Efficient Estimation of a Distribution Function under Quadrant Dependence

LetX₁,X₂, ..., be real-valued random variables forming a strictly stationary sequence, and satisfying the basic requirement of being either pairwise positively quadrant dependent or pairwise negatively quadrant dependent. LetF^ be the marginal distribution function of theX_ips, which is estimated by the empirical distribution functionF_n and also by a smooth kernel-type estimateF_n, by means of the segmentX₁, ...,X_n. These estimates are compared on the basis of their mean squared errors (MSE). The main results of this paper are the following. Under certain regularity conditions, the optimal bandwidth (in the MSE sense) is determined, and is found to be the same as that in the independent identically distributed case. It is also shown thatn MSE(F_n(t)) andnMSE (F^_n(t)) tend to the same constant, asn→∞ so that one can not discriminate be tween the two estimates on the basis of the MSE. Next, ifi(n) = min {k∈{1, 2, ...}; MSE (F_k(t)) ≤ MSE (F_n(t))}, then it is proved thati(n)/n tends to 1, asn→∞. Thus, once again, one can not choose one estimate over the other in terms of their asymptotic relative efficiency. If, however, the squared bias ofF^_n(t) tends to 0 sufficiently fast, or equivalently, the bandwidthh_n satisfies the requirement thatnh³_n→ 0, asn→∞, it is shown that, for a suitable choice of the kernel, (i(n) ?n)/(nh_n) tends to a positive number, asn→∞ It follows that the deficiency ofF_n(t) with respect toF^_n(t),i(n) ?n, is substantial, and, actually, tends to ∞, asn→∞. In terms of deficiency, the smooth estimateF^_n(t) is preferable to the empirical distribution functionF_n(t)     

The NTEE classification system: tests of reliability/validity in the field of higher education

An analysis of the field of higher education reveals a surprisingly large number of classification errors within the (US) National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities database. Of the nearly 4,000 non-profit entities coded within the universe of institutions of higher education, we estimate that approximately 60 per cent were incorrectly included (Type II errors). Institutions incorrectly excluded from the higher education universe (Type I errors) represent roughly 10 per cent of the institutions coded correctly. These errors result primarily from assigning codes on the basis of the names of organisations (for example, College Park Towers is classified as a college, when it is in fact a housing complex for senior citizens) and from trying too hard to assign codes in ambiguous situations. The consequences can be significant for the users of these data, and we recommend raising bright warning flags while simultaneously enlisting the help of the entire non-profit sector in improving the classification coding process.The authors are with The Andrew W. Mellon Foundation. In addition to our colleagues on the staff of the Foundation, we wish to thank Helmut Anheier, Ted Bozovich, Harvey Dale, Virginia Hodgkinson, Stephen Noga and Christopher Toppe for helpful suggestions.     

The relevance of the Chinese experience for third world economic development

Conclusion If the ten elements of Chinese development strategy discussed earlier are to provide object lessons relevant for other third world nations, they must be potentially transferable to other societies. The extent to which each element of the strategy is transferable depends on the conditions under which it can be successfully implemented, and on the degree to which these conditions are satisfied in other third world nations. I had also sought to determine what political-economic, geographical, and historical conditions are required for the successful implementation of each of the ten elements of strategy. The results of this analysis are summarized in the form of a matrix in Table 1. Each of the ten elements of strategy under discussion requires at least one - and often many more - of the major features of China's political-economic system. In all cases an effective and extensive system of public administration and/or a massoriented class structure are required, and in most cases a considerable degree of public ownership of the means of production and administrative control of resource allocation is either necessary or helpful. Less often required, but crucial in a few cases, are a central government with the power to mobilize resources on a large scale, a political leadership capable of influencing and involving people on a wide scale, and a ruraloriented class structure.Among the key geographic characteristics considered, large size is necessary or helpful for the successful implementation of two of the ten elements of strategy, but is disadvantageous in many cases because it is then more difficult for the political leadership to establish an effective system of public administration and to influence and involve people on a wide scale. An abundance of labor and scarcity of land is quite generally disadvantageous because it makes the achievement of rapid economic growth more difficult under any development strategy. But ethnological unity can be very helpful for the establishment of a strong state in all three respects I have distinguished.A cultural tradition oriented to cooperative work is quite helpful - if not strictly necessary - for three of the elements of strategy. A heritage of educational and administrative experience is helpful - but not absolutely essential - for all ten elements, since it improves the operation of those basic economic institutions and those characteristics of the state which have played an important role in the success of the Chinese development strategy. The less a society has been subject to foreign domination, the more its environment is likely to be conducive to the success of many elements of the Chinese strategy. And, finally, a profound social revolution would appear to be necessary in most instances for the development of three features of the Chinese political-economic system which as a group are indispensable for the success of all ten elements of the Chinese development strategy.These conclusions suggest that most of the elements of strategy described are currently applicable in only a few third world nations at best. Only a handful of nations have experienced a social revolution of any kind, and not all of these revolutions have been strongly rooted in the rural masses. Moreover, many of the revolutionary societies (e.g., Cuba, Mozambique, Vietnam) have a bitter history of Western imperialist domination to overcome, and most have only a limited heritage of educational and administrative experience to draw upon (e.g., the African nations). Some do not have a cultural tradition conducive to collective modes of operation (most notably Cuba), and many are ethnologically heterogeneous (e.g., Angola, Mozambique). Of all contemporary third world nations, North Korea would appear to come closest to meeting the historical, geographical, and political-economic conditions that have played a significant (and in many cases an essential) role in the success of the Chinese development strategy. But even in the case of North Korea the match is far from perfect in many respects.Do these observations imply that the Chinese experience is essentially unique and therefore largely irrelevant for the rest of the third world? I think not. First of all, the Chinese experience has set new and higher standards for the evaluation of development performance and policy throughout the world: it is no longer enough to promote rapid economic growth, but development planners can and will be held accountable for achieving a balanced pattern of development in which non-growth objectives such as greater equity and self-reliance are promoted along with faster growth.Second, certain elements of the Chinese development strategy do lend themselves to successful application - at least to a certain extent - in other societies which differ considerably from China in their political-economic, geographical, and historical conditions. For example, the promotion of mass-oriented human resource development could be carried out with some success in a nation with a reasonably strong state (in terms of its capacity for resource mobilization and public administration) and a political leadership somewhat oriented to the masses. A strategy of restriction of luxury consumption is potentially more widely transferable, for it requires mainly a mass-oriented political leadership and, up to a point, does not depend on an unusually effective state apparatus. Some degree of economic diversification of regions and localities, as well as some degree of amelioration of rural-urban imbalance, can be successfully accomplished provided that the political leadership is sufficiently rural-oriented and can rely upon an effective and extensive administrative system. In all these cases the necessary configuration of political-economic conditions is possible (if not very likely) in a society that has not undergone a profound social revolution and that operates within a predominantly capitalist institutional framework. More revolutionary change would be more conducive to success, but not absolutely essential for some progress to be made.Third, and more important, some of the key conditions required for the successful implementation of much of the Chinese development strategy can be realized in the future even if they do not obtain at present in most third world societies. Here it is important to distinguish between those aspects of the setting of any given society which are virtually immutable and those aspects which are amenable to change under appropriate historical circumstances. The key geographical characteristics that I have discussed clearly involve stable features of a society's environment; nothing short of massive territorial annexation, massive migration, or genocide could alter the size, the resource endowment, or the ethnological structure of contemporary third world nations. The historical characteristics I have cited vary considerably in their susceptibility to change. Cultural traditions built up over centuries (and in some cases millenia) cannot be transformed within a generation. The amount of time it takes to overcome the effects of Western imperialism depends of course on the force and the longevity of its imposition, but in many areas at least a generation might be needed. And a substantial degree of educational and administrative experience can only be built up with several decades of concerted effort. The possibility of significant change in any of these three historical characteristics hinges on some kind of decisive break with the past which ushers in new political leadership determined to bring about large-scale change. Such a decisive break need not involve a revolutionary redistribution of power from dominating to oppressed classes, but it does require at least the accession to power of strongly nationalist forces determined to modernize their country (i.e., to increase its resemblance to the powerful industrialized nations of the modern world). Social revolution is the most fundamental historical characteristic of all, for it underlies the establishment of many of the key features of China's political-economic system and (not incidentally) also creates a context in which the needed changes in the other three historical characteristics become more readily achievable. Profound social revolutions, in which formerly oppressed classes do succeed in wresting power from formerly privileged classes, are not made overnight, but they can be brought about after a period of revolutionary organization and struggle. If the revolutionary movement is to be truly rooted in the masses (and the rural masses in particular), and if it is to succeed in a contemporary international context in which privileged classes in third world nations can often count on support from major foreign powers, it is bound to take a great deal of time and effort. But the point I am making here is that it has been done in some countries in the past, and there is every likelihood that it will eventually be done in some other countries in the future.At present it would be foolhardy to attempt to predict where Chinese-style revolutions might succeed in generating historical and political-economic conditions approximating those which have contributed to the success of the Chinese strategy of development. But there are many third world nations with one or more relevant geographic and historical characteristics already similar to China's. For example, India, Indonesia, and Brazil share China's large size, some of the Latin American nations are ethnologically quite homogeneous, many East and Southeast Asian nations have cultural traditions resembling those of the Chinese, the people of India and some of the other semi-industrialized nations of the third world have already acquired a substantial degree of educational and administrative skills, and nations such as Tanzania, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan were not thoroughly restructured by foreign powers. Profound social revolutions in any of these nations - however distant the prospect may now appear- would go a long way toward establishing the conditions under which many of the lessons from the Chinese strategy of development could indeed be successfully applied. As for the immediate future, there is little likelihood that the Chinese experience will be of much relevance to development planning in the rest of the third world. For the great majority of third world nations are still dominated by propertied or otherwise privileged elites, and, as one observer has put it, revolution is precisely the fate which [they] are striving to avert through their development.

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The VFW — A case study in the “iron law of oligarchy” and goal displacement

The iron law of oligarchy is applied to the VFW. Using participant observation and qualitative interviews, membership of the VFW is dichotomized into a leadership oligarchy and a drinking membership. Opinions of members of the two groups about the purposes of the organization and about each other are documented. An historical analysis traces the change in organizational goals over time from promoting nationalism, fraternalism, and special benefits for members to political advocacy of veterans' rights.     

Fertility differences between the family of orientation and the family or procreation in Barbados

Data from an island-wide probability sample of 4119 Barbadian females aged 16-50 were used to study whether there has been an intergenerational fertility decline between the respondents and their mothers. The fertility of the respondents, all from the low or lower middle class, was significantly lower than that of their mothers. However, the size of the family of procreation was seen to be positively related to the size of the family of orientation; i.e., those from large families tended to have large families and vice versa. There was, however, a regression to the mean. There were no differences between women from small and large families as to fertility norms, age at 1st use of contraceptives, or actual practice of contraception. Women from small families did tend to enter sexual relationships and get pregnant at a later age. The women from small families were better educated, earned higher incomes, and had higher status occupations, all factors which might have influenced their fertility. Women from larger families cited higher numbers for both small and large families than did the women from small families. This indicates a perceptual difference which was, in turn, related to fertility differences.     

Priority Setting for the Distribution of Localized Hazard Protection

We address the problem of distributing safety-enhancing devices across a region, where each identical device provides for only local protection of the population. The devices protect nonidentical sectors of the population. The sectors of population are exposed to nonidentical intensities of hazard. A method for the screening and prioritizing of needs for the protective devices is described. An approach of risk-benefit-cost analysis under uncertainty is recommended as follows. Measures of hazard intensity and population exposure are identified. Exogenous parameters that influence assessments of risks, benefits, and costs are identified. Uncertainties of the exogenous parameters are propagated by interval analysis. Several tiers of the plausibility of need for protection are identified. The tiers are useful in setting priorities for the distribution of the safety devices. The method is demonstrated in an engineering application to roadway lighting, but has implications for disaster preparedness, anti-terrorism, transportation safety, and other arenas of public safety.     

Culture, Cosmopolitanism, and Risk Management

Most cultural approaches to risk management deal with the connections between the forms of social relations within groups and the risk concerns of those groups. According to these theories, a certain limited set of different relational forms (usually three, four, or five) lead to specific, different and conflicting, risk concerns. In contrast to these theories, cosmopolitanism is an approach to culture that focuses, not on forms of sociality, but on changes among forms—expansions and contractions in the inclusivity of forms and movement by persons from one form of sociality to another. Relative to other cultural theories, cosmopolitanism thus is much more concerned with the solution of risk management problems than with their origins. Cosmopolitanism can be thought of as a cultural continuum, with cosmopolitanism at one end and pluralism at the other. Cosmopolitan persons are more open to cultural change—and thus the solution of risk management problems. In this article, we outline our new theory of cosmopolitanism, describe a method for measuring it and present an experimental study that tests some implications of the theory. Results from the study support the theory by showing that, compared to pluralistic respondents, cosmopolitan respondents are more inclusive in their risk management judgments—that is, they express equal concern for a local and a national issue, whereas the pluralistic respondents express greater concern in the local case. We discuss the risk management implications of a cosmopolitan approach to culture.