Ideas versus ideology: The origins of modern labor economics

Starting with its early twentieth century origins, the development of Labor Economics is traced to the present. We describe an intellectual revolution in which an earlier tra-dition that focused primarily on the institution of the labor union has been replaced by a perspective that emphasizes the various roles played by labor markets in an eco-nomic system. That earlier tradition contained very significant ideological elements, whereas its successor deals much more with the world of ideas. In the course of the debate, which still continues, ideas triumphed over ideology and created modern Labor Economics.     

Flipping and ex post aggregation

We show that Bayesian ex post aggregation is unstable with respect to refinements. Suppose a group of Bayesians use ex post aggregation. Since it is a joint problem, each agent's problem is captured by the same model, but probabilities and utilities may vary. If they analyze the same situation in more detail, their refined analysis should preserve their preferences among acts. However, ex post aggregation could bring about a preference reversal on the group level. Ex post aggregation thus depends on how much information is used and may keep oscillating (“flipping”) as one keeps adding more information. Received: 16 April 2002/Accepted: 27 May 2002     

On strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores: A converse result

In a general model of indivisible good allocation, S?nmez (1999) established that, whenever the core is nonempty for each preference profile, if an allocation rule is strategy-proof, individually rational and Pareto optimal, then the rule is a selection from the core correspondence, and the core correspondence must be essentially single-valued. This paper studies the converse claim of this result. I demonstrate that whenever the preference domain satisfies a certain condition of `richness', if the core correspondence is essentially single-valued, then any selection from the core correspondence is strategy-proof (even weakly coalition strategy-proof, in fact). In particular, on the domain of preferences in which each individual has strict preferences over his own assignments and there is no consumption externality, such an allocation rule is coalition strategy-proof. And on this domain, coalition strategy-proofness is equivalent to Maskin monotonicity, an important property in implementation theory. Received: 22 February 2000/Accepted: 22 January 2002 I am grateful to Ryo-ichi Nagahisa, Shinji Ohseto, Hiroshi Ono, Tomoichi Shinotsuka and Shigehiro Serizawa for valuable comments. And I am indebted to two anonymous referees for useful suggestions. Especially, I owe the present proof of Lemma 2 to one referee. I also thank Yukihiko Funaki, Atsushi Kajii, Mamoru Kaneko, Eiichi Miyagawa, Tatsuyoshi Saijo, Manimay Sengupta, Yves Sprumont, Yoshikatsu Tatamitani, Manabu Toda, Takashi Ui, Takehiko Yamato, Naoki Yoshihara and the participants of the seminars in Hokkaido University, Kansai University, ISER (Osaka University), Otaru University of Commerce and Tsukuba University. All errors are my own responsiblity.     

THE EFFICACY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF MARITAL AND FAMILY THERAPY: A PERSPECTIVE FROM META-ANALYSIS

This article reviews the major findings from a multiproject meta-analysis of the effects of marital and family therapy (MFT). Across 163 randomized trials, MFT demonstrates moderate, statistically significant, and often clinically significant effects. No orientation is yet demonstrably superior to any other, nor is MFT superior to individual therapy. Cost effectiveness information is scant in these 163 studies, but supportive. Randomized experiments yield very different answers from nonrandomized experimental studies of the effects of MFT, calling into question whether we should mix the two in reviews. We have also found several new differences in the ways that marital therapy (MT) and family therapy (FT) studies are conducted, making them harder to compare. Finally, important questions still exist about whether any psychotherapy, including MFT, yet has sufficient information about how well research generalizes to everyday clinical practice.     

Estimating the Rayleigh distribution scale parameter from doubly censored samples—Some comments

In a recent paper in this journal, Lee, Kapadia and Brock (1980) developed maximum likelihood (ML) methods for estimating the scale parameter of the Rayleigh distribution from doubly censored samples. They reported convergence difficulties in attempting to solve numerically the nonlinear likelihood equation (LE). To mitigate these difficulties, they employed approximations to simplify the LE, but found that the solution of the resulting simplified equation can give rise to parameter estimates of erratic accuracy. We show that the use of approximations to simplify the LE is unnecessary. In fact, under suitable parametric transformation, the log-likelihood function is strictly concave, the ML estimate always exists, is unique and finite. Furthermore, the LE is easy to solve numerically. A numerical example is given to illustrate the computations involved.     

Construction and selection of tightened-normal-tightened sampling inspection scheme of type TNT-(n1, n2; c)

A table is presented for the construction and selection of tightened-normal-tightened sampling scheme of type TNT-(n1, n2;c). Efficiency of TNT-(n1, n2;c) scheme over conventional single and double sampling plans is discussed.     

A simultaneous-equations model of the relationship between public sector bargaining legislation and unionization

This paper estimates a simultaneous-equations model with public sector bargaining laws and union membership treated as jointly-determined variables. The extent of public sector unionization has a significant positive influence on the passage of prolabor bargaining legislation and bargaining legislation has strong, independent effects on the extent of public sector unionization. We gratefully acknowledge the research support provided by Minbo Kim and Parisun Chantonahom.