Dynamic reasoning and time pressure: Transition from analytical operations to experiential responses

Based upon the Decision Field Theory (Busemeyer and Townsend 1993), we tested a model of dynamic reasoning to predict the effect of time pressure on analytical and experiential processing during decision-making. Forty-six participants were required to make investment decisions under four levels of time pressure. In each decision, participants were presented with experiential cues which were either congruent or incongruent with the analytical information. The congruent/incongruent conditions allowed us to examine how many decisions were based upon the experiential versus the analytical information, and to see if this was affected by the varying degrees of time pressure. As expected, the overall accuracy was reduced with greater time pressure and accuracy was higher when the experiential and analytical cues were congruent than when they were incongruent. Of great interest was the data showing that under high time pressure participants used more experiential cues than at other time pressures. We suggest that the dynamic reasoning paradigm has some future potential for predicting the effects of experiential biases in general, and specifically under time pressure.     

Analyzing supersaturated designs with entropic measures

A supersaturated design is a design for which there are fewer runs than effects to be estimated. In this paper, we propose a method for screening out the important factors from a large set of potentially active variables, based on an information theoretical approach. Three entropy measures: Rényi entropy, Tsallis entropy and Havrda–Charvát entropy, have been associated with the measure of information gain, in order to identify the significant factors using data and assuming generalized linear models. The investigation of the proposed method performance and the comparison of each entropic measure application have been accomplished through simulation experiments. A noteworthy advantage of this paper is the use of generalized linear models for analyzing data from supersaturated designs, a fact that, to the best of our knowledge, has not yet been studied.     

Interval estimation for the breakpoint in segmented regression: a smoothed score‐based approach

This paper is concerned with interval estimation for the breakpoint parameter in segmented regression. We present score‐type confidence intervals derived from the score statistic itself and from the recently proposed gradient statistic. Due to lack of regularity conditions of the score, non‐smoothness and non‐monotonicity, naive application of the score‐based statistics is unfeasible and we propose to exploit the smoothed score obtained via induced smoothing. We compare our proposals with the traditional methods based on the Wald and the likelihood ratio statistics via simulations and an analysis of a real dataset: results show that the smoothed score‐like statistics perform in practice somewhat better than competitors, even when the model is not correctly specified.     

“Service” Municipal Administration as Part of the Development of Youth Entrepreneurship in Russia

The study offers a development of the social technologies of “service” municipal administration. The consumers’ opinions should be taken into consideration when determining the nomenclature and standards of their provision, which include the quality parameters that the consumers consider important. In addition, “service” relations imply the assessment of consumer satisfaction with the services and the correction of services based on the results of the assessment. Since this interaction implies communication between the municipal administration body and service users, it is necessary to focus on communicative technologies that are capable of providing a full cycle of service development and improvement for young entrepreneurs. Communications should help determine the expectations associated with a service, raise awareness thereof, and involve young people in the decisions related to the provision of services.     

The Alliance Experience Transfer Effect: The Case of Industry Convergence in the Telecommunications Equipment Industry

A central premise of the industry change literature is that firms change their strategic actions when an industry changes. Industry convergence (IC), the blending of boundaries between industries creating competition among firms that previously did not compete, is increasingly impacting many industries and is a salient case of industry change. Acquisitions are an important action shaping the course of IC because they trigger imitation and bandwagon effects further accelerating IC. This paper focuses on why and when learning from alliances reduces uncertainty resulting in acquisitions during IC: an ‘alliance experience transfer effect’. We demonstrate the utility of this mechanism for the substitution‐based form of IC that occurred between the telecommunications equipment and computer networking industries. Our key insight is that when the extent of IC is low there are significant transfer effects but, as the extent of IC increases, firms have access to an expanding volume and diversity of information sources that reduce uncertainty, thus weakening the transfer effect mechanism. We contribute to the alliance–acquisition relationship and learning literatures by demonstrating that the alliance experience transfer effect mechanism explains changes in firm strategic action (alliancing and acquiring) as the extent of IC changes. We also introduce a semi‐convergence perspective by directly measuring the extent of IC.     

Demand for contract enforcement in a barter environment

Do greater potential gains from trade enhance or erode contracting institutions? In an anonymous exchange environment traders can sign a contract, hence agreeing to interact with the assigned partner, or wait till the next match. Any contract can be endorsed (for a payment) by the enforcement agency, which then observes the interaction with a positive probability known to the traders and punishes any detected infractors. Demand for contract enforcement is the highest amount a proposer of a contract is ready to pay to the agency, in a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium. It may be strictly positive, as we show, even when contracts are broken. Surprisingly, larger potential gains from exchange may dampen the demand, but not always: the demand is boosted under agencies that oversee the interactions frequently.