Experts in experiments

An ever increasing number of experiments attempts to elicit risk preferences of a population of interest with the aim of calibrating parameters used in economic models. We are concerned with two types of selection effects, which may affect the external validity of standard experiments: Sampling from a narrowly defined population of students (??experimenter-induced selection??) and self-selection due to non-response or incomplete response of participants in a random sample from a broad population. We find that both types of selection lead to a sample of experts: Participants perform significantly better than the general population, in the sense of fewer violations of revealed preference conditions. Self-selection within a broad population does not seem to matter for average preferences. In contrast, sampling from a student population leads to lower estimates of average risk aversion and loss aversion parameters. Furthermore, it dramatically reduces the amount of heterogeneity in all parameters.     

A WHITER SHADE OF PALE: ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATORY INSTRUMENTS

We consider an intertemporal policy game between changing governments that differ in their attitudes towards a particular feature of market outcomes, exemplified with environmental pollution. When in power, a government will choose policy instruments and set strictness of regulation with a view to influencing the policy of future, possibly different, governments. We demonstrate that a “brown” government favours emission quotas over effluent taxes, as quotas establish property rights that are costly to reverse. Conversely, a “green” government prefers to regulate by taxes, in order to limit the incentives of future brown governments to ease regulations. Strategic behaviour tends to exaggerate policy differences (making green governments greener and brown governments browner) compared to when such strategic considerations were not an issue. (JEL: D81, D9, H23, L51, Q28, Q38)     

The Distributive Impact of Reforms in Credit Enforcement: Evidence From Indian Debt Recovery Tribunals

It is generally presumed that stronger legal enforcement of lender rights increases credit access for all borrowers because it expands the set of incentive compatible loan contracts. This result relies on an assumption that the supply of credit is infinitely elastic. In contrast, with inelastic supply, stronger enforcement generates general equilibrium effects that may reduce credit access for small borrowers and expand it for wealthy borrowers. In a firm‐level panel, we find evidence that an Indian judicial reform that increased banks' ability to recover nonperforming loans had such an adverse distributive impact.     

Applying competing risks regression models: an overview

In many clinical research applications the time to occurrence of one event of interest, that may be obscured by another??so called competing??event, is investigated. Specific interventions can only have an effect on the endpoint they address or research questions might focus on risk factors for a certain outcome. Different approaches for the analysis of time-to-event data in the presence of competing risks were introduced in the last decades including some new methodologies, which are not yet frequently used in the analysis of competing risks data. Cause-specific hazard regression, subdistribution hazard regression, mixture models, vertical modelling and the analysis of time-to-event data based on pseudo-observations are described in this article and are applied to a dataset of a cohort study intended to establish risk stratification for cardiac death after myocardial infarction. Data analysts are encouraged to use the appropriate methods for their specific research questions by comparing different regression approaches in the competing risks setting regarding assumptions, methodology and interpretation of the results. Notes on application of the mentioned methods using the statistical software R are presented and extensions to the presented standard methods proposed in statistical literature are mentioned.     

Randomized response techniques for complex survey designs

Singh et al. ([13]) pointed out that the Randomized response (RR) technique proposed by Moors ([9]) is not desirable because it fails to protect the confidentiality of the respondents and they provided two alternative strategies free from the above drawback but limited to SRSWOR sampling only. In this paper, generalization of one of the strategies is provided for complex survey designs, wider class of estimators and for quantitative characteristics. Relative efficiency of the modified strategy is tested through empirical investigations. An erratum to this article is available at .     

Patterns of Conflict About Risky Technologies

This paper examines taxonomies for classifying risks and conflicts about risky technologies. First, we describe six levels of conflict that represent various " shades of gray" between purely factual and purely value laden conflicts in technology disputes. Subsequently, we survey several recent taxonomies of risks and hazards that were at least partly intended to clarify the nature of the public conflicts about technologies and their risks. After pointing out that non-risk features frequently shape technology debates, we develop a taxonomy of the disputes themselves, based on a collection of 162 cases. Our taxonomy of technological controversies is related to the recent risk taxonomies and to the different levels of conflict. It turns out that the different technological disputes create quite different levels of conflict ranging from mainly factual (consumer products, drugs) to extremely value laden (nuclear power, genetic engineering). Depending on the type of controversy and level of conflict we suggest alternative conflict management strategies.     

Norwegian lottery winners: Cautious realists

The study investigated 261 lottery winners of prizes of NKR 1 million (US $150,000) or more in the years 1987–91 in a postal survey. The modal Norwegian winners were middle-aged married men of modest education, living in small communities. Emotional reactions to winning were few, aside from moderate happiness and relief. Winners emphasized caution, emotional control and unconspicuous spending, e.g. paying debts and sharing with children. There was only a slight increase in economic spending. A wish for anonymity was frequent, together with fear of envy from others. Betting was modest both before and after winning. Experiences with winning were predominantly positive. Life quality was stable or had improved. An age trend was observed, accounting for more variance than any other variable. The older winners seemed to represent a puritan subculture of caution, modesty and emotional restraint. A slightly more impatient pattern of spending was characteristic of younger winners. The results support Kaplan's 1987 and others' findings that lottery winners are not gamblers, but self-controlled realists and that tenacious, negative cultural expectations to the contrary are myths, but perhaps also deterrents of uncontrolled behavior.     

Helge Pross-Preis 2007 der Universität Siegen an Cornelia Helfferich

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