Simple nonparametric tests for a known standard survival based on censored data

It is often of interest in survival analysis to test whether the distribution of lifetimes from which the sample under study was derived is the same as a reference distribution. The latter can be specified on the basis of previous studies or on subject matter considerations. In this paper several tests are developed for the above hypothesis, suitable for right-censored observations. The tests are based on modifications of Moses' one-sample limits of some classical two-sample rank tests. The asymptotic distributions of the test statistics are derived, consistency is established for alternatives which are stochastically ordered with respect to the null, and Pitman asymptotic efficiencies are calculated relative to competing tests. Simulated power comparisons are reported. An example is given with data on the survival times of lung cancer patients.     

DYSFUNCTION AND FAILURE IN OPEN FAMILY SYSTEMS: II. CLINICAL ISSUES*

The “open family” model is widely used as a point of reference for healthy family functioning, but potential dysfunctional aspects of open families are not well understood. A unified theory is used to integrate diverse typological models of families to build a composite clinical picture of the disabled open family. The disabled open family is found to be chaotically enmeshed, caught in its commitment to collective problem solving. Its need for closure, tolerance for ambiguity, and expressive communication style can lead to intensely emotional sustained conflicts. Stress-related symptoms and aggressive acting out may be manifest in individuals, especially children. Dispersal of members may ultimately be necessitated by the exhausting process. Family therapy with the open family requires special attention to its style as a family and its characteristic responses to interventions. The unified theory is shown to be useful in planning strategy and choosing techniques for treatment of open families. The treatment issues connected with the pseudo-open family, a family with open values but severely limited resources in actual operation as an open system, are also highlighted.     

Emergent Marketing Strategies and Performance: The Effects of Market Uncertainty and Strategic Feedback Systems

Although many process‐based studies appear in the strategic management literature, little attention has been devoted to the formation process of marketing strategies. Drawing on enactment and information‐processing theories, this study views the external environment as a source of information (i.e. enacted) and organizations as information‐processing entities. We propose a conceptual framework of antecedents and market performance consequences of emergent marketing strategies and test it with a sample of 214 UK enterprises. The results suggest that dimensions of market uncertainty (i.e. dynamism and complexity) and strategic feedback systems influence the formation of emergent marketing strategy. Furthermore, the data reveal that market uncertainty aspects condition the association between emergent marketing strategies and market performance in different ways. These findings provide new insights into how emergent marketing strategies evolve and influence organizational outcomes.     

Unions’ and Firms’ Attitudes Towards Research Joint Ventures: When Will the Incentives Be Aligned?

Abstract. This paper studies the relationship between unionization and innovation activity. Under a unionized labour market, we find that when R&D spillovers are relatively low (high), cooperative, as well as non‐cooperative R&D is a strategic substitute (complement). Furthermore, irrespective of the spillover rate, cooperation increases firms’ profits, whereas it increases union utility only if spillovers are sufficiently high. Alignment of incentives between firms and unions requires that firms pay transfers in the form of ‘rent‐sharing’ to make a Research Joint Venture attractive to unions. Our results suggest that if spillovers are low enough, the amount of money that firms give up in order to buy unions’ acquiescence weakens their incentives to form a Research Joint Venture.