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51.
Consider a linear regression model with regression parameter β=(β1,…,βp) and independent normal errors. Suppose the parameter of interest is θ=aTβ, where a is specified. Define the s-dimensional parameter vector τ=CTβt, where C and t are specified. Suppose that we carry out a preliminary F test of the null hypothesis H0:τ=0 against the alternative hypothesis H1:τ≠0. It is common statistical practice to then construct a confidence interval for θ with nominal coverage 1−α, using the same data, based on the assumption that the selected model had been given to us a priori (as the true model). We call this the naive 1−α confidence interval for θ. This assumption is false and it may lead to this confidence interval having minimum coverage probability far below 1−α, making it completely inadequate. We provide a new elegant method for computing the minimum coverage probability of this naive confidence interval, that works well irrespective of how large s is. A very important practical application of this method is to the analysis of covariance. In this context, τ can be defined so that H0 expresses the hypothesis of “parallelism”. Applied statisticians commonly recommend carrying out a preliminary F test of this hypothesis. We illustrate the application of our method with a real-life analysis of covariance data set and a preliminary F test for “parallelism”. We show that the naive 0.95 confidence interval has minimum coverage probability 0.0846, showing that it is completely inadequate.  相似文献   
52.
Consider an election in which each of the n voters casts a vote consisting of a strict preference ranking of the three candidates A, B, and C. In the limit as n→∞, which scoring rule maximizes, under the assumption of Impartial Anonymous Culture (uniform probability distribution over profiles), the probability that the Condorcet candidate wins the election, given that a Condorcet candidate exists? We produce an analytic solution, which is not the Borda Count. Our result agrees with recent numerical results from two independent studies, and contradicts a published result of Van Newenhizen (Economic Theory 2, 69–83. (1992)).  相似文献   
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