Institutional Infrastructure and Economic Performance: Dynamic Panel Data Evidence

This paper attempts to empirically investigate the link between institutional quality and economic performance in a group of 72 countries during 1980–2001, using dynamic panel data analysis. Five institutional indicators that represent the overall institutional infrastructures of an economy are employed, namely corruption, rule of law, bureaucracy, repudiation of contracts and risk of expropriation. The empirical results demonstrate that institutions’ variables are statistically significant determinants of economic performance. The findings also suggest that the effects of institutional quality vary according to the level of economic development, where institutions are more responsive in the low-income and middle-income countries. In terms of specific effect of institutional development, the results reveal that the higher level of rule of law is most potent in delivering long-run economic benefits.     

Solidarity in choosing a location on a cycle

We study the implications of two solidarity conditions on the efficient location of a public good on a cycle, when agents have single-peaked, symmetric preferences. Both conditions require that when circumstances change, the agents not responsible for the change should all be affected in the same direction: either they all gain or they all loose. The first condition, population-monotonicity, applies to arrival or departure of one agent. The second, replacement-domination, applies to changes in the preferences of one agent. Unfortunately, no Pareto-efficient solution satisfies any of these properties. However, if agents’ preferred points are restricted to the vertices of a small regular polygon inscribed in the circle, solutions exist. We characterize them as a class of efficient priority rules.     

The minimal overlap rule revisited

This paper provides an analysis of the Minimal Overlap Rule, a solution for bankruptcy problems introduced by O’Neill (1982). We point out that this rule can be understood as a composition of Ibn Ezra’s proposal and the recommendation given by the Constrained Equal Loss Rule. Following an interpretation of bankruptcy problems in terms of TU games, we show that the Minimal Overlap Value is the unique solution for bankruptcy games which satisfies Anonymity and Core Transition Responsiveness.     

Brief des neuen DGS-Vorsitzenden anlässlich des schon etwas zurückliegenden Beginns seiner Amtszeit

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

Soziologisches Denken

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

“Sugar and Spice But Not Always Nice”: Gender Socialization and its Impact on Development and Maintenance of Aggression in Adolescent Girls

Aggression in girls is a problem that is gaining increased attention. The indirect forms of relational aggression historically used by girls to harm their victims are increasingly escalating into physical altercations. An understanding of the interplay between the developmental and contextual factors that contribute to learned aggression in girls is needed to inform program development that truly responds to the unique gender socialization of girls. This article examines parental, environmental, and peer factors for their contributions to the development of girls’ aggression. Implications for program development that teaches girls and their families alternative ways of expressing their needs and protecting themselves from harm is discussed.