Restaurant Revenue Management at Chevys: Determining the Best Table Mix

Revenue management has been used in a variety of industries and generally takes the form of managing demand by manipulating length of customer usage and price. Supply mix is rarely considered, although it can have considerable impact on revenue. In this research, we focused on developing an optimal supply mix, specifically on determining the supply mix that would maximize revenue. We used data from a Chevys restaurant, part of a large chain of Mexican restaurants, in conjunction with a simulation model to evaluate and enumerate all possible supply (table) mixes. Compared to the restaurant's existing table mix, the optimal mix is capable of handling a 30% increase in customer volume without increasing waiting times beyond their original levels. While our study was in a restaurant context, the results of this research are applicable to other service businesses.     

Country-specific institutional effects on ownership: concentration and performance of continental European firms

This paper examines the effect of country-specific institutional constructs on the relationship between ownership concentration and performance for firms in the eight Continental European countries of Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal. Using data from publicly-traded firms owned by other companies (i.e., blocks), measures of the quality of investor and creditor protection and the effectiveness of legal institutions are applied. Employing a hierarchical moderated multiple regression analysis, differential validity is established for the relationship between ownership concentration and performance as measured by return on shareholders’ funds. This differential effect comes from creditor protection regimes and is consistent with a relational corporate governance model based on debt finance and concentrated ownership.     

When do Public Managers Imitate Each Other? Mimetic Decision Making in Contracting Decisions of Danish Municipalities

Using organizational new institutional theory, this paper explores a core mechanism underlying contracting decisions in public organizations. A central proposition of this branch of institutional theory is that uncertainty leads to organizational isomorphism. The present study investigates this proposition by asking: When does perceived uncertainty lead public managers to imitative behavior in contracting out decisions? Contrary to most previous studies, we apply an individual level approach and relate different types of perceived uncertainty of decision makers to mimetic decision making. We define mimetic decision making as when decision makers deliberately obtain information about other organizations in order to possibly imitate them. In a survey of Danish municipal managers facing important and complex contracting decisions, we test our hypotheses about three types of perceived uncertainty and mimetic decision making. The results show that technological uncertainty is strongly related to mimetic decision making among public managers. However, we do not find significant results for either volume uncertainty or performance uncertainty. The paper illustrates how uncertainty, through mimetic decision making, is connected to organizational isomorphism. It further highlights that future studies should pay attention to the multidimensionality of uncertainty and its consequences.     

Effects of repeated multi-source feedback on the influence behavior and effectiveness of managers: A field experiment

Despite the widespread use of multi-source behavioral feedback as a method of leadership development, little research has been conducted to identify facilitating conditions that can make the feedback more effective. This article reports results from a longitudinal field experiment on the effects of providing feedback about influence behavior to middle managers in the corporate office of a supermarket chain. Managers who only attended a single feedback workshop were compared to managers who attended a second feedback workshop several months after the initial one. A significant increase in the use of “core” influence tactics with subordinates and peers was found only for the managers who received repeated feedback, and they were also rated higher in overall effectiveness by their bosses. Practical implications for leadership development and suggestions for future research are discussed.     

Binary Response Models for Panel Data: Identification and Information

This paper considers a panel data model for predicting a binary outcome. The conditional probability of a positive response is obtained by evaluating a given distribution function (F) at a linear combination of the predictor variables. One of the predictor variables is unobserved. It is a random effect that varies across individuals but is constant over time. The semiparametric aspect is that the conditional distribution of the random effect, given the predictor variables, is unrestricted. This paper has two results. If the support of the observed predictor variables is bounded, then identification is possible only in the logistic case. Even if the support is unbounded, so that (from Manski (1987)) identification holds quite generally, the information bound is zero unless F is logistic. Hence consistent estimation at the standard pn rate is possible only in the logistic case.     

The Association of Knowledge with Concern About Global Warming: Trusted Information Sources Shape Public Thinking

During the last decade, a great deal of news media attention has focused on informing the American public about scientific findings on global warming (GW). Has learning this sort of information led the American public to become more concerned about GW? Using data from two surveys of nationally representative samples of American adults, this article shows that the relation between self‐reported knowledge and concern about GW is more complex than what previous research has suggested. Among people who trust scientists to provide reliable information about the environment and among Democrats and Independents, increased knowledge has been associated with increased concern. But among people who are skeptical about scientists and among Republicans more knowledge was generally not associated with greater concern. The association of knowledge with concern among Democrats and Independents who trust scientists was mediated by perceptions of consensus among scientists about GW's existence and by perceptions that humans are a principal cause of GW. Moreover, additional analyses of panel survey data produced findings consistent with the notion that more knowledge yields more concern among Democrats and Independents, but not among Republicans. Thus, when studying the relation of knowledge and concern, it is important to take into account the content of the information that different types of people acquire and choose to rely upon.     

Decision Theory Applied to a Linear Panel Data Model

This paper applies some general concepts in decision theory to a linear panel data model. A simple version of the model is an autoregression with a separate intercept for each unit in the cross section, with errors that are independent and identically distributed with a normal distribution. There is a parameter of interest γ and a nuisance parameter τ, a N×K matrix, where N is the cross‐section sample size. The focus is on dealing with the incidental parameters problem created by a potentially high‐dimension nuisance parameter. We adopt a “fixed‐effects” approach that seeks to protect against any sequence of incidental parameters. We transform τ to (δ, ρ, ω), where δ is a J×K matrix of coefficients from the least‐squares projection of τ on a N×J matrix x of strictly exogenous variables, ρ is a K×K symmetric, positive semidefinite matrix obtained from the residual sums of squares and cross‐products in the projection of τ on x, and ω is a (N−J) ×K matrix whose columns are orthogonal and have unit length. The model is invariant under the actions of a group on the sample space and the parameter space, and we find a maximal invariant statistic. The distribution of the maximal invariant statistic does not depend upon ω. There is a unique invariant distribution for ω. We use this invariant distribution as a prior distribution to obtain an integrated likelihood function. It depends upon the observation only through the maximal invariant statistic. We use the maximal invariant statistic to construct a marginal likelihood function, so we can eliminate ω by integration with respect to the invariant prior distribution or by working with the marginal likelihood function. The two approaches coincide. Decision rules based on the invariant distribution for ω have a minimax property. Given a loss function that does not depend upon ω and given a prior distribution for (γ, δ, ρ), we show how to minimize the average—with respect to the prior distribution for (γ, δ, ρ)—of the maximum risk, where the maximum is with respect to ω. There is a family of prior distributions for (δ, ρ) that leads to a simple closed form for the integrated likelihood function. This integrated likelihood function coincides with the likelihood function for a normal, correlated random‐effects model. Under random sampling, the corresponding quasi maximum likelihood estimator is consistent for γ as N→∞, with a standard limiting distribution. The limit results do not require normality or homoskedasticity (conditional on x) assumptions.     

Incentives to Exercise

Can incentives be effective in encouraging the development of good habits? We investigate the post‐intervention effects of paying people to attend a gym a number of times during one month. In two studies we find marked attendance increases after the intervention relative to attendance changes for the respective control groups. This is entirely driven by people who did not previously attend the gym on a regular basis. In our second study, we find improvements on health indicators such as weight, waist size, and pulse rate, suggesting the intervention led to a net increase in total physical activity rather than to a substitution away from nonincentivized ones. We argue that there is scope for financial intervention in habit formation, particularly in the area of health.     

Decision Theory Applied to an Instrumental Variables Model

This paper applies some general concepts in decision theory to a simple instrumental variables model. There are two endogenous variables linked by a single structural equation; k of the exogenous variables are excluded from this structural equation and provide the instrumental variables (IV). The reduced‐form distribution of the endogenous variables conditional on the exogenous variables corresponds to independent draws from a bivariate normal distribution with linear regression functions and a known covariance matrix. A canonical form of the model has parameter vector (ρ, φ, ω), where φis the parameter of interest and is normalized to be a point on the unit circle. The reduced‐form coefficients on the instrumental variables are split into a scalar parameter ρand a parameter vector ω, which is normalized to be a point on the (k−1)‐dimensional unit sphere; ρmeasures the strength of the association between the endogenous variables and the instrumental variables, and ωis a measure of direction. A prior distribution is introduced for the IV model. The parameters φ, ρ, and ωare treated as independent random variables. The distribution for φis uniform on the unit circle; the distribution for ωis uniform on the unit sphere with dimension k‐1. These choices arise from the solution of a minimax problem. The prior for ρis left general. It turns out that given any positive value for ρ, the Bayes estimator of φdoes not depend on ρ; it equals the maximum‐likelihood estimator. This Bayes estimator has constant risk; because it minimizes average risk with respect to a proper prior, it is minimax. The same general concepts are applied to obtain confidence intervals. The prior distribution is used in two ways. The first way is to integrate out the nuisance parameter ωin the IV model. This gives an integrated likelihood function with two scalar parameters, φand ρ. Inverting a likelihood ratio test, based on the integrated likelihood function, provides a confidence interval for φ. This lacks finite sample optimality, but invariance arguments show that the risk function depends only on ρand not on φor ω. The second approach to confidence sets aims for finite sample optimality by setting up a loss function that trades off coverage against the length of the interval. The automatic uniform priors are used for φand ω, but a prior is also needed for the scalar ρ, and no guidance is offered on this choice. The Bayes rule is a highest posterior density set. Invariance arguments show that the risk function depends only on ρand not on φor ω. The optimality result combines average risk and maximum risk. The confidence set minimizes the average—with respect to the prior distribution for ρ—of the maximum risk, where the maximization is with respect to φand ω.     

Experimental Games on Networks: Underpinnings of Behavior and Equilibrium Selection

In this paper, we describe a series of laboratory experiments that implement specific examples of a general network structure. Specifically, actions are either strategic substitutes or strategic complements, and participants have either complete or incomplete information about the structure of a random network. Since economic environments typically have a considerable degree of complementarity or substitutability, this framework applies to a wide variety of settings. We examine behavior and equilibrium selection. The degree of equilibrium play is striking, in particular with incomplete information. Behavior closely resembles the theoretical equilibrium whenever this is unique; when there are multiple equilibria, general features of networks, such as connectivity, clustering, and the degree of the players, help to predict informed behavior in the lab. People appear to be strongly attracted to maximizing aggregate payoffs (social efficiency), but there are forces that moderate this attraction: (1) people seem content with (in the aggregate) capturing only the lion's share of the efficient profits in exchange for reduced exposure to loss, and (2) uncertainty about the network structure makes it considerably more difficult to coordinate on a demanding, but efficient, equilibrium that is typically implemented with complete information.