Determinants and effects of formal target agreements: an empirical investigation of German firms

We investigate organizational determinants and performance effects of formal target agreements for employees based on the IAB establishment panel, a representative panel of German establishments. The results show that establishments with a high employee turnover rate, a large proportion of temporary workers, and a highly qualified workforce are significantly more likely to implement target agreements. Also, establishments with works councils installed are more likely to do so, controlling, among others, for firm size. Concerning organizational performance, we apply a first-difference and a fixed effects approach and find that establishments that implement target agreements achieve around 5 % higher total sales compared to firms that did not introduce this practice. Hence, organizations seem to benefit from the implementation of formal target agreements for employees.     

An Alternative Model of the Formation of Political Coalitions

Most models of the formation of political coalitions use either Euclidean spaces or rely purely on game theory. This limits their applicability. In this article, a single model is presented which is more broadly applicable. In principle any kind of set can be used as a policy space. The model is also able to incorporate different kinds of party motivations: both rent-seeking and idealism. The model uses party preferences and power to identify stable coalitions and predict government policy as well as to indicate which member of the opposition will be able to break up the governing coalition if no stable coalition exists. In the latter case it will also indicate on which issue the government is likely to split. Parties may have preferences over issues such as the composition of cabinet and/or the governing coalition as well as the more traditional issues of government formation. The model also provides a rationale for log-rolling.     

A tractable method to measure utility and loss aversion under prospect theory

This paper provides an efficient method to measure utility under prospect theory. Our method minimizes both the number of elicitations required to measure utility and the cognitive burden for subjects, being based on the elicitation of certainty equivalents for two-outcome prospects. We applied our method in an experiment and were able to replicate the main findings on prospect theory, suggesting that our method measures what it is intended to. Our data confirmed empirically that risk seeking and concave utility can coincide under prospect theory. Utility did not depend on the probability used in the elicitation, which offers support for the validity of prospect theory.

The impossibility of unbiased judgment aggregation

Standard impossibility theorems on judgment aggregation over logically connected propositions either use a controversial systematicity condition or apply only to agendas of propositions with rich logical connections. Are there any serious impossibilities without these restrictions? We prove an impossibility theorem without requiring systematicity that applies to most standard agendas: Every judgment aggregation function (with rational inputs and outputs) satisfying a condition called unbiasedness is dictatorial (or effectively dictatorial if we remove one of the agenda conditions). Our agenda conditions are tight. When applied illustratively to (strict) preference aggregation represented in our model, the result implies that every unbiased social welfare function with universal domain is effectively dictatorial.     

Does Society Matter? Life Satisfaction in the Enlarged Europe

Life satisfaction is quite heterogeneously distributed across countries of the enlarged European Union. Previous research has shown how living conditions within individual countries, such as access to material and emotional resources, are important for personal well-being, but it has been less successful in explaining differences between countries. This article investigates whether it matters in which political and economic circumstances people live, as well as whether their particular perception of the quality of their societal environment plays a role. People are well aware that the institutional and cultural settings in which their lives are embedded create opportunities and limitations: within individual countries, perceptions of society influence life satisfaction outcomes irrespective of access to resources. However, their importance for well-being differs across Europe: perceptions of societies are highly decisive in countries that provide only a minimum of social security and in which the reliability of political institutions is poor. In rich and stable countries, the impact is weaker and private social support becomes more important. In addition to these country-specific weights of life satisfaction determinants, life satisfaction variations between countries can be explained to a large extent by taking into consideration the economic performance, the social security level, and the political culture in a country—all in all, general conditions that enable people to live a respectable life.     

Bounded information dissemination in multi-channel wireless networks

More and more wireless networks and devices now operate on multiple channels, which poses the question: How to use multiple channels to speed up communication? In this paper, we answer this question for the case of wireless ad-hoc networks where information dissemination is a primitive operation. Specifically, we propose a randomized distributed algorithm for information dissemination that is very near the optimal. The general information dissemination problem is to deliver \(k\) information packets, stored initially in \(k\) different nodes (the packet holders), to all the nodes in the network, and the objective is to minimize the time needed. With an eye toward the reality, we assume a model where the packet holders are determined by an adversary, and neither the number \(k\) nor the identities of packet holders are known to the nodes in advance. Not knowing the value of \(k\) sets this problem apart from broadcasting and all-to-all communication (gossiping). We study the information dissemination problem in single-hop networks with bounded-size messages. We present a randomized algorithm which can disseminate all packets in \(O(k(\frac{1}{\mathcal {F}}+\frac{1}{\mathcal {P}})+\log ^2n)\) rounds with high probability, where \(\mathcal {F}\) is the number of available channels and \(\mathcal {P}\) is the bound on the number of packets a message can carry. Compared with the lower bound \(\varOmega (k(\frac{1}{\mathcal {F}}+\frac{1}{\mathcal {P}}))\), the given algorithm is very close to the asymptotical optimal except for an additive factor. Our result provides the first solid evidence that multiple channels can indeed substantially speed up information dissemination, which also breaks the \(\varOmega (k)\) lower bound that holds for single-channel networks (even if \(\mathcal {P}\) is infinity).     

Dynamic reasoning and time pressure: Transition from analytical operations to experiential responses

Based upon the Decision Field Theory (Busemeyer and Townsend 1993), we tested a model of dynamic reasoning to predict the effect of time pressure on analytical and experiential processing during decision-making. Forty-six participants were required to make investment decisions under four levels of time pressure. In each decision, participants were presented with experiential cues which were either congruent or incongruent with the analytical information. The congruent/incongruent conditions allowed us to examine how many decisions were based upon the experiential versus the analytical information, and to see if this was affected by the varying degrees of time pressure. As expected, the overall accuracy was reduced with greater time pressure and accuracy was higher when the experiential and analytical cues were congruent than when they were incongruent. Of great interest was the data showing that under high time pressure participants used more experiential cues than at other time pressures. We suggest that the dynamic reasoning paradigm has some future potential for predicting the effects of experiential biases in general, and specifically under time pressure.     

A tighter formulation of the <Emphasis Type="Italic">p</Emphasis>-median problem

Given a set of clients and a set of potential sites for facilities, the p-median problem consists of opening a set of p sites and assigning each client to the closest open facility to it. It can be viewed as a variation of the uncapacitated facility location problem. We propose a new formulation of this problem by a mixed integer linear problem. We show that this formulation, while it has the same value by LP-relaxation, can be much more efficient than two previous formulations. The computational experiment performed on two sets of benchmark instances has showed that the efficiency of the standard branch-and-cut algorithm has been significantly improved. Finally, we explore the structure of the new formulation in order to derive reduction rules and to accelerate the LP-relaxation resolution.     

Digit ratios (2D:4D) as predictors of risky decision making for both sexes

Many important decisions involve financial risk, and substantial evidence suggests that women tend to be more risk averse than men. We explore a potential biological basis of risk-taking variation within and between the sexes by studying how the ratio between the length of the second and fourth fingers (2D:4D) predicts risk-taking. A smaller 2D:4D ratio has been linked to higher exposure to prenatal testosterone relative to estradiol, with men having lower ratios than women. In financially motivated decision-making tasks, we find that men and women with smaller 2D:4D ratios chose significantly riskier options. We further find that the ratio partially explains the variation in risk-taking between the sexes. Moreover, for men and women at the extremes of the digit-ratio distribution the difference in risk-taking disappears. Thus, the 2D:4D ratio partially explains variation in financial risk-taking behavior within and between sexes and offers evidence of a biological basis for risk-taking behavior.