Strategic risk in supply chain contract design

Supply chains facing asymmetric information can either operate in a cooperative mode with information and benefit sharing or can choose a non-cooperative form of interaction and align their incentives via screening contracts. In the cooperative mode, supply chain efficiency can be achieved, but high levels of trust and trustworthiness are required. In the non-cooperative mode, the contract mechanism guarantees a second best supply chain performance, but only if all parties choose their equilibrium strategies without trembles. Experimental evidence, however, shows that both operating modes often fail due to strategic risk. Cooperation is disrupted by deceptive signals and the lack of trust, whereas non-cooperative strategies suffer from persistent out-of-equilibrium behavior. We present two means to reduce strategic risk. First, a punishment mechanism leads to a better matching of trust and trustworthiness and supports the cooperative operating mode. Second, an enforcement of self-selection supports the non-cooperative equilibrium by increasing the attractiveness of screening contracts. We find that supply chain performance can benefit from reduced strategic risk in either operating mode.     

Just-in-time purchasing: an empirical study of operational practices, supplier development and performance

This paper examines the role of supplier development in establishing and managing efficient buyer–supplier operational links. The paper develops and assesses a measurement instrument for “operational” and “supplier development” just-in-time purchasing practices, followed by an examination of the relationships between the two sets, and an investigation into whether the use of “operational” and “supplier development” practices has a bearing on higher plant performance. A plant-level survey was carried out on a sample of electronics and machinery plants. The study empirically:

• documents the close connection between the buyer–supplier operational link and the buyer’s practices for supplier development;

• demonstrates that recourse to supplier development programs and their nature depend on the kind of vendor–vendee operational connection;

• test whether different plant performance outcomes result from the implementing of different “operational” and “supplier development” practices. It demonstrates that better-performing plants exhibit more advanced design and logistic links with sources, more formalised vendor-rating and ranking procedures, greater use of organisational devices for supplier-organisational integration and place greater importance on supplier assistance and training.

A psychometric evaluation of a Dutch version of the Job Content Questionnaire and of a short direct questioning procedure

Using the demand-control-support perspective on job stress, a Dutch translation of an adapted version of the Job Content Questionnaire (AJCQ) was administered to a large population ( N = 3638) of Flemish workers in a variety of jobs, together with the General Health Questionnaire, and a negative affectivity scale. Overall, the AJCQ was shown to be a solid measurement instrument as indicated by several estimated reliability indices and validity of the subscales. A factor analysis largely reproduced the a priori structure of the AJCQ. A short 10-item direct questioning procedure was constructed to measure the 10 subscales of the AJCQ and the results of this procedure were compared with the AJCQ in a subsample ( N = 660). The correlations with six criterion variables showed that single questions were equally predictive than the much longer version of the AJCQ.     

Overeducated Workers as an Insurance Device

Empirical findings show that firms frequently employ overeducated workers. Since overeducated workers earn more than adequately educated ones working in similar jobs these findings seem to be puzzling. In this paper, we introduce an insurance approach to explain the employment of overeducated workers. Referring to this approach, overeducated workers are employed by a firm to avoid high losses in the case of a crisis (e.g. when the production process breaks down). Contrary to adequately educated workers, overeducated ones may be helpful in this situation by quickly offering improvisatorial solutions. First, we use a simple model to demonstrate the insurance argument. Second, we test the major implication of the model empirically by using industry panel data: if and only if high‐skilled workers are employed for insurance purposes, the average wage of high‐skilled workers in firms that need insurance will be lower compared with firms that do not need insurance. The data confirm this theoretical result.     

On the measurement of socioeconomic inequality of health between countries

This paper focuses on the measurement of socioeconomic inequality of health between countries and its evolution over time, by means of population-weighted indicators. We show that rank-dependent indicators of inequality can be highly sensitive to small changes in the socioeconomic variable when estimating inequality in samples consisting of countries with large differences in population weights. Since larger countries count more than smaller countries, changes in the former tend to have bigger effects than changes in the latter. When using rank-dependent indicators, however, the sensitivity to small changes in the variable which is used for ranking can be so extreme, that the indicator may suggest trend reversals in inequality which do not really exist. An empirical study shows that this is not a freak case. The use of rank-dependent indicators may therefore produce misleading results when it comes to the measurement of population-weighted between-country inequality. We propose a simple diagnostic test to check how sensitive rank-dependent indices are to small changes in the variable used for ranking.     

LIMITED ASSET MARKET PARTICIPATION,STICKY WAGES,AND MONETARY POLICY

A small amount of nominal wage stickiness makes limited asset market participation (LAMP) irrelevant for the design of monetary policy. Recent research argues that LAMP could invert the slope of the IS curve in otherwise standard New Keynesian models. This, in turn, implies that optimal monetary policy rules should be passive. We show that the so‐called inverted aggregate demand logic (IADL) relies on nominal wage flexibility. Outside of extreme parameterizations, wage stickiness prevents the inversion of the slope of the IS curve. Hence, LAMP does not generally alter the trade‐offs faced by a welfare maximizing Central Bank, and for this reason it does not fundamentally affect the design of optimal simple rules and optimal monetary policy. (JEL E21, E52)     

Endogenous fertility and human capital in a Schumpeterian growth model

This study develops a scale-invariant Schumpeterian growth model with endogenous fertility and human capital accumulation. The model features two engines of long-run economic growth: R&D-based innovation and human capital accumulation. One novelty of this study is endogenous fertility, which negatively affects the growth rate of human capital. Given this growth-theoretic framework, we characterize the dynamics of the model and derive comparative statics of the equilibrium growth rates with respect to structural parameters. As for policy implications, we analyze how patent policy affects economic growth through technological progress, human capital accumulation, and endogenous fertility. In summary, we find that strengthening patent protection has (a) a positive effect on technological progress, (b) a negative effect on human capital accumulation through a higher rate of fertility, and (c) an ambiguous overall effect on economic growth.