Life after work: older Australians' experiences of early exit from the workforce

Little is known about the experience of those in the baby boom cohort who are outside the labour market. Understanding their experience has the potential to inform policy strategies to support older people to remain longer in the workforce. Using in‐depth interview data from 26 participants, this paper examines the reasons people aged between 50 and 64 years give for being not‐employed, how they perceive it affects their health, how socioeconomic characteristics shape their experience and what would entice them back into paid work. Participants' main reasons for being not‐employed included: feeling financially able and ready to exit, feeling unhappy about workplace reorganisations, disability, or their partner's retirement or ill‐health. The reasons given and the degree to which they had planned to exit the workforce affected their willingness and capacity to consider returning. Key determinants of participants' health and wellbeing after stopping paid work were the extent to which they had planned their exit and the status of their health and wealth at the time of their exit. The paper concludes there is some scope for increasing the number of employed older people if policy makers attend to workforce health and wellbeing as crucial to workforce retention policy development.     

Alerts and catastrophes: The case of the 1999 storm in France,a treacherous risk

How is it that catastrophes always seem predictable ex post but never ex ante? The paradox is recurrent. Our study of the warnings issued prior to one of the last major natural disasters in France – the tempest of December 27, 1999 – focuses on the organizational factors accounting for the surprise effect of the catastrophe, to try and understand why, though the phenomenon had been predicted and announced by the French weather bureau, the protagonists of Civil Defense said the magnitude of the event took them by surprise. A multi-level, qualitative analysis of the inter-organizational meteorological alert system shows that a combination of factors pertaining to structure, context and individuals transformed the warnings into routine messages. The case of the 1999 storm allows us to introduce a particular, ideal-type of risk, the treacherous risk, which, though clearly announced, was disregarded because seemingly so familiar.     

Evaluating the Move to a Linear Tax System in Germany and Other European Countries

This paper proposes a comparison of the results of tax policy analysis obtained on the basis of unitary and collective representations of the household. We first generate labour supplies consistent with the collective rationality, by use of a model calibrated on microdata as described in Vermeulen et al. [Collective Models of Household Labor Supply with Nonconvex Budget Sets and Nonparticipation: A Calibration Approach (2006)]. A unitary model is then estimated on these collective data and unitary and collective responses to a tax reform are compared. We focus on the introduction of linear taxation in Germany. The exercise is replicated for other European countries and other topical reforms. Distortions due to the use of a unitary model turn out to be important in predicting labour supply adjustments, in the design of tax revenue neutral reforms, and in predicting a reform’s welfare implications.

Contents to Volume 1, 2003

Volume Contents

Contents to Volume 1, 2003     

Implementation of allocation rules under perfect information

We study subgame perfect implementation through perfect information mechanisms in economic environments. We assume that worst bundles exist for each agent and can be assigned to them independently of the bundle assigned to at least one other agent. We restrict our attention to allocation rules that are anonymous, efficient on their own range, single-valued in welfare, and that induce agents' participation. We define a class of mechanisms, which satisfy properties of minimal path length and finiteness of message dimensions. We characterize the class of allocation rules which can be implemented through those mechanisms.I would like to thank Bhaskar Dutta, Louis Gevers, Matthew Jackson, Ozgur Kibris, Hervé Moulin and Arunava Sen for stimulating discussions, seminar participants at Université de Montréal (the Axiomatic Theory of Resource Allocation meeting, May 1996), Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, Universitad Carlos III de Madrid and Université de Paris Dauphine for their comments, and Frédéric Gaspart, Tarik Kara, James Schummer, William Thomson and an anonymous referee for extremely useful comments and suggestions on earlier versions.