The Multiple Realities of Sameness and Difference: Ideology and Practice

Gender distinctions as dichotomous categories are perpetuated and maintained by social mechanisms and are socially constructed. Part of this social construction is reproduced by many social scientists who adopt mainstream cultural categories of gender and, through theoretical or methodological biases, fail to question them, or who, by their own practices, reinforce them. This analysis is an overview of the epistemological and methodological practices that reinforce gender distinctions and neglect reporting of similarities. Rejecting several models used to explain cultural differences, an alternative mode of analysis—multiplicity and proteanism—is proposed as a more productive perspective in the analysis of gender.     

The Politics of Randomness

Recent analysis of public policy is based on elaborate political-economic models. A major advantage of these useful models is that they have micro-foundations. Their main shortcomings are that they are usually based on drastic simplifications regarding the institutional setting and, more importantly, that the results they yield are not robust to the assumptions regarding the institutional setting, the policy space or the agents’ preferences. An alternative reduced-form modeling is the public-policy lobbying contest. This model can be applied to public-policy determination in representative democracies. However, its main drawback is that the notion of contest success function (CSF), a crucial component of the contest model, does not have micro-foundations and, therefore, the random behavior of the government seems ad-hoc. In the present paper we propose a partial micro-foundation for the public-policy contest. The possible rationalization of random government behavior is illustrated in the case of the most commonly studied CSFs: the function associated with the all-pay auction and Tullock’s lottery logit functions. We also clarify how stake asymmetry, lobbying-skill asymmetry and return to lobbying effort determine the relative desirability, from the government’s point of view, of these CSFs.     

Uncovering some subtleties of the uncovered set: Social choice theory and distributive politics

 Although the uncovered set has occupied a prominent role in social choice theory, its exact shape has never been determined in a general setting. This paper calculates the uncovered set when actors have pork barrel, or purely distributive, preferences, and shows that in this setting nearly the entire Pareto set is uncovered. The result casts doubt on the usefulness of the uncovered set as a general solution concept and suggests that to predict the distribution of political benefits one must explicitly model the institutions that structure collective choice. Received: 29 April 1993/Accepted: 28 June 1996     

An Incitement to Discourse: Sociology and The History of Sexuality

Sociological Forum -     

The law of large numbers and the attractiveness of compound gambles

A compound of many independent replicas of a gamble may be chosen by a risk averter even if the single gamble would be rejected given any initial wealth level. Samuelson has shown that such choices are impossible if the expected utility theory of preference is adopted. But they are consistent with more general theories of preference. Consequently, the intuition suggested by the law of large numbers can be supported.     

Online scheduling with rejection and reordering: exact algorithms for unit size jobs

We study an online scheduling problem with rejection on \(m\ge 2\) identical machines, in which we deal with unit size jobs. Each arriving job has a rejection value (a rejection cost or penalty for minimization problems, and a rejection profit for maximization problems) associated with it. A buffer of size \(K\) is available to store \(K\) jobs. A job which is not stored in the buffer must be either assigned to a machine or rejected. Upon the arrival of a new job, the job can be stored in the buffer if there is a free slot (possibly created by evicting other jobs and assigning or rejecting every evicted job). At termination, the buffer must be emptied. We study four variants of the problem, as follows. We study the makespan minimization problem, where the goal is to minimize the sum of the makespan and the penalty of rejected jobs, and the \(\ell _p\) norm minimization problem, where the goal is to minimize the sum of the \(\ell _p\) norm of the vector of machine completion times and the penalty of rejected jobs. We also study two maximization problems, where the goal in the first version is to maximize the sum of the minimum machine load (the cover value of the machines) and the total rejection profit, and in the second version the goal is to maximize a function of the machine completion times (which measures the balance of machine loads) and the total rejection profit. We show that an optimal solution (an exact solution for the offline problem) can always be obtained in this environment, and determine the required buffer size. Specifically, for all four variants we present optimal algorithms with \(K=m-1\) and prove that in each case, using a buffer of size at most \(m-2\) does not allow the design of an optimal algorithm, which makes our algorithms optimal in this respect as well. The lower bounds hold even for the special case where the rejection value is equal for all input jobs.     

The cost of selfishness for maximizing the minimum load on uniformly related machines

Consider the following scheduling game. A set of jobs, each controlled by a selfish agent, are to be assigned to m uniformly related machines. The cost of a job is defined as the total load of the machine that its job is assigned to. A job is interested in minimizing its cost, while the social objective is maximizing the minimum load (the value of the cover) over the machines. This goal is different from the regular makespan minimization goal, which was extensively studied in a game theoretic context. We study the price of anarchy (poa) and the price of stability (pos) for uniformly related machines. The results are expressed in terms of s, which is the maximum speed ratio between any two machines. For uniformly related machines, we prove that the pos is unbounded for s>2, and the poa is unbounded for s≥2. For the remaining cases we show that while the poa grows to infinity as s tends to 2, the pos is at most 2 for any s≤2.     

Selfish bin coloring

The bin packing problem, a classical problem in combinatorial optimization, has recently been studied from the viewpoint of algorithmic game theory. In this bin packing game each item is controlled by a selfish player minimizing its personal cost, which in this context is defined as the relative contribution of the size of the item to the total load in the bin.