Skilling and deskilling: technological change in classical economic theory and its empirical evidence

This article reviews and brings together two literatures: classical political economists’ views on the skilling or deskilling nature of technological change in England, during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when they wrote, are compared with the empirical evidence about the skill effects of technological change that emerges from studies of economic historians. In both literatures, we look at both the skill impacts of technological change and at the “inducement mechanisms” that are envisaged for the introduction of new technologies. Adam Smith and Karl Marx both regarded the deskilling of the labour force as the predominant form of biased technical change, but other authors such as Charles Babbage also took account of capital-skill complementarities and skill-enhancing effects of technological change. For Smith, the deskilling bias was an unintended by-product of the increasing division of labour, which in his view “naturally” led to ever more simplification of workers’ tasks. As opposed to Smith, Marx considered unskilled-biased technical change as a bourgeois weapon in the class struggle for impairing the workers’ bargaining position. Studies of economic historians lend support to Marx’s hypothesis about the inducement mechanisms for the introduction of unskilled-biased innovations, but have produced no clear-cut empirical evidence for a deskilling tendency of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century technological change as a whole. Industrialization in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries rather led to labour polarization, by simultaneously deskilling a large part of the workforce and raising the demand for some (but fewer) high-skilled workers.     

THE OPTIMAL ALLOCATION OF PRIZES IN TOURNAMENTS OF HETEROGENEOUS AGENTS

Tournaments are widely used in organizations, explicitly or implicitly, to reward the best‐performing employees, for example, by promotion or bonuses, and/or to penalize the worst‐performing employees, for example, by demotion, withholding bonuses, or unfavorable job assignments. These incentive schemes can be interpreted as various prize allocations based on the employees' relative performance. While the optimal prize allocation in tournaments of symmetric agents is relatively well understood, little is known about the impact of the allocation of prizes on the effectiveness of tournament incentive schemes for heterogeneous agents. We show that while multiple prize allocation rules are equivalent when agents are symmetric in their ability, the equivalence is broken in the presence of heterogeneity. Under a wide range of conditions, loser‐prize tournaments, that is, tournaments that award a low prize to relatively few bottom performers, are optimal for the firm. The reason is that low‐ability agents are discouraged less in such tournaments, as compared to winner‐prize tournaments awarding a high prize to few top performers, and hence can be compensated less to meet their participation constraints. (JEL M52, J33, J24)     

Foundation ownership and shareholder value: an event study

Review of Managerial Science - Some of the largest listed firms in Western and Northern Europe are partly owned by foundations. So far, little research exists about the shareholder value effects of...     

An inspection game of internal audit and the influence of whistle-blowing

In this paper we analyse how whistle-blowing affects fraudulent behaviour of managers while the company instigates imperfect internal audit to detect the fraud. To do so, we employ in a first step a non-cooperative inspection game to analyse fraudulent behaviour of a manager controlled by an internal auditor. In a second step we introduce exogenous whistle-blowing of a manager’s employee to aid the auditor to reveal the fraud. In a third step, the two-person inspection game is extended to a three-person approach with endogenous whistle-blowing. Our novel results are that the intensity of internal audit is always lower with whistle-blowing than without and that whistle-blowing renders the manager to act less fraudulently than compared to the basic inspection game if and only if she is unaware of the whistle-blower’s expected pay-off and the efficacy of internal audit is sufficiently low.     

How customer satisfaction with respect to price and quality affects customer retention: an integrated approach considering nonlinear effects

There is consensus in the marketing literature that satisfaction of customers concerning the perceived quality and pricing of products or services is critical for customer retention. In contrast, there is lack of empirical evidence about the exact functional relationship. Using parametric and nonparametric regression, this contribution empirically investigates whether and to what extent nonlinear effects of and interaction effects between both satisfaction dimensions affect customer retention. The empirical results do not only reveal complex nonlinear effects for those satisfaction-retention relationships, respectively, but also indicate strong interaction effects of both satisfaction dimensions on customer retention. Furthermore, nonparametric approaches prove to be more flexible than parametric approaches to model complex interactions.     

Correction to: Persuasion under ambiguity

Theory and Decision - In Proposition 4, lines 3, 4 and 8, 9 were scrambled by mistake during the pagination process of the online published article.     

Index of Authors Volume 59, 2002

Authors Index

Index of Authors Volume 59, 2002     

Using Implied Probabilities to Improve the Estimation of Unconditional Moment Restrictions for Weakly Dependent Data

In this article, we investigate the use of implied probabilities (Back and Brown, 1993) to improve estimation in unconditional moment conditions models. Using the seminal contributions of Bonnal and Renault (2001 Bonnal, H., Renault, E. (2001). Minimal Chi-Square Estimation with Conditional Moment Restrictions, Document de Travail, CESG, September 2001. [Google Scholar]) and Antoine et al. (2007 Antoine, B., Bonnal, H., Renault, E. (2007). On the efficient use of the informational content of estimating equations: Implied probabilities and euclidean empirical likelihood. Journal of Econometrics 138(2):461–487.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]), we propose two three-step Euclidian empirical likelihood (3S-EEL) estimators for weakly dependent data. Both estimators make use of a control variates principle that can be interpreted in terms of implied probabilities in order to achieve higher-order improvements relative to the traditional two-step GMM estimator. A Monte Carlo study reveals that the finite and large sample properties of the three-step estimators compare favorably to the existing approaches: the two-step GMM and the continuous updating estimator.