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931.
Agents in a large population are randomly matched to play a certain game, payoffs in which represent fitness. Agents may have preferences that are different from fitness. They learn strategies according to their preferences, and evolution changes the preference distribution in the population according to fitness. When agents know the preferences of the opponent in a match, only efficient symmetric strategy profiles of the fitness game can be stable. When agents do not know the preferences of the opponent, only Nash equilibria of the fitness game can be stable. For 2 × 2 symmetric games I characterize preferences that are stable.Jel Codes: C72, A13 相似文献
932.
Dao-Zhi?ZengEmail author Liping?Fang Keith?W.?Hipel D.?Marc.?Kilgour 《Theory and Decision》2004,57(4):345-365
A new approach to policy analysis is formulated within the framework of the graph model for conflict resolution. A policy is defined as a plan of action for a decision maker (DM) that specifies the DM’s intended action starting at every possible state in a graph model of a conflict. Given a profile of policies, a Policy Stable State (PSS) is a state that no DM moves away from (according to its policy), and such that no DM would prefer to change its policy given the policies of the other DMs. The profile of policies associated to a PSS is called a Policy Equilibrium. Properties of PSSs are developed, and a refinement is suggested that restricts DMs to policies that are credible in that they are in the DM’s immediate interest. Relationships with existing stability definitions in the graph model for conflict resolution are then explored. 相似文献
933.
Harold?HoubaEmail author Dinard?van der?Laan Dirk?Veldhuizen 《Theory and Decision》2011,71(2):269-295
Lowest-unique sealed-bid auctions are auctions with endogenous participation, costly bids, and the lowest bid among all unique
bids wins. Properties of symmetric NEs are studied. The symmetric NE with the lowest expected gains is the maximin outcome under symmetric strategies, and it is the solution to a mathematical program. Comparative statics for the number
of bidders, the value of the item and the bidding cost are derived. The two bidders’ auction is equivalent to the Hawk–Dove
game. Simulations of replicator dynamics provide numerical evidence that the symmetric NE with the lowest expected gains is
also asymptotically stable. 相似文献
934.
Bayesian decision theory assumes that agents making choices assign subjective probabilities to outcomes, even in cases where information on probabilities is obviously absent. Here we show that agents that presume that they are equal risks can share risks mutually beneficially, even if the probabilities of losses are unpredictable or genuinely uncertain. We show also that different risk aversions among pool members do not exclude mutually beneficial loss sharing at uncertainty. Sharing when individuals’ losses differ in probabilities or in amount may still make individuals better off. Our findings are related to the theory of the insurance firm, to the management of development risks, and to the theory of justice.JEL Classification: D8, G22, L10, L30 相似文献
935.
George?WuEmail author Jiao?Zhang Mohammed?Abdellaoui 《Journal of Risk and Uncertainty》2005,30(2):107-131
The two versions of prospect theory, original prospect theory (OPT; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) and cumulative prospect theory (CPT; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), use different composition rules to combine the value function and the probability weighting function and hence value gambles with two or more non-zero outcomes differently. Previous tests of OPT and CPT have yielded mixed results, with some investigations supporting OPT and some supporting CPT. We extend the probability tradeoff consistency axiom used in Abdellaoui (2002) for CPT to OPT, and develop a critical test of the two prospect theories based on their respective probability tradeoff consistency conditions. An empirical investigation of the critical test shows that choices are consistent with OPT, but not CPT, for gambles that do not involve a certainty effect, and consistent with both CPT and OPT for gambles that do involve a certainty effect, provided that an editing operation is invoked for OPT. 相似文献
936.
Aspiration-based evolutionary dynamics have recently been used to model the evolution of fair play in the ultimatum game showing
that incredible threats to reject low offers persist in equilibrium. We focus on two extensions of this analysis: we experimentally
test whether assumptions about agent motivations (aspiration levels) and the structure of the game (binary strategy space)
reflect actual play, and we examine the problematic assumption embedded in the standard replicator dynamic that unhappy agents
who switch strategies may return to a rejected strategy without exploring other options. We find that the resulting “no switchback”
dynamic predicts the evolution of play better than the standard dynamic and that aspirations are a significant motivator for
our participants. In the process, we also construct and analyze a variant of the ultimatum game in which players can adopt
conditional (on their induced aspirations) strategies. 相似文献
937.
This paper introduces the likelihood method for decision under uncertainty. The method allows the quantitative determination
of subjective beliefs or decision weights without invoking additional separability conditions, and generalizes the Savage–de
Finetti betting method. It is applied to a number of popular models for decision under uncertainty. In each case, preference
foundations result from the requirement that no inconsistencies are to be revealed by the version of the likelihood method
appropriate for the model considered. A unified treatment of subjective decision weights results for most of the decision
models popular today. Savage’s derivation of subjective expected utility can now be generalized and simplified. In addition
to the intuitive and empirical contributions of the likelihood method, we provide a number of technical contributions: We
generalize Savage’s nonatomiticy condition (“P6”) and his assumption of (sigma) algebras of events, while fully maintaining
his flexibility regarding the outcome set. Derivations of Choquet expected utility and probabilistic sophistication are generalized
and simplified similarly. The likelihood method also reveals a common intuition underlying many other conditions for uncertainty,
such as definitions of ambiguity aversion and pessimism. 相似文献
938.
Counterexamples are constructed for classical decision theory, turning on the fact that actions must often be chosen in groups rather than individually, i.e., the objects of rational choice are plans. It is argued that there is no way to define optimality for plans that makes the finding of optimal plans the desideratum of rational decision-making. An alternative called locally global planning is proposed as a replacement for classical decision theory. Decision-making becomes a non-terminating process without a precise target rather than a terminating search for an optimal solution. 相似文献
939.
Despite growing evidence that debt influences pivotal life events in early and young adulthood, the role of debt in the familial lives of young adults has received relatively little attention. Using data from the NLSY 1997 cohort (N = 6,749) and a discrete-time competing risks hazard model framework, I test whether the transition to first union is influenced by a young adult’s credit card and education loan debt above and beyond traditional educational and labor market characteristics. I find that credit card debt is positively associated with cohabitation for men and women, and that women with education loan debt are more likely than women without such debt to delay marriage and transition into cohabitation. Single life may be difficult to afford, but marital life is unaffordable as well. Cohabitation presents an alternative to single life, but not necessarily a marital substitute for these young adults. 相似文献
940.