THE RIGHT AMOUNT OF TRUST

We investigate the relationship between individual trust and individual economic performance. We find that individual income is hump‐shaped in a measure of intensity of trust beliefs. Our interpretation is that highly trusting individuals tend to assume too much social risk and to be cheated more often, ultimately performing less well than those with a belief close to the mean trustworthiness of the population. However, individuals with overly pessimistic beliefs avoid being cheated, but give up profitable opportunities, therefore underperforming. The cost of either too much or too little trust is comparable to the income lost by forgoing college. Our findings hold in large‐scale international survey data, as well as inside a country with high‐quality institutions, and are also supported by experimental findings. (JEL: A1, A12, D1, O15, Z1)     

An Interactive Framework for Multi-Person,Multiobjective Decisions

Group decision making in the presence of multiple conflicting objectives is complex and difficult. This paper describes and evaluates an iterative technique to facilitate multiple objective decision making by multiple decision makers. The proposed method augments an interactive multiobjective optimization procedure with a preference ranking tool and a consensus ranking heuristic. Two multiple objective linear programming (MOLP) solution approaches, the SIMOLP method of Reeves and Franz [39] and the interactive weighted Tchebycheff procedure of Steuer and Choo [49], are recommended optimization strategies to be used independently or in concert. Computational experience suggests that the proposed framework is an effective decision-making tool. The procedure quickly located excellent compromise solutions in a series of test problems with hypothetical decision makers. In addition, human decision makers gave positive evaluations of the procedure and the production plans the procedure provided for a resource allocation case problem.