Individuals and Communities: the Importance of Neighbors Volunteering

In this analysis, I examine the effects of community-level volunteering on an individual’s choices regarding time – whether to work and whether to volunteer. In order to better explain the decision to volunteer, a classic pure public goods structure is contrasted with a less restrictive impure public goods model that admits other possible private motivations. The results of this study undermine the neoclassical notion that volunteering can be understood solely as a pure public good that is provided less when others are seen to be contributing. In fact, individuals are found to be more, not less, likely to volunteer when others in their communities do so. An innovative instrumental variables strategy is used to account for reflection bias and the possible endogeneity caused by selective sorting of individuals into neighborhoods, which allows for a causal interpretation of these results. Employment regressions provide preliminary evidence that average volunteering relates, to some extent, with the decision of whether to participate in the labor force. Variations in the effect of average volunteering across age and gender are also explored. The present work is unique by virtue of its use of a large and representative dataset, along with rigorous statistical testing. I use United States Census 2000 Summary File 3 and Current Population Survey (CPS) 2004–2007 September Supplement file data and control for various individual and community-level characteristics.     

Winning a Battle but Losing the War? Third Sector and Social Policy in Latin America: The Case of Uruguay

This paper analyzes some aspects of the third sector’s involvement process in the provision of public social services. Using evidence garnered in previous research based on in-depth interviews, I offer elements toward an assessment of the consequences this process has produced not only in terms of the gains and losses it has produced for social policy, but also for the very identity and constitutive characteristics of the third sector. The evidence hereby compiled strengthens skepticism toward the hypothesis that sees a transformative potential in the role of the third sector in social policy in Latin America. This skepticism arises from issues detected by involved actors themselves and that are linked to the weakness of the sector as a whole.     

Emergency Saving and Household Hardship

Households with limited income and wealth often struggle to access the financial liquidity needed to address unexpected expenses or income drops. Emergency savings can act as form of insurance against such economic shocks and reduce the risk of hardships that influence family wellbeing. Prior research has established that threshold amounts of liquid assets can reduce the risk of economic hardship. This study used a measure of self-reported emergency saving behavior to examine whether households who reported saving for emergencies were less likely to experience subsequent economic hardships in a longitudinal sample of households in disadvantaged neighborhoods from the Annie E. Casey Foundation’s Making Connections project. Results across a range of regression models suggest that households who saved for emergencies experienced slightly less overall hardship and were less likely to report several specific hardships, such as food insecurity and having a phone disconnected, three years later. This study supports the idea that small, unrestricted savings may play a protective role for low-income households.     

Merit Payment in France: Towards New Forms of Wage Determination?

ABSTRACT Wage policies in France were substantially renewed in the 1980s; this renewal was reflected in two phenomena: profit-sharing and merit payment. Merit payment is analysed here in relation to the emergence of new forms of organization of production. The need for higher-skilled labour, the relative decline of execution work and Taylorism have led to the setting up of systems of individual assessment and a more coherent organization of internal labour markets. Thus, merit payment should be seen as a very different practice from piece work: rather, it is the first attempt to establish a system of payment which could serve as a basis for renewing the entire wage bargaining set-up.     

Modeling Demand For Unionization With Nontraditional Data Analysis Methods

Upon reviewing the extant literature on determinants of unionism, it becomes clear that many areas that have had a plethora of research attention do not converge upon singularly directional findings. This study explores a potential cause of such an apparent anomaly: nonlinearity of data. An exploratory examination of correlation coefficients among typical union determinant variables seems to show different patterns of relationships at different levels of union demand. Thus, a break from traditional linear data analysis techniques is explored in the interest of explaining more variance with typical, theoretically derived variables by using neural network analysis. Results of analyses on industry level data reveal that using neural network analysis to model union demand explained over four times as much variance as multiple regression analysis.     

Disagreement over the immigration of low-income earners in a welfare state

This paper studies natives’ economically motivated preferences over different levels of immigration of low-income earners. Immigration affects natives through both intra- and intergenerational redistribution programmes and in the labour market. Our analysis suggests, in a welfare state that looks after the poor and the aged, economic motivation does not necessarily lead a native to have an extreme opinion on the preferable level of immigration, although it causes disagreement among natives. We find, regardless of parameter values, high-income earners prefer at least as much immigration as low-income earners who, in turn, prefer at least as much immigration as pensioners. The median voter is then likely to be a low-income native.

Preference intensity representation: strategic overstating in large elections

If voters vote strategically, is it useful to offer them the possibility of expressing nuanced opinions, or would they always overstate the intensity of their preferences? For additive voting rules, say that a ballot is extremal if it is neither abstention-like nor can be expressed as a mixture of the available ballots. We give a sufficient condition for strategic equivalence: if two rules share the same set of extremal ballots (up to an homothetic transformation), they are strategically equivalent in large elections. This condition is also necessary for the strategic equivalence of positional rules. These results do not hold for small electorates.     

The division problem with voluntary participation

The division problem consists of allocating a given amount of a homogeneous and perfectly divisible good among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences on the set of their potential shares. A rule proposes a vector of shares for each division problem. The literature has implicitly assumed that agents will find acceptable any share they are assigned to. In this article we consider the division problem when agents’ participation is voluntary. Each agent has an idiosyncratic interval of acceptable shares where his preferences are single-peaked. A rule has to propose to each agent either to not participate or an acceptable share because otherwise he would opt out and this would require to reassign some of the remaining agents’ shares. We study a subclass of efficient and consistent rules and characterize extensions of the uniform rule that deal explicitly with agents’ voluntary participation.     

Strategy-proof and anonymous rule in queueing problems: a relationship between equity and efficiency

We consider a relationship between equity and efficiency in queueing problems. We show that under strategy-proofness, anonymity in welfare implies queue-efficiency. Furthermore, by combining the result of Kayı and Ramaekers (Games Econ Behav 68:220–232, 2010) with ours, we also give a characterization of the class of rules that satisfy strategy-proofness, anonymity in welfare, and budget-balance.