An Efficient and Egalitarian Negotiation Procedure for Economies with Externalities

We construct a simple mechanism that can be used in situations when a group of well informed agents try to cooperate in the production and allocation of a good with external effects. We start by auctioning the right to have the initiative in the negotiation, then the winner proposes an allocation that is implemented if the rest of the players unanimously accept it. In case of a rejection, the process is started again. We show that the outcome of any stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibrium leads to an efficient allocation of the good with externalities, together with an equal split of the surplus that cooperation generates.     

Are Spontaneous Expressions and Emotions Linked? an Experimental Test of Coherence

We measured facial behaviors shown by participants in a laboratory study in which a film was used to elicit intense emotions. Participants provided subjective reports of their emotions and their faces were recorded by a concealed camera. We did not find the coherence claimed by other authors (e.g., Rosenberg & Ekman, 1994) between the displayed facial expressions and subjective reports of emotion. We thus concluded that certain emotions are not a necessary or sufficient precondition of certain spontaneous expressions.     

Olson VS. Coase: Coalitional Worth in Conflict

We analyze a model of conflict with endogenous choice of effort, where subsets of the contenders may force the resolution to be sequential: First the alliance fights it out with the rest and – in case they win – later they fight it out among themselves. For three-player games, we find that it will not be in the interest of any two of them to form an alliance. We obtain this result under two different scenarios: equidistant preferences with varying relative strengths, and varying vicinity of preferences with equal distribution of power. We conclude that the commonly made assumption of super-additive coalitional worth is suspect.     

Historical background and characteristics of the evolution of Islam in Albania

Religious beliefs and practices are to a large extent influenced by historical conditions. The present paper outlines the development of religion in Albania, and specifically the development of Islam, and examines the historical, political and social factors that originally led to the ‘extinction’ and recently the ‘rebirth’ of religion in the country.     

Toward a culturally sensitive child sexual abuse prevention program for latinos

A culturally sensitive sexual abuse prevention program for Latinos is proposed which makes recommendations regarding style of interaction, discussion topics of importance, and other areas which need he considered in the design and implementation of such a program. The role of the child, parents, professionals, and others involved is discussed.     

Inequality and deprivation within and between groups: An illustration of European union countries

This paper broadens the approach of Hey and Lambert (Q. J. Econ. 95,567–573 1980) regarding relative deprivation to the case in which individuals compare themselves with individuals belonging not only to their own group, but also to other groups. In this way, we obtain the average deprivation of a population in relation to another. This allows us to establish a correspondence between the decomposition of the Gini coefficient based on a partition of the population, and the decomposition of deprivation into two components. One quantifies deprivation within the subpopulation and the other deprivation between populations. An empirical illustration is given, based on the European Community Household Panel (ECHP). The authors acknowledge the financial support of the Spanish Government–MCYT, (SEC2001-1668) and would like to thank Jacques Silber and two anonymous referees for their suggestions.