Symbiotic mothers and infantilized only children: A subtype of single-parent family

One single-parent family pattern is the enmeshed mother/onlychild dyad. Women marry to have children, and then divorce, while mother and child live out the reciprocally gratifying symbiotic period. When these mothers hamper offspring moves toward separation-individuation, post-divorce difficulties bring them to treatment. These difficulties are distinct from those found in other single-parent families. Intervention can move mother and child from the prolonged symbiosis. Treatment stresses modification of low maternal selfesteem, and correction of pathogenic maternal behavior. Re-introduction of the father to the system can also free both mother and child for further growth.     

Inférence statistique dans les processus stochastiques: Aperçu historique

The study of statistical inference for stochastic processes has evolved along two paths. Some problems related to particular processes have been studied, and also some trials to extend general results obtained for independent identically distributed random variables have been made. We retrace the first main contributions, evaluate their influence, and give an idea of the evolution of the research in the field of statistical inference made with observations coming from a stochastic process.     

Summative scales for measuring community satisfaction

Results of this study indicate that pen and paper questionnaire procedures can be successfully adapted to random digit dialing telephone interview methods. Further, the study produced a reliable instrument for measuring attitudes about how residents perceive their communities as a place to live.     

HOW TO HAGGLE and TO STAY FIRM: BARTER AS HIDDEN PRICE DISCRIMINATION

Barter transactions, conducted openly by established corporations, play an increasingly significant role in the U.S. economy. The model developed here helps explain why firms use barter and yields predictions concerning the circumstances under which barter is likely to occur. It is shown that when two firms barter goods used as inputs, price discrimination occurs. This price discrimination is hidden from the firms' other customers because the real values of the transacted goods to the barterers are different from the accounting prices used in the transaction. Since price discrimination that is observed by potential customers might have an adverse effect on the selling firm's future bargaining power, barter will have value as a means of hiding price discrimination.