Capital accumulation,endogenous population growth,and Easterlin cycles

In this paper we attempt to explain the occurrence of population cycles in industrialised economies where the birth rate depends on the difference between the actual and the expected consumption rate. This model of an endogenously growing population brings together Easterlin's idea of an adapting aspiration level with the neoclassical optimal growth paradigm. It is shown that in this highly aggregated demo-economic system (i.e., without inclusion of the age structure of a population) swings both in the economic and demographic variables may exist. The reason behind this strange optimal behaviour is identified to be an intertemporal substitution effect between current and future levels of consumption.We wish to thank A. Novak for helpful assistance and an anonymous referee for useful comments. Financial support by the Austrian Science Foundation under contract No. P6601 is acknowledged.     

The impact of migratory flows on population changes in Jordan: a Middle Eastern case study

The impact of migration into and out of Jordan on population changes from 1949 to the present is examined. The author briefly discusses population growth, spatial distribution, urban growth, economic conditions, and remittances. (SUMMARY IN FRE AND SPA)     

Telling lies in everyday life: Motivational and organizational consequences of sequential preferences

This study of a collection of self-observed lies told in everyday interactions indicated that all informants lied; that lying was, generally, an easy and spontaneous activity; and that our varied informants told lies in much the same manner and for the same reasons. The analysis of the general features of the interactions in which lies were embedded showed that many lies are the consequence of a preference system that promotes acceptance and hides rejection in the sequential organization of interaction. The lies found in pre-acceptance and pre-rejection sequences indicate that both parties contrive for acceptance. The negative cases of lies told in rejection of deprecating assessments suggest a broader theoretical template that encompasses the lies told for acceptance as a subset of the interactional preference for social solidarity. In contrast to the view that telling lies undermines social cohesion by interfering with trust, this study indicates that many lies are told to affirm affiliation.     

Tearoom trade: A research update

Conclusion Like many studies of covert deviance, this paper is based upon a captive sample of persons who have come to the attention of law enforcement agencies. The existence of Laud Humphreys' research, however, makes possible a comparison of police generated data with data obtained through observations and interviews with unapprehended offenders. Because police observations were so detailed, a rare opportunity to replicate a qualitative study presented itself. This research largely substantiates the picture drawn by Humphreys in his classic study,Tearoom Trade: Impersonal Sex in Public Places. Consistent with his observations, most tearoom participants (a) communicate through non-verbal gestures and seldom speak, (b) do not associate outside the tearoom or attempt to learn one another's identity or exchange biographical information, (c) do not use force or coercion or attempt to involve youths or children, (d) are primarily heterosexual and married, (e) depart separately with the insertor leaving first, (f) commit their sex acts out of sight of the entrance and accidental exposure, (g) do not undress or engage in anal sex, (h) break off sexual contact when someone enters the washroom, (i) rarely approach straight men, (j) read and write sexually explicit homosexual graffiti, and (k) linger inside and outside the washroom for someone to appear. In addition, (1) fellatio is generally not reciprocated and fellators are usually older men; (m) most offenders are neat in appearance; (n) some engage in series and simultaneous encounters; (o) encounters are brief, usually not exceeding twenty minutes; and (p) few have criminal records with the exception of those previously convicted of similar offenses.The behavior of players reveals remarkable consistency over time, from community to community, and across national boundaries. Many men, the majority of them married and primarily heterosexual, continue to visit out-of-the-way public washrooms in search of fast, impersonal, and exciting sex despite the risk to family, friends, job, and reputation. Although shopping malls have usurped public parks as the favorite locale of tearoom participants, the basic rules of the game and profile of the players—as Humphreys contends—remain the same over time and place.     

Neutralizing marginally deviant behavior: Bingo players and superstition

Bingo is one of the most popular and most accepted forms of gambling in the United States today. Yet, despite its popularity, many bingo players are not completely comfortable with the moral rightness of their actions. This participant observation and interview study spanning a 5 year period shows how bingo players use superstitious strategies, such as feelings, hunches and psi, attitudes, and luck to neutralize their marginally deviant behaviors.     

Smart money

Rick was an ambitious entrepreneur beginning the first of several businesses at age 16. He amassed a fortune by age 35. Between the ages of 42 and 50, his gambling rampage liquidated his assets, he lost his business and license to practice in his field, and he ended up in debt of over $1 million. Today at age 53 he is starting a new career in counseling and working with compulsive gamblers.     

New information from the State Committee on Statistics of the USSR

Selected data concerning the USSR are presented. They concern vital statistics by republic for 1989 for rural and urban areas, birth order, life expectancy by sex, and population change and vital statistics for cities with a population over one million.     

Effects of fixed costs in two-person sequential bargaining

Rubinstein (1982) considered the problem of dividing a given surplus between two players sequentially, and then proposed a model in which the two players alternately make and respond to each other's offers through time. He further characterized the perfect equilibrium outcomes, which depend on the players time preferences and order of moves. Using both equal and unequal bargaining cost conditions and an unlimited number of rounds, two experiments were designed to compare the perfect equilibrium model to alternative models based on norms of fairness. We report analyses of final agreements, first offers, and number of bargaining rounds, which provide limited support to the perfect equilibrium model, and then conclude by recommending a shift in focus from model testing to specification of the conditions favoring one model over another.