Explaining the High False Positive Rate of the South Oaks Gambling Screen

The South Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS) has been used extensively in estimating the prevalence of pathological gambling but produces a large number of false positive classifications. Ladouceur et al. (, Journal of Gambling Studies, 16, pp. 1–24) claim that misunderstanding of SOGS items is responsible for the high false positive rate. However, their study is open to a number of methodological criticisms. The current study, where clinical and non-clinical gamblers complete the SOGS with and without clarification, overcomes these problems. Results suggest that clarification does not have a significant overall effect on SOGS scores. This implies that item misunderstanding is not responsible for the false positive rate of the SOGS.     

Watergate and sociological theory

Theory and Society -     

A Sample Size Formula for Multiple Regression Studies

This article provides a readily accessible sample size formulafor use in designing multiple regression studies. The formulaprovides a more accurate determination than commonly used rulesof thumb, thus helping to maximize resources at the researcher'sdisposal. It is also easier to use than existing formulas basedon statistical power, a dimension not ordinarily addressed bysocial scientists. While the formula provided assumes a simplerandom sample, its use for stratified and cluster samples isdiscussed as well.     

Can Independent Distribution Function as a Mode of Corporate Governance?: An Examination of the UK Life Insurance Market

This paper examines whether independent modesof distribution can act as effective externalmonitors of managerial action. Becauseindependent agents are owners of the clientlist, control of an essential cash-generatingasset is concentrated in the hands of informedpurchasers. A consequence of this concentrationis the ability of independent agents tochastise bad management by moving customers toalternative management teams. Therefore,insurance companies that use independent agentsshould exhibit lower levels of opportunisticbehaviour. By studying 42 UK life insurancecompanies over the period 1990–1997 this studyprovides evidence that independent agents doreduce life companies' free cash flow,managerial expenses and shareholder dividends,while increasing policyholders' reserves.     

PRIZE‐BASED MECHANISMS FOR FUND‐RAISING: THEORY AND EXPERIMENTS

We study the optimal design of mechanisms for the private provision of public goods in a setting in which donors compete for a prize of commonly known value. We discuss equilibrium bidding in mechanisms that promote both conditional cooperation and competition (i.e., the lottery and the all‐pay auction with the lowest‐bid payment rule) and rank their fund‐raising performance vis‐à‐vis their standard (pay‐your‐own‐bid) counterparts. The theoretically optimal mechanism in this model is the lowest‐price all‐pay auction—an auction in which the highest bidder wins the prize and all bidders pay the lowest bid. The highest amount for the public good is generated in the unique, symmetric, mixed‐strategy equilibrium of this auction. In the laboratory, the theoretically optimal mechanism generates the highest level of donations with three bidders but not with two bidders. (JEL D44, D64)     

Anxious academics: talking back to the audit culture through collegial,critical and creative autoethnography

ABSTRACT

Our New Zealand university recently required us to produce portfolios for a research evaluation process. At a presentation promoting and explaining the process, we raised questions and objections. Pointlessly, it seemed. But we continued to rail and rant about it. One of us set in motion the following discussion, presented here as a series of critical and creative autoethnographic responses. We have resisted, with some anxiety, the urge and the expectation to theorize our experiences or to situate them within ‘the literature’. Our proposition is that ‘giving voice’ in the manner in which we have done so is an affective means of ‘talking back’ against neo-liberal regimes of performativity which may also be effective as a form of localized resistance, strengthening our ability to cope with the anxiety such regimes provoke. We hope our efforts encourage others to develop critical, creative and collegial responses to academic audit regimes.