenously or results from a vote. We show that people are willing to exclude the least cooperators and they punish more, and more severely, chronic defections. In return, a longer exclusion has a higher disciplining effect on cooperation after reintegration, but only when the length of exclusion is not chosen by group members. Its relative disciplining effect on cooperation after reintegration is smaller when the length of exclusion results from a vote. In this environment, a quicker reintegration also limits retaliation. The difference in the impact of long versus short exclusion on retaliation is larger when the length of exclusion is chosen by group members than when it is exogenous. Post-reintegration cooperation and forgiveness depend not only on the length of exclusion but also on the perceived intentions of others when they punish. (JEL C92, H41, D23)     

Theoretical Beacons: Maturana's Theory in Clinical Practice

This paper introduces several theoretical constructs drawn from the work of Humberto Maturana that can be applied to a diverse range of clinical contexts, including supervision. These constructs are: love as a fundamental need of human beings; pathways of explanation: (Objectivity), Objectivity; Emotioning; Structural Coupling; Plasticity; Domains of Operational Coherences. These constructs assist in choosing a point of entry for specific clinical situations and form a foundation on which one's preferred model of practice can be built.