Strategy-proof and anonymous rule in queueing problems: a relationship between equity and efficiency

We consider a relationship between equity and efficiency in queueing problems. We show that under strategy-proofness, anonymity in welfare implies queue-efficiency. Furthermore, by combining the result of Kayı and Ramaekers (Games Econ Behav 68:220–232, 2010) with ours, we also give a characterization of the class of rules that satisfy strategy-proofness, anonymity in welfare, and budget-balance.     

Balanced consistency and balanced cost reduction for sequencing problems

We investigate the implications of balanced consistency and balanced cost reduction in the context of sequencing problems. Balanced consistency requires that the effect on the payoff from the departure of one agent to another agent should be equal between any two agents. On the other hand, balanced cost reduction requires that if one agent leaves a problem, then the total payoffs of the remaining agents should be affected by the amount previously assigned to the leaving agent. We show that the minimal transfer rule is the only rule satisfying efficiency and Pareto indifference together with either one of our two main axioms, balanced consistency and balanced cost reduction.     

Fathers’ Financial Support of Children in a Low Income Community in South Africa

We used data from the Birth to Twenty Cohort study to understand children’s receipt of financial support from their fathers in a low income, Black community in urban South Africa. Specifically, we (1) described fathers’ financial support over the life course of children; (2) estimated survival probabilities of receiving support for all children and not receiving support for children who experienced a parental union dissolution; and (3) identified factors that explained variation in the receipt of support after a union dissolution. Results suggest that most children received full or partial support throughout the life course. Furthermore, a high proportion of children received support after a union dissolution with much of the variation driven by pre-dissolution support, father’s education and the presence of extended kin.     

Information security governance: pending legal responsibilities of non-executive boards

The study shows that a structural conflict of interest in non-executive boards exists due to missing corporate governance structures and a lack of awareness for legal issues with regard to information security risks. Non-executive boards receive information on strategic security threats as a part of their oversight function to fulfill investor interest in transparency. At the same time, they act as representatives of company stakeholders and have an interest to counteract to information security risks based on the stakeholder’s risk disposition. If not properly structured by corporate governance rules, these different interests may lead to regulatory aberrations on non-executive board level. The study analyses a Deutsche Telekom AG case where non-executive board members, employees, and journalists fell victim to a spying scandal subject to the German telecommunications secrecy law in 2005–2006. The analysis demonstrates how the handling of information security on non-executive board level bears governance risks as well as legal risks that are insufficiently addressed in corporate governance research. The paper contributes to avoid a reproduction of events in the future, by suggesting the principle of a segregation of duties on non-executive boards as well as providing an overview of relevant legislative requirements that clarify tasks of non-executive board members with regard to information security. The study therefore helps protecting corporations and their stakeholders from similar consequences of missing corporate security governance.     

Minority and majority private equity investments: firm performance and governance

This paper adds to the literature on the determinants of the effects of private equity (PE) investments. Using an original dataset of 191 target firms in Italy, we study the effects on performance and governance of the stakes acquired by the PE investor. We employ a difference-in-differences approach and compare target and control firms sharing similar characteristics and performance in the years preceding the deal. We find that PE investment has a positive effect on profitability, sales, and employment; these effects are larger for minority investments. We argue that this signals effective governance that follows from complementing rather than substituting incumbent managers in minority investments.     

Dual class shares,board of directors’ effectiveness and firm’s market value: an empirical study

This study aims to identify whether a relationship exists between the controlling shareholders’ voting power and outside directors’ effectiveness in maximizing firms’ financial performance. We analyze a panel data with 3057 observations for the 2000–2012 period using a random effects model, logit and probit regressions, and the two-stage model of Heckman in the Brazilian stock market. Our findings show that firms whose controlling shareholders use dual class shares to leverage their voting power have less independence from the board and worse financial performance and market value. Further, the percentage of outside directors tends to be ineffective in increasing the firm’s value, and in changing the firm’s chief executive officer (CEO) when (1) the controlling shareholder’s voting power is leveraged, or (2) when the CEO assumes a position on the board of directors simultaneously. We interpreted that these results are in line with the arguments in favor of the existence of a new agency cost, which is related to the undue obedience of board members to authority, such as the largest controlling shareholder or the CEO in Brazilian listed firms.     

Is a loosely specified regulatory intervention effective in disciplining management commentary? The case of performance indicator disclosure

This paper offers a contribution to the call for research on the effectiveness of regulatory interventions governing management commentary disclosure. Specifically, we focus on the mandatory requirement concerning performance indicator disclosure introduced by the Modernisation Directive (2003/51/EC). In keeping with other regulators, the European legislator opted to implement a regulatory approach based on a rule with loose specifications. To understand the effects of this Directive, we have investigated the Italian context, in which neither the national legislator nor the standard setter have supported companies with detailed specifications or guidelines aimed at integrating the European provision. We have compared companies’ disclosure practices before and after the adoption of the Directive, investigating the number of disclosed indicators and also their modalities of presentation, as they are considered essential to guaranteeing the quality of this disclosure. Our results document that a mandatory intervention, even if based on loose specifications, is associated with an increase in disclosure practices. Nevertheless, such regulation does not seem able to guarantee high quality disclosure practices. In fact, before and after the regulation, companies primarily disclose common financial measures. Moreover, the usefulness of such disclosure is undermined by a limited compliance with the international guidelines concerning the modalities of presentation. These results reveal some weaknesses in the European approach to performance indicator regulation. In general, the EU legislator fails to explain the purpose and the objective of performance indicator disclosure and does not take into account the differences between financial and non-financial indicators. Furthermore, it does not provide firms with clear guidelines concerning the presentation modalities.     

The role of the board in shaping foundations’ strategy: an empirical study

This paper investigates the relationships of the choice of philanthropic strategy with board capital (diversity and networks), board activities (board processes, internal board committees, and board effectiveness), and CEO leadership. Using a sample of 110 Italian foundations, the research shows that board processes have the strongest positive association with an evolved strategic approach to philanthropic institutional grant-giving, while board diversity and strong CEO leadership are associated with the strategic approach only under certain conditions. In particular, good governance processes (e.g., training the board, self-evaluation of trustees, setting the stage for effective board and committee meetings, implementing control software, and steering meetings to improve the board’s analysis) are positively associated with evolved strategic approaches to philanthropy (e.g., signaling other funders for the best grantees, improving the performance of grant recipients, and advancing selected social fields’ state of knowledge and practice).     

Do auditors’ perceptions actually help fight against fraudulent practices? Evidence from Tunisia

The purpose of this paper is focused on investigating empirically how Tunisian Auditors perceive their status regarding fraud fighting issue. In this respect, a set of auditor-associated mental representations will be expressed in terms of their respective roles as relevant governance models (legal versus ethical ones), via the cognitive mapping technique. The findings reveal that corporate governance can be globally depicted within these particular representations, indicating the supremacy of the legal governance approach over the ethical one with regard to the Tunisian case. .